

A DIGEST, *578. P 9* *10 Md*  
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OR,

AN ENTIRE NEW AND COMPLEAT BODY OF THE  
LAW CONCERNING THE POOR,

FROM THE

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME,

ARRANGED UNDER PROPER HEADS;

COMPRIZING

A GREAT NUMBER OF REPORTED CASES NOT TO BE FOUND  
IN ANY ONE WORK OF THIS KIND,

TOGETHER WITH

MANY OTHER DETERMINED CASES NEVER BEFORE PRINTED;

TAKEN FROM THE NOTES OF

*HENRY DEALTRY*, Esq.

CLERK OF THE RULES IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH.

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BY *D. PRICHARD*, GENT. *K*

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TO WHICH WILL BE ADDED,

*A C O P I O U S I N D E X*,  
AND A TABLE OF THE CASES.

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L O N D O N :

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M.DCC.XCI.

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A DIGEST

OF

AN ACT FOR THE REFORMATION OF THE

LAW CONCERNING THE POOR

IN THE

HANDBOOK RELIED TO THE REVENUE

AND THE REVENUE

OF THE

A CERTAIN NUMBER OF REVISED CASES NOT TO BE

IN ANY ONE WORK OF THE KIND

AND

MANY OTHER CASES CONCERNING THE REVENUE

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TO THE HONOURABLE  
GEORGE HARDINGE,  
CHIEF-JUSTICE  
OF THE  
COUNTIES OF GLAMORGAN, BRECON, AND RADNOR.

SIR,

THOUGH DEDICATIONS seem out of *common* Use, yet it readily occurred to me, that, before a Work of mine should be sent forth into the World, it would require a better Sanction than that of a Name so obscure as my own.

Your Contribution to this Work, as well as the Situation you hold in *our* SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE, soon pointed out the Person to whom I could most properly inscribe it; I asked your Permission—you granted it—and I am encouraged by the Hope, that my Attempts to make the LAW RELATIVE TO THE POOR better understood, may be found, as far as they extend, useful to that Part of our Police.

The Ambition of being called an AUTHOR formed no Part of my Inducement to publish: in our County, as in many others, Attornies practise in the Quarter-Sessions as Advocates: for my own Instruction, therefore, in the Course of such Practice there, I arranged the following Work.—I found it *myself* of much Use; and the Expectation of making it useful to others, was *one* Reason that induced me to publish it; and when, as *another*, I give the Hope of *some* Benefit from Labours undertaken in the Course of that Profession to which I am bred, I trust I shall neither be thought presumptuous nor unreasonable.

With Respect and Gratitude,

I subscribe myself,

SIR,

Your most obliged humble Servant,

Cardiff, May 5, 1791.

D. PRICHARD.



## TO THE PUBLIC.

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LORD MANSFIELD has frequently declared, from the Bench, "That it is a melancholy Consideration, that so many Questions arise on Settlement Cases." A Consideration *certainly* the more to be lamented, as it is known that all the Attempts hitherto made, though brought forward by great Characters, have been found inadequate to the Amendment of the present System of Law concerning the Poor.

It can hardly be doubted but that many of these Questions, in the *inferior Courts*, must have been chiefly occasioned by the want of Opportunities of being better acquainted with the Constructions put upon these Laws, by the Determinations of *superior Courts*: but as this End is attainable in no other Way than by consulting such Determinations, which are, for the most part, blended with other Cases, in voluminous Books of Reports, at least *expensive*, it not *unnecessary*, in the Libraries of any others than Professional-Men—a Selection of such only as, together with the Statutes which more immediately concern this Subject, into one Book, appeared to me to be the most likely Way of overcoming this Inconvenience; especially when these Statutes, and the several Decisions pronounced upon them, are (*as in the following Work*) arranged under proper Heads, so as to be seen at one View.

THE Decisions of late Years are certainly rendered peculiarly interesting, by the Pains the JUDGES in *Westminster Hall* have taken (*very much to the Public Advantage*) to lessen the Number of these Questions, in establishing for this Purpose, certain Rules or Principles of Construction, so plain, simple, and clear, as need only to be consulted to be understood.

I FEEL happy in this Opportunity of making my public Acknowledgements to HENRY DEALTRY, ESQ. *Clerk of the Rules in the Court of King's Bench*; for the very polite and friendly Manner in which he gave me the full Use of his Notes; which Circumstance alone enabled me to offer the Public the *Manuscript Cases* contained in the following Work: and which, for my *own Credit*, I have transcribed with the utmost possible Care; as any Inaccuracies will certainly be rather imputable to *me*, than to *him*, whose Abilities and Accuracy are too well known to suffer from any Want of either which may appear in my Report of them.

As I have spared neither Labour nor Attention in my Endeavours to make the following Work as *generally* useful as *my* Abilities would enable me—I presume to hope, that it will be found much more comprehensive and faithful than any one Work hitherto published on the Subject; yet I offer it to the Public Eye with all possible Diffidence, and under the fullest Conviction of a Want of those Talents necessary to *secure* Encouragement; flattering myself only with the further Hope, that, from a generous and indulgent Public, I shall find that Countenance ever shewn to those who *sincerely* endeavour to serve them.



P. O. R. (OVERSEERS.)

A NEW AND COMPLEAT BODY

OF

THE LAW

CONCERNING THE

P O O R,

ARRANGED UNDER PROPER HEADS;

COMPRIZING A GREAT NUMBER OF REPORTED CASES NOT TO BE FOUND

IN ANY ONE WORK OF THIS KIND,

TOGETHER WITH MANY OTHERS NEVER YET PRINTED.

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P O O R. (OVERSEERS.)

DOCTOR BURN, whose Arrangement has been chiefly adopted in the following Work, as well on account of its superior Accuracy to any other on this Subject, as of the more general Acquaintance almost every Description of Persons are supposed to have therewith; from the universal Esteem in which his JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER has been so long held, gives the following Historical Account of this Office.

*Of their APPOINTMENT and DUTY thereupon.*

“ A NCIENTLY the Maintenance of the Poor, was chiefly an Ecclesiastical concern: A fourth Part of the Tithes in every Parish was set apart for that Purpose. The Minister, under the Bishop, had the principal Direction in the Disposal thereof, assisted by the Churchwardens and other principal Inhabitants; hence naturally became established the Parochial Settlement. Afterwards, when the Tithes of many of the Parishes became appropriated to the Monasteries, those Societies had some Share likewise (by reason of the said Tithes and other Donations for that Purpose) in the Relief of the Poor, and the rest was made up by voluntary Contributions.

A

“ By



## P O O R. (OVERSEERS.)

"By the Statute of the 27 Hen. VIII. c. 25. the Churchwardens or two other of every Parish, were to make Collections for the Poor, on Sundays. By the 5 and 6 Edw. VI. c. 2. the Minister and Churchwardens were annually to appoint two able Persons, or more, to be Gatherers and Collectors of Alms for the Poor. By the 5 Eliz. c. 3. the Parishioners were to choose the said Collectors and Gatherers for the Poor. By the 14 Eliz. c. 5. the Justices were to appoint Collectors for the Poor within every Parish; and were also to appoint the OVERSEER of the Poor, whose Office was nearly the same as it is at present, except only for collecting the Money, which was done by the aforesaid Gatherers or Collectors. By the 18 Eliz. c. 3. the Justices were to appoint Collectors and GOVERNORS of the Poor. By the 39 Eliz. c. 3. the Churchwardens of every Parish, and four substantial Household-ers there, being Subsidy Men, or for want of Subsidy Men, four other substantial Household-ers, to be nominated Yearly in Easter Week, by two Justices (1 Q.) were to be called OVERSEERS OF THE POOR of the same Parish."

And so it continues with some small Variation, by the Stat. 43 Eliz. c. 2. as followeth:

By the 43 Eliz. c. 2. s. 1. the Churchwardens of every Parish, and four, three, or two substantial Household-ers there, as shall be thought meet, having respect to the Greatness of the Parish, to be nominated Yearly, in Easter Week, or within one Month after Easter, under the Hand and Seal of two or more Justices of the Peace in the same County, whereof one to be of the Quorum, dwelling in or near the same Parish or Division, where the same Parish doth lie, shall be called OVERSEERS of the POOR of the same Parish.

### I<sup>st</sup>. THEIR APPOINTMENT.

Churchwardens were OVERSEERS OF THE POOR long before, as appears from the above Account, and confirmed such by this Statute; and, consequently, no formal Appointment of them to the Office of Overseer is necessary.

By the 13 and 14 Car. II. c. 12. Whereas the Inhabitants of Lancashire, Cheshire, Derbyshire, Yorkshire, Northumberland, the Bishoprick of Durham, Cumberland, and Westmorland, and many other Counties in England and Wales, by reason of the Largeness of the Parishes, cannot reap the Benefit of the said Act of the 43 Eliz. it is enacted, that all and every the poor, needy, impotent, and lame Persons, within every Township or Village within the several Counties aforesaid, shall be maintained, provided for, and set on Work, within the several and respective Township and Village, wherein he, she, or they, shall inhabit, or wherein he, she, or they, was or were last lawfully settled; and there shall be Yearly chosen and appointed, two or more OVERSEERS, within every of the said Townships or Villages respectively.

By the 17 Geo. II. c. 38, s. 15, In every Township or Place, where there are no Churchwardens, the Overseers alone may act, in all respects, as Churchwardens and Overseers may do in other Places, by virtue of this or any former Act.

And by sect. 3. of the same Act, if any Overseer shall die, or remove, or become insolvent, before the Expiration of his Office, two Justices (on Oath thereof made) may appoint another in his stead.

### PARISH, TOWNSHIP, OR VILLAGE.

Parish, what.

PARISH, is that circuit of Ground which is committed to the charge of one Parson or Vicar, or other Minister, having cure of Souls therein. How ancient the Division of Parishes is, may at present be difficult to ascertain; for it seems agreed, that in the early Ages of Christianity in this Island, Parishes were unknown, or at least signified the same that a Diocese now does.

About the Year 970.

It was ordered by the Law of King Edgar, c. 1. that "*dentur omnes decimæ Primariæ Ecclesiæ ad quam Parochia pertinet*;" which proves that the Kingdom was then universally divided into Parishes;

\* All Tithes should be paid to the Mother Church in that Parish to which it (the Church) belonged.

which



which Division happened probably not all at once, but by degrees. For it seems pretty clear and certain, that the Boundaries of *Parishes* were originally ascertained by those of a *Manor* or *Manors*, since it very seldom happens, that a *Manor* extends itself over more *Parishes* than one, though there are many *Manors* in one *Parish*.

The Lords, as Christianity spread itself, began to build *Churches* upon their own *Demefnes* or *Wastes*, to accommodate their Tenants in *one* or *two* adjoining Lordships; and, in order to have Divine Service regularly performed therein, obliged all their Tenants to appropriate their Tithes to the Maintenance of the *one* officiating Minister, instead of leaving them at Liberty to distribute them among the Clergy of the Diocese in general, and this *Tract of Land*, the Tithes whereof were so appropriated, formed a *distinct Parish*.

But some Lands, either because they were in the Hands of irreligious or careless Owners, or were situate in Forests or Desert Places, or were Parcels of Land detached from the main of their Estates, but not sufficient to form distinct *Parishes* of themselves; or for other, now unsearchable, Reasons, were never united to any *Parish*, and therefore continue to this Day, *Extra-Parochial*, Blackst. Com. Vol. I. 111. &c. And thus it appears, that *Parishes* were formerly considered as *Divisions* in reference to Ecclesiastical affairs only; insomuch, as a *Fine* was not admitted of Lands in a *PARISH*; but in process of Time a *PARISH* became considered as it now is, a *Division* known to the Law in all Civil Proceedings.

Extra-Parochial Places.

A *PARISH* may comprize many *Vills*, but generally it shall not be accounted to contain more than One, except the contrary be shewn, because most *Parishes* have but one *Vill* within them, Hil. 23 Car. I. B. R. and it shall not be intended that there is more than *one Parish* in a City, if not made to appear, for some Cities have but *one Parish*. *Ibid*.

*Parish* may comprize many *Vills*.

TOWN OR TOWNSHIP. There ought to be in every TOWN a *Constable* or *Tithing-man*; and it cannot be a *Town* unless it hath or had a *Church* with Celebration of Sacraments, &c. 1 Inst. 115. Under the Name of a *Town* or *Village*, Boroughs, and, it is said, Cities, are contained; for every *Borough* or *City* is a *Town*; and a *Township* is answerable for Felon's Goods to the King, which may be seized by them. 1 R. II. c. 3.

*Township, what.*

VILLAGE OR VILL, is sometimes taken for a *Manor*, and sometimes for a *Parish*, or part of it; but a *Vill* is most commonly the out-part of a *Parish*, consisting of a few Houses, as it were, separate from it. *Villa est pluribus Mansionibus, vicinata et collata ex pluribus vicinis*. 1 Inst. 115.

*Village, what.*

Fleta says, that the Difference between a *Mansion*, a *VILLAGE*, and a *Manor* is, a *Mansion* may be of one or more Houses, but it must be but one Dwelling Place, and none near it; for if other Houses are contiguous, it is a *VILLAGE*, and a *Manor* may consist of several *Villages*, or one alone. Lib. 6, c. 51. And according to Fortesc. de laud. leg. Angl. cap. 24. the boundaries of *Villages* are not by Houses or Streets, but by a Circuit of Ground, within which there may be Hamlets, Woods, and Waste-grounds, &c.

WINCHCOMB v. GODDARD, Trin. 43 Eliz. 1 Cro. 837, C. B. ERROR was assigned in this. That in the Replication, the Place where, &c. was alledged to be Forty Acres in HENWICK-PARSONAGE, in the Manor of Thackham in the Parish of Thackham. And the Issue was, whether the Plaintiff was Demurrant at Henwick-Parsonage. And the ven. fac. was awarded de Vicineto de Thackam; where it was alledged, that it ought to have been from Henwick-Parsonage, which is the Place known, and a Vill per se. But the Court held it well enough, for it shall be intended, that Henwick-Parsonage is a Place known, and the Vill of Thackham, and Parish of Thackham be all one in Intendment; as 39 H. VI. is for the Parsonage of Stoke. And if a Thing be alledged to be done at the Manor in a Vill, the Visne shall be from the Vill, which is the most notorious. Wherefore the Judgment was affirmed.

*Vill and Parish all one by Intendment.*



LORD SANDS  
v.  
PINDER.

Parish and Vill  
of Mottesfont  
both one by In-  
tendment, and  
then taken to be  
the Hamlet of  
Mottesfont; for  
though a Parish  
may contain ma-  
ny Vill, yet it  
shall not be so  
intended, unless  
shewn.

LORD SANDS v. PINDER, Trin. 44. Eliz. 1 Cro. 898. B. R. TRESPASS, *quare clausum*, &c. called Cadbury Grounds at Mottesfont. The Defendant pleaded, that before the time when, &c. he was, &c. seized, &c. of and in the Rectory and Parish Church of Mottesfont aforesaid, in Mottesfont aforesaid, and one MESSAGE, called the Parsonage, Parcel of the Rectory aforesaid, in right of his Church aforesaid. And that he and all his Predecessors, Rectors, &c. had right of Way from that House, over the said Place where, &c. to an Hamlet, called Lockerly, in the Parish of Mottesfont aforesaid. It was moved in Arrest of Judgment, that the Plea was not good. Because, first, it was not alledged in what Vill the said House was, whereto he claimed the Way; for it may be it was in another Vill, but not allowed. For the Parson shall be always intended to be Resident within his Parsonage: Wherefore it is intended, That the Parsonage-House is within the said Vill, where the Parish is alledged to be, (viz. in Mottesfont,) and secondly, for that the *ven. fac.* is only of Mottesfont, and not from Lockerly also. It was therefore alledged, that this was a Mifs-Trial. Wherefore, &c. But all the Court held, that forasmuch as Lockerly is mentioned as an Hamlet, in the Parish of Mottesfont, it shall be intended, that the Parish and Vill of Mottesfont be both one; and then it shall be taken to be the Hamlet of Mottesfont; for although a Parish may be extended to many Vill, yet it shall not be conceived to be so, unless it be shewn. And to that Purpose Gawdy cited Long, 5 Edw. IV. That where one is named of a Parish, it is a good Addition.

VALE v. FIELD, Eas. 12 Jac. 2 Cro. 340. Ejectment of a Lease of Robert Arden, made at Cardeworth, of Lands in the Parish of Cardeworth, aforesaid, the Defendant pleaded Not Guilty, and being found against him, it was moved in Arrest of Judgment, that the Venue was awarded of the Parish of Cardeworth, where it ought to have been of the Vill of Cardeworth; for the Parish of Cardeworth, aforesaid, is not the Village mentioned before; but all the Court held it was good enough, for (aforesaid) made them all one. And the Court shall not intend, that the Parish extend into other Vill than Cardeworth; and though a Parish may extend into more Vill, yet it shall not be so intended, especially when it is said, the Parish of Cardeworth aforesaid, and so adjudged by the whole Court.

Town and Parish  
all one by In-  
tendment.

BROCK v. SPENCER. Hob. 6. Brock the Plaintiff, brought Trespass against Spencer for Cutting, &c. certain Oaks, &c. at Hursley. And in the new Affignment lays it in a Close called Newlands in Hursley, aforesaid. To this the Defendant pleaded, that Newlands was customary Lands of the Manor of Marden, in the Parish of Hursley aforesaid. And that by Custom within the said Manor, the Copyhold Tenants might, &c. The Plaintiff traversed the Custom, and it was found for him in the K. B. Brock the Plaintiff died, and Spencer brought a Writ of Error against the Executors of Brock, and one Error assigned was, that the *ven. fac.* was *de Vicineto de Hursley*, and not *de Vicineto Parochiae de Hursley*. But all the Judges in the Exchequer Chamber over-ruled it to be good enough, for since it was first laid that the Trespass was done at Hursley, which shall be understood a Town; and then the Defendant speaks of the Parish of Hursley aforesaid, they shall be understood all one, and two former Judgments were cited accordingly; for the Word aforesaid couples them. And in the Case of

Cro. Jac. 274.

WALSH v. WRAY, Ibid. The like was adjudged in the Exchequer Chamber. Cro. Jac. 263. same Case. And in the Case of

Parish shall be  
intended a Vill.

WILSON v. LAWS, Eas. 6 W. III. B. R. 3 Salk. 380. In an Appeal of Murder, it was objected, that the Fact was laid, in the Parish of St. Giles in the Fields, when it should have been in the Vill, as it ought by the Statute of Gloucester: but not allowed; for the Parish shall be intended a Vill. It is true, a Parish may contain more Vill than one, but that shall not be intended, unless shewn. Same Case, 1 Lord Raym. 20.

But not to con-  
tain more Vill  
than one, unless  
shewn.

Having



Having thus endeavoured to describe each separately, whereby it might appear, that, as to this Subject, they are in Law all one, I proceed to shew,

1. PARISH, TOWNSHIP, or VILLAGE, or what shall or shall not be deemed such, within the meaning of the 43 Eliz. c. 2. and 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12. And herein of EXTRA-PAROCIAL PLACES, as far as they relate to this HEAD. Vide further as to them Title REMOVAL, &c.

HILTON v. PAWLE. Hil. 2 Car. Cro. Car. 92. Trespass for taking a Saddle of the Plaintiff's at Stoke-Goldingham. Upon Not Guilty, a Special Verdict was found, viz. That the Parish of Hinkley, in the County of Leicester, is, and Time whereof, &c. was, an ancient Rectory and Parish Church; and that the Village of Stoke-Goldingham is an ancient Village, and Parcel of the Rectory of Hinkley aforesaid; and that from the Time of King Henry the Sixth, and always afterwards until this present, there is, and hath been, a Church in the said Village of Stoke-Goldingham, which, during all the said Time hath been used and reputed as a Parish, and that the Inhabitants of Stoke-Goldingham aforesaid, during all the said Time, have had all Parochial Rites and Churchwardens, and that the said Village of Stoke-Goldingham is distant from Hinkley about two Miles; and if, *super totam Materiam in forma prædicta compertam videbitur Justiciariis & Curie hic*\*, that the aforesaid Village of Stoke-Goldingham be such a Parish as by Stat. 43 Eliz. c. 2. for Relief of the Poor, is chargeable to the maintaining their own Poor: Then they say the Defendant is Guilty, to the Damage, &c. and if, *super totam*, &c. that the aforesaid Village of Stoke-Goldingham stands chargeable, by the Statute aforesaid, to maintain the Poor of Hinkley aforesaid: Then they say that the Defendant is not Guilty: And upon this Verdict being argued at the Bar by Athoe for the Plaintiff, and Berkley for the Defendant, the COURT resolved and delivered their Opinion *seriatim* for the Plaintiff.

A Village, tho' Parcel of a Rectory, yet having from the Time of Henry VI. a Church, and reputed a Parish, and having Parochial Rites, and Churchwardens,

That this is such a Parish within the Statute 43 Eliz. as is chargeable for the Relief of the Poor of Stoke-Goldingham, and not for the Poor of Hinkley; for being found, that it was a Church in the Time of King Henry the Sixth, *et tunc et semper postea*†, REPUTED for a PARISH, and not in the negative, that it was not a Parish before: It may be well intended to be a Parish before, and it doth not exclude, that it was not before time whereof, &c. And although it should not be so intended, yet being found that it was a Church then, and that there were Churchwardens there, it is a Parish within the Statute, although it be but a reputative PARISH; for, being in use so long before the Statute, and at the Time of the Statute, the Statute appoints that the Churchwardens, and three or four OVERSEERS OF THE POOR joined with them, shall, &c. and no Churchwardens of Hinkley are Churchwardens of Stoke-Goldingham, and, by Consequence, have nothing to do there; and Churchwardens of Stoke-Goldingham are only to meddle with the Church there, and, by Consequence, with the Poor of the Parish; and the Statute hath an Intention to confine the Relief to Parishes then in esse, and that every Parish should meddle with its proper Village, and their Poor are to be provided for there, and not elsewhere; wherefore it was adjudged for the Plaintiff.

is a Parish within 43 Eliz. for being found that it was a Church in the Time of Henry VI. and then, and always after, reputed a Parish, and not in the negative, may be intended a Parish, before Time whereof, &c.

43 Eliz. intended to confine the Relief of the Poor to Parishes then in esse.

NICHOLS v. WALKER and CARTER. Trin. 10 Car. Cro. Car. 394. TRESPASS for entering into his House in Tatridge, and taking of a Fowling-piece and other Goods. Upon Not Guilty a Special Verdict was found, that Carter was Churchwarden of the Parish of Hatfield, and Walker was Overseer of the Poor of the Parish of Hatfield; and that the 16th November 1632, a Rate was made by the Inhabitants of Hatfield, for the Relief of the Poor of that Parish, according to the Statute: That the

\* "Upon the whole Matter in form aforesaid found, it shall appear to the Justices and Court here."

† "And then and always afterward."



NICHOLS  
v.  
WALKER.

Plaintiff was an Inhabitant in *Tatridge*, not having any Lands in *Hatfield*, but having Lands in *Tatridge*, and was rated by the said Rate, towards the Relief of the Poor of *Hatfield*: That the Plaintiff having refused to pay, by Warrant of Justices, they distrained the Goods aforesaid, and they found,

A Village, Parcel of a Parish, never by any legal Act severed therefrom, the Tithes thereof paid to the Parson of that Parish, who used always to find a Curate for such Vill, there being no Parson there; but being a reputed Parish at the Time of making the said Act, and sixty Years before, having Parish Officers, and all Rates, Levies, &c. made there for the Relief of their Poor, with Parochial Rights, shall be charged to its own Poor only, within the Statutes.

That anciently the Village of *Tatridge* was Parcel of the Parish of *Hatfield*, and that there was not any legal Act to sever the said Vill from the Parish of *Hatfield*, *Quodque modo et ante tempus cujus, &c.* the Tithes of *Tatridge* were paid to the Parson of *Hatfield*; and that the Parson of *Hatfield* used always to find a Curate at *Tatridge*, and that there is no Parson at *Tatridge*; and that for *threescore Years* past and more, and at the Time of making the said Statute, 43 Eliz. c. 2. for Relief of the Poor, and always from thence until this Day, called the Village of *Tatridge*, commonly reputed to have been a Parish of itself, and for the Whole of the same Time, and the Inhabitants used to elect and have Constables, Churchwardens, and Overseers of the Poor there; and that for all the said Time, Rates, Assessments, and Levies, have been made there by them, for the Relief of the Poor of *Tatridge*, which Rates, during all the said Time, have been used to be levied by their proper Officers for Relief of the Poor there, without any paying to the Poor of *Hatfield*, or joining in any Assessment with the Town of *Hatfield*: And that the Church of *Tatridge*, during all that Time, have had all Parochial Rights: And that the Inhabitants of *Tatridge* have not used all that Time to contribute to the Reparation of the Church at *Hatfield*, but to the Reparation of their own proper Church and Chapel only. And if upon the whole Matter, &c. And, after Argument at the Bar by Brian for the Plaintiff, and Atkins for the Defendant, the Court resolved, That Judgment ought to be given for the Plaintiff: For *Tatridge* being a Parish in Reputation so long before and after, and at the Time of the Statute made, it shall not be now for this Purpose charged by *Hatfield*, but it shall be charged by itself, and for their Poor only. And they relied on the foregoing Case of *Hilton v. Pawle*.

Parishes in Reputation only are within the Stat. 43 Eliz. as other Parishes are, if the Usage of such Parish to chuse Overseers has been constant without Interruption; but otherwise, the Overseers and Collector of the Mother Church are only within the Statute: By MONTAGUE, Ch. J. and DODDRIDGE, J. But HOUGHTON, J. contra, as to reputative Parishes being within the Stat. 2 Rol. Rep. 160. 2 Nelf. Abr. 1285. E. 18 Jac. B. R.

One Parish may contain several Vills, when there are distinct Constables, but if the Constable of one runs through the whole, then the whole is but one Vill.

Sed quære. Vide next Case.

WALDRON v. ———, &c. M. 22 Car. II. B. R. 1 Mod. 78.—HALES—It is true, one Parish may contain three Vills. The Parish of A. may contain the Vills of A. B. and C.; that is, when there are distinct Constables in every one of them. But if the Constable of A. doth run through the Whole, then is the Whole but one Vill in Law. Or where there is a Tithing-man, it may be a Vill: But if the Constable run through the Tithing, then it is all one Vill. I know where Three or Four Thousand Pounds a Year hath been enjoyed by a Fine levied of Land in the Vill of A. in which are Five several Hamlets, in which are Tithings; but the Constable of A. runs through them all, and upon that was held good for all. Here was a Case of the Constable of *Blandford-Forum*, wherein it was held, that if he had a concurrent Jurisdiction with all the rest of the Constables, the Fine would have passed the Lands in all. In some Places they have Tithing-men, and no Constables.

POLLEXFEN—Lambard 14. is, that the Constable and the Tithing-man are all One.

HALES—That is, in some Places. *Præpositus* is a proper Word for a Constable, and *Decimarius* for a Tithing-man.

When Constable of one runs through the whole, they may be either separate Vills or one Vill.

In the Case of GREEN v. PROUDE, Eas. 26. Car. II. B. R. 1. Mod. 117. It was objected, that a Recovery (suffered in the Marquis of Winchester's Court in ancient Demesne) was of Land in King's cleare. Whereas the Land claimed was in a particular Vill called ———: That the Vills were several, and that there were distinct Courts in every Vill. But by

HALES



HALES—There are several *Tithings* of *Dale*, *Sale*, and *Downe*, there is a *Tithing-man* in every particular Place; but the *Constable* of *Dale* goes through all; these may go for several *Vills* or one *Vill*. There may be a *Manor* that hath several little *Manors* within it, wherein are held several Courts for the Ease of the Tenants, but all but one *Manor*. As the *Manor* of *Barton* hath several little *Manors* under it, yet all within the *Manor*.

GREEN  
v.  
PROUDE.

RUDD v. FOSTER. M. 4. W. & M. B. R. 4. Mod. 157. In Replevin for taking of a Gelding, the Defendant justified by Virtue of the Stat. of the Queen (43 Eliz.) for Money due upon the Poor Tax.

The Parties being at Issue, it was tried at Bar, and the Question was, Whether the *Vill* of *Stratton* was in the *Parish* of *Biggleswade*, in *Bedfordshire*, or not?

The Evidence to prove it to be in that *Parish* was, that there were but two *Churchwardens* and two *Overseers* of the Poor, and that *Marriages*, *Burials*, and *Christenings* and all other *Parochial Rights*, were done at *Biggleswade*, and that the Inhabitants of the *Vill* of *Stratton* did contribute to the Repairs of the Church of *Biggleswade*.

On the other Side, to prove that *Stratton* was a *reputed Parish* by itself, at the Time of the making of this Statute, this Evidence was given, viz.

In the Reign of *Edward III.* there was a *Public Chapel*, there, where the People went to hear Mass, and that *Divine Service* was read in that Chapel at the Time of the making of this Statute.

Then it was proved, that a *Rate* was made there in the Year 1654; and that formerly they had distinct *Constables*, and repaired their own Highways, till the Year 1634, and the Difference between them was settled by the Judges in their Circuit.

They would have this like the Case between the *Parish* of *Tateridge* and *Hatfield*. (Ante 5. *Nicholas v. Walker*, &c.)

But *Stratton* was not so much a *Parish* in Reputation at the Time of the making the Act, and so not like that Case; for all that was proved was, that they had made *Rates* since the Statute, and had a *Chapel* before; but making *Rates* will not make it a *Parish* without all other *Parochial Rights*, and therefore it was held to be a *Vill* in the *Parish* of *Biggleswade*.

Not being a *Parish* in Reputation at the Time of making the Act, though making their own Rates, and having a distinct Overseer, without all *Parochial Rights*, is not within the Stat. 43 Eliz.

The same Case is reported in 2 *Salk.* 501. where it is further said, "That because at *Stratton* they had but one *Chapelwarden*, whose Office it was to collect the Rates taxed upon *Stratton*, and pay them to *Biggleswade*, they were held Part of the *Parish* of *Biggleswade*, and not a *reputed Parish* within 43 Eliz. and their having a distinct Overseer, and maintaining their own Poor, was not thought sufficient to make them a distinct *Parish*."

If a Place be named generally, that Place shall be taken to be and intended a *Vill*; adjudged *Mich.* 10 W. III. B. R. *Ibid.*

And in the Case of *Doulting* and *Stoke-Lane*, (Post.) PARKER, Ch. Justice, in delivering the Opinion of the Court, said, "This Order of Sessions is naught, because this is not within a *Town* or *Village*; and, therefore, though *Extra-Parochial Towns* and *Vills* are within this Law, yet not other Places which are neither *Town* nor *Vill*. If it were said at *Brewcomb's-Lodge* generally, and no more, that might be intended a *Vill*; but this is said to be a certain *Extra-Parochial Place* called *Brewcomb's-Lodge*; so that this may be but one House, for it must consist of several Houses, and Inhabitants; so that, it not appearing to be any more than one single House, it is not within the Act of Parliament."

Vide what the Order was in the Report of the Case, Post.

SKELLINGTON v. NORTON.—*Freem. Rep.* 401. There were two *Vills* in one *Parish*, which had used severally to maintain their own Poor, and now there being *Overseers* made of the whole *Parish*, they were rated together. The Question was, Whether having been used Time out of Mind to pay severally, they might now, by the Stat. 43 Eliz. c. 2. be rated together? By HALE, Ch. Justice—If there be



SKELLINGTON *no Chapel within the Vill, where the Church does not stand, it is not sufficient to make it a reputed Parish within Statute 43 Eliz.*

NORTON.

ANONYMOUS—*Eas. 13 W. III. 12 Mod. 504.* Indictment concluding *ad nocumentum* of Inhabitants of a certain *Vill*, was quashed for the special Conclusion.

BY THE COURT—A Chapel's having *Sacramentals* only, makes it not Independent of the *Parish*, but it must have all other *Badges*, as *Sepultures*, &c.

12 *Mod. 546. Trin. 13 W. III. P. HOLT, CH. J.* A *Vill* and a *Village* are the same, and a *Hamlet* is a Division of a *Vill*. 18 *Ed. I.* the whole *Vill* is a *Constabulary*, and a *Hamlet* is commonly a *Tithing*.

Towns and Villages in Extra-Parochial Places, are within 43 Eliz.

Hil. 11 *Anne, Vin. Abr. Title POOR, 421.* The Court held that the last Clause in the 21 *Seet. 13 & 14 Car. II.* extends to *Towns and Villages in Extra-Parochial Places*, as well as within *Parishes*; for the *Law-Makers* had in View the Inconvenience, that some *Towns and Villages* would not have the Benefit of 43 *Eliz.* This *Stat.* is of (*Towns, &c. in Counties*), and not (*in Parishes*), and *Towns and Villages in Extra-Parochial Places* are plainly within the *Words*, though not directly within the View of the Act; and though there be not Officers appointed in *Extra-Parochial Places*, yet the Justices ought to do it upon Complaint. *M. S. Cases.*

Mandamus to appoint Overseers in Extra-Parochial Places.

THE KING *v. the Inhabitants of RUFFORD.* *Eas. 8 G. Str. 512.* *Mandamus* directed to the Justices of the Peace of the County of *Nottingham*, reciting, that within the *Vill of Rufford* there are divers substantial Freeholders able to contribute to the Maintenance of the Poor, and that there are Poor unprovided for; therefore it commands them to appoint *Overseers*.

They return that the *Ville of Rufford* is Part of *no Parish*, but Time out of Mind has been *Extra-Parochial*, without Church, Chapel, or *Parochial Rights*, and that there never have been any *Overseers of the Poor*, and for that Cause they cannot appoint.

Post.

And there having been only an *obiter* Opinion of the Court in the Case of *Daulting v. Brewcomb's-Lodge (Stoke-Lane)* Hil. 11 *Anne, B. R.* that *Overseers of the Poor* might be appointed in *Extra-Parochial Places*, the Court directed an Argument, that the Point might be solemnly determined.

And after Argument and Consideration of all the Statutes relating to the Poor, the Court were of Opinion, that the Powers given by the 43 *Eliz.* to be executed in *Parishes*, were, by the 13 & 14 *Car. II. c. 12.* extended to all *Townships and Villages*, whether *Parochial* or *Extra-Parochial*, and, consequently, *Overseers* might be appointed in this Case, for which Purpose a peremptory *Mandamus* was awarded.

Two Houses in an Extra-Parochial Place are not enough to denominate a Vill.

THE KING *v. the Inhabitants of DENHAM.* *Eas. 8 G. II. Burr. S. C. 35.* Two Justices removed E. W. and E. his Wife from *Dalham* to *Denham*: And the Sessions upon an Appeal confirm the Order, and state the Case specially. E. W. hired a House and Farm of 10*l.* a Year and lived therein from the Year 1725 to the Year 1730, and was rated and paid to the Poor's Rates of the said *Parish*: Afterwards he hired another House and Farm in *Southwold Park*, of 150*l.* a Year, and lived there for several Years. But *Southwold Park* aforesaid is an *Extra-Parochial Place*, consisting of two Houses and about 300 Acres of Land only, belonging to and in the Occupation of different Persons, being in the Whole of the Value of near 300*l.* a Year. And it does not appear that within the said *Extra-Parochial Place* there are, or ever were, any Persons appointed to receive or provide for the Poor happening therein.

Mr. *Strange*, who moved to quash these Orders, said, It was now established "that a Person may be removed to an *Extra-Parochial Place*, which may be looked upon as a *Township* or *Vill*, and has more Houses than one;" and "that a *Mandamus* will lie, to appoint *Overseers* for an *Extra-Parochial Place*," and cited the Case of *Dolting, Stoke-Lane*, and *Brookham-Lodge*, and the *King v. Rufford*. Therefore the last legal Settlement of the Paupers was at *Southwold Park*, not at *Denham*.

Mr.



## P O O R. (OVERSEERS.)

9

Mr. Abney and Mr. Filmer, on the other Side, argued, that the *general Rule* is, that Persons cannot be sent to or from *Extra-Parochial* Places. And there is no Inconvenience in this Doctrine: For as they are not to take *other's* Poor, so neither are *other's* obliged to take *their's*. Indeed, if such *Extra-Parochial* Place be so populous as to be looked upon as a *Town* or *Vill*, that may make a great Difference.

KING  
v.  
DENHAM.

In the Case of *Stoke-Lane, Dolting, and Brookham-Lodge*, the Pauper was sent to an *Extra-Parochial* Place called *Brookham-Lodge*: And the Order was quashed, because the *Extra-Parochial* Place did not come under the Notion of a *Township* or *Village*.

The Act of 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12. extends to *all England*, if the *Extra-Parochial* Place can come under the Notion of a *Township* or *Village*.

In the King v. *Belvoir* \*, M. 2 G. II. B. R. where there were only two Houses, but never any Officers, the Order of Removal to that Place was quashed.

In the King v. *Rufford*, it appeared, on the Proceedings, that it was a *Ville*, though *Extra-Parochial*. A *Township* or *Village*, by *Finch's* Law, should contain *ten* Families. And by *Waldron's* Case, a *Village* is a District that hath a Petty Constable over it. Ante 6.

It was argued in Reply, that this Case was within the meaning of a *Ville*, as laid down in the Case of *Dolting and Brookham-Lodge*, as having more Houses than *One*, as well as the Definition in *Co. Litt.* 115. If a *Town* be decayed, it is still a *Town*. This shall be intended a *Ville*, 1 Mod. 117. *Green* Ante 6. v. *Proude*. 1 Mod. 251.

In the Case of *Belvoir*, there was a material Fault; for it was directed, "To the Churchwardens and Overseers of the Parish or Liberty of *Belvoir*." Whereas it was particularly stated that there were none. Besides, it was not defended.

LORD HARDWICKE—This is to me a new Case. Before the Case of *Dolting and Stoke-Lane*, it had been generally taken that there was no Power lodged in the Justices of Peace to send Paupers to *Extra-Parochial* Places where there were no Overseers: But in that Case, all the Court held that within the 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12. the Court might oblige the Justices to appoint Overseers, where the Place might come under the Notion of a *Township* or *Village*. Now that Clause (Sect. 21.) was plainly intended for *Townships* in the large Northern Parishes only; and that appears by the recital Part of the Act: But in the enacting Part, the Words *Towns, Hamlets, and Vills*, are mentioned at large; and therefore the Court did determine, that a Settlement might be gained in such Parishes at large, without confining it to those Parishes only which were particularized in the Recital. That alone was a very liberal Construction of the Act: But they thought it within the Mischief provided against by the Act, and reasonable. And I believe my Lord Chief Justice Parker's Words were, "That a Settlement might be gained in an *Extra-Parochial* Place, consisting of more Houses than one, so as come under the Notion of a *Town* or *Village*."

Now this Place is called a *Park*, and described as *such*. It is certainly very hard to define exactly what is a *Township* or *Village*: It must be left to the Judgment of the Court, upon the Construction of the Case stated. By the 43 Eliz. there must, in every Place, be more OVERSEERS than one; and when there are only two Houses in a Place, must the whole Parish be perpetual Overseers; and in such a Case there is nobody over whom they are to have Jurisdiction, nor any body to chuse them, excepting themselves.

\* THE KING v. the Inhabitants of BELVOIR. H. II G. II. Is thus reported in 2. Sess. Cas. III. Case 105. Moved to grant an Order of Sessions, upon which there had been no Adjudication; but the Judgment of the Court was suspended. The Exception was, it appears in the Body of the Order, that *Belvoir* is an *Extra-Parochial* Place, and that there neither now is, nor ever was, an Officer in the Place, neither Churchwardens nor Overseers, nor any Inhabitant, except one Person who kept an Alehouse. In *Salk.* 486. it was held by Holt, Ch. J. If a Place is *Extra-Parochial*, and had not the face of a Parish, the Justices have no Authority to send any Man thither.



KING  
v.  
DENHAM.

Now this Place does not appear to my Satisfaction to be a *Town* or *Village*. In the Case of *Dolting* and *Stoke-Lane*, the Order was quashed because *Brookham-Lodge* was holden by the Court *not* to be a *Town* or *Village*; notwithstanding that the *general* Law was there laid down as I have before mentioned. And here the Place does not, in my Opinion, come under the Notion of a *Town* or *Village*: And the Orders ought therefore to be affirmed.

PAGE, J. held, that a *single* House, or *two* Houses, cannot amount to the Notion of a *Town* or *Village*. If the Place had *formerly* consisted of *more* than *two*, or had been a *Town*, and fallen to decay, it ought to have been *so* stated; however, if the Houses were really and in fact decayed and gone, it would then *cease* to be a *Town* or *Village*.

A *Town*, or *Village*, in common parlance, is an *aggregate* Number of Houses. Therefore he concurred.

PROBYN, J. was of the same Opinion. The *least* Division known in the Old Law is a *Tithing*, which consisted of *ten* Families. I should therefore think a *Vill* must consist of *at least* as much as a *Tithing*: It seems, indeed, to be something between a *Tithing* and a *Town*. Since there is no certain Definition of a *Vill*, why should we not fix it to the Number of a *Tithing*, *at least*?

\* *Dolting v. Stoke-*  
*land.*

The 13 and 14 Car. II. c. 12. was, I believe, intended for the *Northern* Parishes: But it was at length construed to extend to *all others* in *England*,\* as coming under the same Equity and Reason.

The Limitation of the "more Houses than one," in the Case of *Dolting*, is so as to come under the Notion of a *Township* or *Village*. Now, if there are but *two* Housekeepers, are these two People to chuse *themselves*, and to be *perpetual* Overseers; I think *two* Houses are not within the Rule, so as to come within the Notion of a *Township* or *Village*.

Lee, J. was of the same Opinion.

A Village according to the ancient Law, is a *Tithing*, consisting of *ten* Families; according to the modern Notion, a Place having a *Constable*.

It is now thoroughly settled, that the Justices may appoint *Overseers* in *Extra-Parochial* places. But it is upon the Principle and Foundation, that the *Extra-Parochial* Place, comes under the Notion of a *Village* or *Town*. I think a *Village*, according to the *ancient* Law, is a *tithing* consisting of *ten* Families: According to the *modern* Notion, it is a Place that has a civil Officer called a *Constable*. I think it ought at *least* to have the *Reputation* of a *Vill* or *Town*. But this Place is not stated to have had the *Reputation* of a *Vill* or *Town*; but only "to consist of two Houses." Lord Coke's Definition of a *Ville*, *expluribus Mansionibus vicinata*, must mean *more* than *two* Houses, but this does not appear before us to be such a Place, as we can say is *within* the Stat. 13 and 14 Car. II. c. 12.

LORD HARDWICKE, on an Application that it might be again argued, said, that he could not distinguish it from the Case of *Belvoir Castle* (where there was only the Castle which was the Duke of Rutland's House, and an Alehouse,) and could not be considered as a *Township* or *Village*. And the Orders were both affirmed. Same Case reported, *Str.* 1004. 2d *Seff. Cas.* Ed. 1760. 250. And *Cases* in B. R. 7, 8, 9, and 10 G. II. *pa.* 163, all differently entitled.

An Issue granted to try the Truth of a Return to a *Mandamus*.

THE KING v. the Overseers of the Poor of the Town of SPOTLAND. M. 9. G. II. *Cases temp.* Lord Hardw. 184. A *Mandamus* issued to the Defendants to make a Rate for the Poor, who returned, that there are two *Townships*, *Further Spotland* and *Nearer Spotland*; and that *Overseers* are appointed for the *Township* of *Further Spotland*, and that the Inhabitants thereof have made a Rate, and provided for their Poor; and upon this Return in behalf of the *Township* of *Nearer Spotland*, an Information was moved for against the Defendants as for a false Return; for the Question is between these Places, whether they shall join in the Maintenance of the Poor, as *one Parish* or *Township*, or not; there being *many* in *Nearer Spotland* and very *few* in the other; and, therefore, *Nearer Spotland* alledged, that they are not *distinct*, but *one* and the same *Township*, which now upon shewing Cause is denied by *Further Spotland*; and they offer to try it in a feigned Issue.

LORD HARDWICKE. If this had been a *Mandamus* upon the Stat. of 2 Ann. c. 20. ("which is an Act for rendering the Proceedings on *Quo warrantos* and *Mandamus* more effectual in Cases of Members of



# P O O R. (OVERSEERS.)

II

"of Corporations, who have been turned out of their Franchises; and enacts, that when a Return is made to such Mandamus, it shall be lawful for the Person suing or prosecuting such Mandamus, to plead to or traverse the material Facts contained therein, to which the Persons making such Return shall reply, take issue or demur; and such Proceedings shall be had therein, as if the Person had brought an Action for a false Return," the Return might have been traversed; or had it been a Mandamus concerning some private Right, the Party might have had an Action for a false Return; and so a peremptory Mandamus if the Return had been wrong; but here there cannot be an Action for a false Return, because no one is particularly interested, so there is no Remedy but an Information, and there being a direct Contrariety in the Affidavits, it is the Course of the Court to grant an Information to try the Fact.

KING  
v.  
SPOTLAND.

*Per Cur.* Let an Information go.

THE KING v. the Overseers of the Poor of the Manor of GRAFTON, *Eas.* 10 G. II. *Strange* 1071. A poor Person was removed to Grafton: and on Appeal it was stated to be an Extra-Parochial Place, formerly a Seat of the Earl of Shrewsbury, consisting of a capital Messuage and three Lodges in the Park, but since converted into five Houses and Farms: and the Sessions adjudge, it a Ville, that ought to maintain its own Poor. This was moved to be quashed, upon the Authority of the Case of *Denham* and *Dalham*. (*Ante.*) And a Rule was made to shew Cause.

Five Houses in an extraparochial Place do not constitute a Ville. *Burr S. C.* 101. 2 Sess. Caf. 217 Same Case.

Afterwards on an Affidavit of Service the Rule was made absolute, this not appearing to have the Reputation of a Vill.

THE KING v. the Inhabitants of WELBECK. M. 14. G. II. *Strange* 1143. A Mandamus was granted, suggesting, that there were several Householders and Farmers, inhabiting and residing within the Village of Welbeck able to provide for the Poor; and, therefore, commands the Justices to appoint Overseers of the Poor. To this it is returned, that Welbeck is Extra-Parochial, and is not, nor ever was reputed to be a Village or Township, and, therefore, they cannot appoint any Persons Overseers.

It is a good Return to a Mandamus for appointing Overseers that the Place is not a Village or Township.

And upon Argument, this was held to be a good Return, for though it does not answer the Supposal of the Writ, as to there being several substantial Householders and Farmers; yet it answers the Point in 13 and 14 Car. II. c. 12. by saying, it is no Township or Village nor reputed as such: and it is to such Places only that we can send a Writ. *Bott.* 16. same Case.

THE KING v. SEVERN and ARNOLD. E. 29 G. II. *Sayer*, 278. Upon a Rule to shew Cause, why an Appointment of Overseers of the Poor should not be quashed, it appeared, that the Defendants were appointed, by two Justices of the Peace, Overseers of the Poor within the Precinct of the Tower, otherwise called the Parish of St. Peters ad Vincula, within his Majesty's Tower of London; and that they were appointed under 43 Eliz. c. 2. and not under 13 and 14 Car. II. c. 12.

An Appointment of Overseers of the Poor for a Precinct is void.

The Rule was made absolute.

And by DENISON, J. We are of Opinion; and the late Chief Justice \*, did concur in this Opinion, the Appointment of the Defendants to be Overseers of the Poor, is void. It does expressly appear, to be an Appointment under 43 Eliz. But it is not a good Appointment under that Statute, nor under the 13 and 14 Car. II. The former of these Statutes does only give a power of appointing Overseers of the Poor in Parishes; and this Power is by the latter Statute only extended to Townships and Vills. And we are of Opinion that both these Statutes, which have in other Instances been strictly construed, ought to be so construed in the present Case. In the Case of the *K. v. Curle and others*, Mich. 20 G. II. it was holden, that the very words Substantial Householders, which are the Words of the 43 Eliz. must be used in an Appointment of Overseers of the Poor; and an Appointment, wherein the Persons appointed were called Principal Inhabitants, was quashed. And the same Strictness in construing this Statute has been observed in divers other Cases.

\* Sir Dudley Ryder, who died the 25th May; and this Judgment was given the 31st.



KING  
v.  
SEVERN, &c.  
Ante 5.

24 H. VIII.  
Brooks pl. 49.  
fo. 9. Brook tit.  
Bryfe pl. 418.  
& 33 H. VIII.  
Dyer 51.

It has been said, that as the Place of which the Defendants were appointed Overseers, is called the *Parish of St. Peter's ad Vincula*, within his Majesty's Tower of London, as well as *Precinct of the Tower*, it is a *Parish* by Reputation, and the Case of *Hilton v. Pawle* has been cited, in which it was holden, that a *Parish* is within the meaning of the 43 *Eliz.* But although a Place may be a *Parish* by Reputation, and although Overseers of the Poor, may be appointed for such Place; yet an Appointment of Overseers for such Place will be bad, unless the Place be therein expressly called a *Parish*. In the present Case, the Description of the Place is, *Precinct within the Tower*; for the Words, *Parish of St. Peter's ad Vincula, within his Majesty's Tower of London*, are under an otherwise called; and the Rule in such Cases is, that the Name or Description which precedes an otherwise called, is always to be considered as the true Name or Description, and not the Name or Description which follows. In an Anonymous Case, 3 *Bulstr.* 296. it is said, that the whole Court were clearly of Opinion, that the true Name of a Man is that which does precede an *alias dictus*, and an Indictment was in that Case quashed, because the Addition of the Person indicted, followed the *alias dictus*. It has been said, that, although the Place, of which the Defendants were appointed Overseers be not a *Parish*, the Court may intend that it is a *Township* or *Vill*, within the meaning of the 13 and 14 *Car. II.* But, as it is not expressly called a *Township* or *Vill* in the Appointment, the Court ought not to intend that it is a *Township* or *Village*, in order to make an APPOINTMENT good, which is not warranted by that Statute.

Order for the  
Appointment of  
Overseers of the  
Poor, for Village  
or Township  
quashed, because  
not in fact so.

THE KING v. SHOWLER and ATTER. *Trin. 3 Geo. III. B. R. Burr. Mansf. 1391.* Mr. Harvey shewed Cause against quashing an Order of Sessions, which confirmed an Order of two Justices of *Lincolnshire-Lindsey*, nominating and appointing *Thomas Showler* and *John Atter*, being substantial Householders of the *Township* or *Village* of *Haugh*, in the said Parts, to be Overseers of the Poor of the said *Township* or *Village* of *Haugh*, for the Year next ensuing, according to the Direction of the Statute; and also against quashing the said original Order of the two Justices. The Case was:

*Thomas Showler*, one of the said Overseers so appointed, having appealed to the General Quarter Sessions, from this Warrant or Order of Appointment, it was adjourned to the next, who state, that it appears to them, that the said *John Atter* in the said Appointment named is a *Day-Labourer*; and that the said Place called *Haugh*, consists of a capital *Messuage*, in which *Thomas Showler* in the said Appointment named, with all his Family, dwells; and of two ancient small Cottages; and of one other small Cottage, lately built; all which said Cottages are let along with the said capital *Messuage*, and the Farm thereunto belonging, to the said *Thomas Showler*; and of another Tenement, part of the said capital *Messuage*; and all of them inhabited by Families; and that one of the Cottages is inhabited by the said *John Atter* and his Family; and another of the said Cottages is inhabited by another *Day-Labourer* and his Family; and the other of the said Cottages is inhabited by a *Shepherd* and his Family; and the Tenement, part of the said capital *Messuage*, is inhabited by a poor Widow and her five Children: all which Occupiers of the said Cottages, and of the said Tenement, part of the said capital *Messuage*, are under Tenants to the said THOMAS SHOWLER. The Court of Sessions therefore adjudged *Haugh* aforesaid, to be a *Village* or *Township*; and confirmed the Appointment.

To this it was Objected. 1st, That the Facts stated, shew this Place to be neither a *Township* nor a *Village*. And, 2dly, That *Atter* appeared to be only a *Labourer*, and not a substantial Householder.

To the first it was answered that the Sessions had determined right in adjudging *Haugh* a *Village*; for the Case stated it to be so. 1 *Inst.* 115. defines a *Village*, as consisting *expluribus Mansionibus et pluribus Vicinis*. And here are five distinct Mansions, which Number answers to the Term "*Plures*." And both *Spelman's Villare Anglicanum*, and *Cambden's Britannia* mention this Place as a *Village*: which is, at least a reason for sending the Order back to the Sessions, in order that the Facts may be more fully stated. That the two Cases cited out of Sir *John Strange's Reports*, viz. *Denham* and *Dalham*, and

Ante.

Stokeprior



*Stokeprior and Grafton*, are not applicable to the present Case; for, the former was upon an *Order of Removal*; and *Southwold-Park*, the *Extra-Parochial* Place, consisting of only two Houses and two Families, which could not be called "*Plures*;" the latter was a Nobleman's Seat, converted within time of Memory into five Houses and Farms; but that Case was never argued; and the Rule was made absolute without Defence.

KING  
v.  
SHOWLER, &c.

The COURT were clearly of Opinion that both the Orders ought to be discharged.

LORD MANSFIELD observed, that by this Method, a Place might be made into a *Village*, which in fact was not so; and the Inhabitants of it might by this Contrivance withdraw themselves from contributing towards the Support of the Poor of their *Parish*. If it be really a *Vill* you may make another Appointment.

WILMOT, J. cited and laid much stress upon the Case of the *K. v. Welbeck*, which *Denison, J.* also said he very well remembered; it was a *Mandamus* to appoint Overseers in and for the *Village of Welbeck*; and the Return was, "That it was *Extra-Parochial*, and never was reputed to be a *Village* or *Township*; and therefore they could not appoint any Persons to be Overseers of the Poor of it. And the Return was allowed, upon the Principle that the Court had no Power to issue such *Mandamus*, but upon the Supposition of its being a *Vill* or *Township*." Ante 11.

Both ORDERS quashed.

The Answer to the 2d Objection was, that the original Order expressly called Atter "a substantial Householder." But as the Court were so clear against the Orders upon the first Objection, as to allow it even without hearing the Counsel who were to argue in Support of it; this second Objection was not discussed, nor even entered into.

1 Black. Rep.  
419. S. C.

THE KING v. TAMWORTH, *Inhabitants of. Trin. 17 G. III. Cald. 28.* T. G. his Wife, and their Child, were removed from the Hamlet of *Bolehall* and *Glasfote* in the *Parish* of *Tamworth*, in the County of *Warwick*, to the *Parish* of *Tamworth* in the Counties of *Warwick* and *Stafford*. On Appeal the Sessions confirmed the Order, and stated,

A Hamlet not having Overseers of its own, is not within the Stat. Car. II. yet though never assessed before, if stated to be within a Parish, and to pay Church Rates, is subjected to all Parochial Taxes.

That the Pauper, T. G. was legally settled in the Hamlet of *Bolehall* and *Glasfote*, and was afterwards hired for a Year, and served it at *Sirefote*, which is a Hamlet consisting of one House only, and between three and four hundred Acres of Land. That *Sirefote* has never contributed towards the Relief of the Poor of the *Parish* of *Tamworth*, nor ever assessed thereto; but has always been assessed, and has always paid to the Support of the *Parish Church* of *Tamworth*; that no Overseer or Overseers of the Poor, hath or have ever been appointed for the said Hamlet of *Sirefote*; and that the said Hamlet lies without the Limits and Jurisdiction of the Borough of *Tamworth*, but is within the said *Parish* of *Tamworth*. That the Paupers were delivered to the Churchwardens of the said *Parish* of *Tamworth*, which *Parish* not only lies partly in *Warwickshire*, and partly in *Staffordshire*, but is a Part thereof within the Limits and Jurisdiction of the Borough of *Tamworth*, and Part thereof without the said Limits and Jurisdiction.

In Support of the Orders, it was insisted that this Hamlet's never having contributed towards the general Burthens of the *Parish*, was immaterial, and never could be considered as a *Vill*, within the Stat. Car. II. there being only one House, and no Overseers; and cited *K. v. Denham*, the *K. v. Grafton*, and the *K. v. Showler*, and another; that this was clearly Part of the *Parish* of *Tamworth*, where there were proper Officers.

Ante 8. 11. 12.

On the other side it was argued, that this was a distinct *Vill*, independent of the *Parish* of *Tamworth*, and to which no Pauper could be sent, till it had Officers duly appointed: In several of the Cases there cited, the Places there mentioned being *Extra-Parochial*, could not be considered as *Vills*. Here this is stated to be a Hamlet, and the Pauper adjudged to have gained a Settlement therein. That a Hamlet is a sub-division of a *Parish*, that may be chargeable with its own Poor, is apparent from the Circumstance of *Bolehall*, the Place from whence this Removal is made, being of that description; therefore Overseers



KING  
v.  
TAMWORTH.

*Overseers* ought to have been appointed, and the *Paupers* removed *there*, instead of to the *Parish* at large.

In support of the Rights of the Owner of the Estate of *Sirefcote*, it was insisted, that there was by no Means enough stated to shew that *Sirefcote* was part of the *Parish* of *Tamworth*: That, though now reduced to a single House, it might be a *Vill*: That, though the Ecclesiastical Division of *Parishes* existed before the *Poor Laws*, it could not reasonably be concluded from the Payment to the *Church*, that it was within the *Parish*; because it had, in no one Instance, contributed to the *Poor*, which is much the heavier Burthen; and, if due from *Sirefcote*, would have been long demanded.

LORD MANSFIELD—There is no Doubt at all. The Place is averred to be within the *Parish*, where the Hiring and Service were had and performed; and it is no *Township* or *Vill* within the *Statute* of *Car. II.* where Officers are appointed; and therefore the Justices could not remove the Pauper there. The State of Places, as to the Number of Houses, may have been different in different Cases; but here are no Overseers, no separate OEconomy. The Adjudication is to *Sirefcote*, as Part of the *Parish* of *Tamworth*.

ASTON, J.—This Place is neither *Extra-Parochial* nor a *Vill*. In the Case of the *Manor* of *Grafton*, it was holden *no Vill*; though it had been converted into five Dwelling-houses and Farms, and was occupied by five several Tenants.

WILLES and ASHURST, *Justices*, concurring,

Rule discharged, and both Orders affirmed.

To obtain a  
Mandamus to ap-  
point Overseers,  
it must be sworn,  
that the Place in  
Question, either  
is, or is reputed  
to be a *Vill*.

THE KING v. the JUSTICES of BEDFORDSHIRE. *Eas. 22 G. III. Cald. 167. B. R.* A Rule was obtained to shew Cause why a *Mandamus* should not issue, directed to the *Justices* of *Bedfordshire*, to appoint an *Overseer of the Poor* for the *Vill* of *Chicksands* in that County, upon this Affidavit:

That the *Vill* of *Chicksands* consisted of a capital *Mansion-house*, called the *Priory*, and a large *Farm-house* thereto belonging, of the yearly Value of £.200, in the Occupation of Sir George Osborne, Bart. and also of three other large *Farm-houses*, with three other *Farms*, altogether of the further yearly Value of £.500. That about forty Years ago, there was another *Farm-house* and *Farm*, in the said *Vill*, but that the House is now pulled down, and the Farm occupied by Sir George Osborne: That in the said *Vill* there was also a *Water-Mill*, now pulled down: That there is a *Chapel* in the said *Vill* for the Celebration of Divine Service: That there immemorially has been, and now is, a *Constable* appointed in and for the said *Vill*; and that there are within it four substantial *Houholders*, but no *Churchwarden* or *Overseer*. These Facts were sworn to by Joseph Cooper, who had, about forty Years before, rented the *Farm-house*, now pulled down, together with the Farm now in the Occupation of Sir G. Osborne.

Against the Application it was sworn by James Bewan, a Tenant of Sir George Osborne's, that he had lived in *Chicksands* thirty-eight Years: That it all belonged to Sir George: That he never knew any *Constable*, *Headborough*, *Tithing-man*, or other *Peace Officer*, appointed or sworn in there, or any *Poor Rates* therein; and that it is, and ever was *Extra-Parochial*. These Facts were also sworn to by John Blackford, who became Steward to Sir George Osborne's Father forty-seven Years before, and then lived in *Chicksands*; and by Richard Gresham, then a Tenant in *Chicksands*, and also for the last eleven Years Steward to Sir George Osborne: That the one, formerly as *Servant* to Sir Danvers, the Father of Sir George, always used to execute, and the other, as *Servant* to Sir George, now does execute the Precepts issued by the Chief *Constable* of the Hundred of *Clifton*, in which *Chicksands* is situated.

And it was also sworn by Sir George Osborne, that ever since 1753 he had been Owner of *Chicksands*: That by Reputation it was formerly a *Monastery*, and came to the Crown at the Time of the Dissolution of *Monasteries*: That it never was reputed a *Vill*, but always deemed *Extra-Parochial*: That the *Chapel* is a private *Chapel* in his *Mansion-house*, not under the Jurisdiction of the *Bishop*, and not having

Any



any *Burial-place* or *Chapelwardens*: That the Person officiating therein is nominated by the Owner of the Estate, upon whose Pleasure his Stipend is dependant, and at whose Pleasure also the *Chapel* is shut up: That Service is never performed there, when the Owner and his Family are absent; and that the *Chapel* had been changed from one Room to another by Sir *George's* Father.

Against the Rule it was argued, that before the Court would interpose to *compel* Justices to act contrary to their Ideas of *Duty* on this Subject, they would require Proof, that the Place in Question had at *some Time* been a *reputed Vill*; and that to constitute a *Vill*, it must appear that there had been at *some Time* a *Public Officer* of some known legal Description therein. On the contrary, nothing appeared here more than the domestic OEconomy of a private Family: The *Chief Constable's* Precepts, the only Process of a Public Nature executed within the Place, were always executed by one of the Servants of the Family; but that this Person was never sworn in or appointed to any such Office: That in the *King v. Grafton* it had been adjudged, *five Houses*, without any *Parochial Officers*, or the Reputation of a *Vill*, would not constitute a *Vill*, which was the Principle laid down in the Case of *Denham and Dalham*.

KING  
v.  
BEDFORD-  
SHIRE Justices.

Against the  
Rule.

Ante 11.

Ante 8.

For the Rule.

3 Salk. 99. *Charley* having no *Constable*, it is no *Vill* but a *Hamlet*, for a *Vill* and a *Constable* are reciprocal.  
P. Holt. Ch. J.

*Cowper contra*, admitted, that it could not be supported, unless this Place appeared to be a *Township* or *Vill* under Statute 13 & 14 Car. II. yet that though it had not been *exactly* defined what these were, Mr. J. *Blackstone* having stated, (Comm. Vol. I. 114.) *Tithings, Towns, and Vill*s, to be of the same Signification in Law; and in *Charley's* Case, that "a *Vill* and a *Constable* are reciprocal." The Circumstance of there being a Person here, who always exercised this Office for the Place in question, was decisive; for though it did not appear that he was appointed with the legal Formalities usual on such Occasions, the constant Execution of Precepts within the *Vill* demonstrated the Necessity of such an Officer; and the dispensing with the Formalities of appointing, &c. was from the Design of the Owner of the *Vill*, to avoid the Consequences of such Appointment; which the Court would not countenance, to the Injury of the Public: That the Affidavit in support of the Application was justified by the Presumption arising from the Duty's being always done by the same Person: That the Statute Car. II. was made to remedy the want of Appointments of Constables by Lords of Manors, &c. in whom, of common Right, the Power was lodged: That no Case had gone so far as to say, that a Place circumstanced like the present was not a *Vill*: That it was only settled that *two Houses* would not constitute a *Vill*, because there could be no one in such a Case over whom *Overseers* were to exercise their *Jurisdiction*, and that they must be for ever in Office: As to the *Chapel*, all the Tenants had constantly, and as of common Right, resorted to it: That this Fact was strong Evidence of its public Nature, and inconsistent with the Idea of its being a *private Family Chapel*: That this must be so, for the *Chapel* had formerly belonged to the *Priory of Chicksands*: That this Place was described as a *Vill* in *Domesday*, and as a *Parish* in Extracts from the Augmentation-Office\*.—That including the *Mansion* or *Priory*, the annual Value of this Property was little less than 800*l.* per Annum, which ought not, by *finesse*, to be exempted from bearing its Proportion of the Public Burthen; and that at any Rate, the granting this Rule could not conclude the Parties, as *Vill* or no *Vill*,—might be a question made by a Return to the *Mandamus*, and thereby receive a solemn Determination.

\* The Extracts duly authenticated were read by Mr. *Cowper*; but not having been made Part of the Affidavit, grounding the Rule, the Court would not notice them.

LORD MANSFIELD. Whatever you may do hereafter, whether Facts alledged are made a Part of the Case, you now come upon a false Foundation. To support this Application, it is necessary, that the Place should be a *Vill*; but you have not said, that it was *ever* so *reputed*, or even that you believe it to be one; and Sir *George Osborne's* Affidavit says, it *never* was so *reputed*. You next deceive the Court by a false Suggestion, that there is a *Constable*, and that a *Constable* has been immemorially appointed. It is not true; and the Argument is only, that one *ought* to be appointed. Next, as to the *Chapel*, it is only a *private Chamber* in the House; sometimes *one* and sometimes another, as suits the Conveniency of the Family, used for religious Purposes when they are in the Country, and when they remove from it,



KING  
v.  
BEDFORD-  
SHIRE Justices.

K. v. Welbeck,  
Ante 11.

it, shut up, or used indifferently with the other Parts of the House, is it possible that this can be the Chapel of a Vill?

BULLER, Justice.—Were Mr. Cowper's Doctrine well founded, the Court ought to grant a *Mandamus* to the Justices in the first Instance, to put them to a Return: But this is by no Means the Case; for the Court must have probable Ground laid before them, to shew that the Place is a Vill, or they will not interpose: And it is laid down in *Strange*, that it is a good Return to a *Mandamus*, that a Place is not, or ever was, *reputed* to be a Vill.

WILLES and ASHHURST, Justices, concurring.

Rule discharged, with Costs.

It must appear upon the Case stated, that a Place either is legally and actually a Vill, or at least so reputed to be, to warrant an Application for a *Mandamus* to appoint Overseers. The Sites and Areas of ancient Cathedrals, Colleges, and Inns of Court, are Extra-Parochial.

THE KING v. JUSTICES OF PETERBOROUGH, Hil. 23 G. III. Cald. 238. A Rule had been obtained to shew Cause why a *Mandamus* should not issue directed to Charles Tarrant, Dean of Peterborough, and the Reverend William Browne, Justices in and for the Liberty of the Soke of Peterborough, in the County of Northampton, to appoint Overseers of the Poor of a certain Vill or Township, called Peterborough Minster, otherwise the Minster within the said Liberty.

The Facts sworn to in Support of the Rule were—That within or close adjoining to the City or Town of Peterborough is a certain Place, called Peterborough Minster: That it has always been Extra-Parochial, and always had a Number of Poor belonging thereto: That such Poor had till the Seventh of May last been always maintained, as the Poor belonging to such Extra-Parochial Place, by the Directions of the Dean and Chapter of the said Place, called the Minster; and out of some Fund belonging to them: That on the Ninth of May last, the Chapter Clerk of the said Dean and Chapter being applied to, to receive Esther Key, Widow, a Pauper, belonging to the said Extra-Parochial Place, and who had come by Pals to the Parish of St. John Baptist, within the said City or Town, and Close adjoining to the said Minster, as a Rogue and Vagabond, declared; that the said Dean and Chapter had already so many Poor, that they did not know how to maintain them; and that, though this Pauper did belong to the Minster, he should not take her in, as there were no Officers appointed within the Minster to whom any Order of Removal could be directed; and that he meant to avail himself of such Want of Appointment: That upon a Statement of these Facts, Application was also made to the Defendants, and to two other Justices of the Peace for the Liberty of Soke, all of whom resided within the said Extra-Parochial Place, called the Cathedral of Peterborough or Minster, to appoint an Officer for the same, and to grant their Order of Removal accordingly: That the said Justices refused so to do, no Officer having at any Time before been appointed for such Place; though it was sworn, they believed, that the Pauper of Right belonged thereto: That the said Extra-Parochial Place contains upwards of Forty-six Acres of Ground, known by several distinct Names, viz. the Minster Close, the Minster Square, the Vineyard, &c. and together with the Bishops, and Six Prebendal Houses, Twenty-five Dwelling-Houses at least, exclusive of Poor-Houses; and that these Houses are inhabited, except in the Instance of the Bishop and Three of the Prebendal Houses, altogether by Laymen or by Strangers to the Cathedral, and those generally Persons of Fortune: That the said Twenty-five Houses contain upwards of 124 Persons: That there are also in the said Extra-Parochial Place several Poor Houses containing a Number of Poor, who have by Birth, Marriage, or Servitude, acquired a Settlement therein; and who from some Fund belonging to the Dean and Chapter, receive, as a Maintenance, the Sum of Two Shillings and Eighteen Pence by the Hands of the Chapter Clerk, together with their Division of the Sacrament Money, amounting to Six-pence per Week over and above the aforesaid Payment: That there is also in the said Minster a Grammar School, with an Annual Endowment for the Support of the Master, payable out of some Fund belonging to the Dean and Chapter; by whom the said Master is appointed: that within the said Minster there is a Place for the Performance of Divine Worship,



KING  
v.  
PETERBORO'  
Justices.

Worship, and for the Burial of the dead; and it appears by the Register there kept for the Purpose, and which is distinct and separate from that of the *Parish Church of St. John Baptist*, and that from the Year 1756 to the End of the Year 1781, there have been Forty-two Marriages and Forty-eight Baptisms; and from the Year 1757 to the End of the Year 1781, Fifty-eight Burials had therein: That the Land and Buildings situated within the said *Minster*, from a Valuation taken thereof, are of the Annual Value of 400 *l.* at least: That the Arrears of Interest due upon the Sum of 200 *l.* lodged in the Hands of one of the Deponents in Support of this Rule in the Character of Trustee, and which had devolved upon three poor Girls who had become chargeable to the said *Extra-Parochial Place*, were demanded of him by the *Chapter Clerk* of the said Cathedral or *Minster*, and by him paid accordingly, and a Receipt given as follows:

6th November, 1782, Received of *Roger Parker*, Esquire, the Sum of 2*l.* 3*s.* 8*d.* the Balance of his Account with *Jeremiah Stanford*, for Interest Money in full, to the 11th Day of September last, and to be by me applied towards the Maintenance of the three Children of the said *Jeremiah Stanford*, who have become chargeable to the *Dean and Chapter of Peterborough*.

NATH. HUDSON, *Chapter Clerk*.

That in the Memory of another of these Deponents, who was Eighty-six Years of Age, there had been several other Poor-Houses inhabited within the said *Extra-Parochial Place*, but that some of them were fallen down, and that others had been taken down by Order of the *Dean and Chapter*, to prevent their being inhabited.

Against the Rule it was sworn by the Defendants, Doctor *Tarrant* and Doctor *Browne*, the *Dean*, and one of the *Prebendaries* of the Cathedral Church of *Peterborough*, that the *Precinct* or Close of the Cathedral Church of *Peterborough*, described in the Affidavit in Support of the Rule, by the Name of the *Minster*, is *Extra-Parochial*; and is not a *Township* or *Vill*, or ever was so reputed: That there have been poor Persons many Years Resident within the said *Precinct*; and that within their *Precincts* the *Dean and Chapter* are by their *Statutes* required to distribute in Charity the Sum of 20 *l.* Annually: That it appears by a Register Book kept for that Purpose, that till the Year 1737, the aforesaid Sum, and no more, had been Annually so supplied from the Chapter Fund; and that this Sum, together with the Sacrament Money, had been sufficient for the Support of the Poor then belonging to, or inhabiting the said *Precinct*: That it appears from the same Book, that in the Year 1737, this Sum proving insufficient, a farther Sum was expended for their Relief, and that since that Period the Expence of maintaining the Poor belonging to the said *Precinct*, has in some Years amounted to upwards of 80 *l.* but that the *Dean and Chapter* have, although without any other appropriated Fund, defrayed the whole Expence: That this Burthen has tended to the Diminution of the Revenue allotted for the Stipends of the several Officers of the Cathedral, the Repairs of the Fabric, and other contingent Expences: That the Land and Buildings within the said *Precinct*, exclusive of the Bishop's Palace, and other official Houses, belonging partly to the *Bishop*, and partly to the *Dean and Chapter*; and are all (except two Houses, which are the Property of private Persons) occupied by their respective Lessees: That there never was any *Constable* or other civil Officer appointed or chosen for the said *Precinct* or Close, or any *Overseer of the Poor* or *Churchwarden*; nor have the Inhabitants ever contributed to the Relief of the Poor within the *Precinct*, or been called upon so to do: That, upon the Application made to these Deponents, to appoint an Overseer of the Poor for the *Precinct* of the Cathedral Church of *Peterborough*, and to grant an Order of Removal, &c. as there appeared no Trace or Vestige of any such Office in any of the Writings or Registers belonging to the said Church; and as no such Officer or

Affidavits against  
the Rule.



KING  
v.  
PETERBORO'  
Justices.

Churchwarden ever had, to their Knowledge, been appointed, they were of Opinion, that they had not Authority to make such Appointment; and therefore declined, &c.

HOWORTH and BLAKE against the Application—Argued, that the *Precinct* in Question, having been the Site of a religious House, and now that of a Cathedral, and being altogether the Church Revenue, set apart for its Officers, was *Extra-Parochial*; and never subject to temporal Cares or *Parochial Duties*: That Places set apart for studious Retirement only, had ever had a similar Protection—that if the Bounty of the Statutes and the Humanity of the Possessors had hitherto induced them to make a *voluntary* Provision; they can neither in legal nor equitable Construction be considered as obliged to subject themselves for ever to those Burthens; that except upon the Face of the Rule, nothing appeared to shew that this Place was either a *Township* or a *Vill*, which was a decisive Answer to the Application.

Ante. 8.

Ante 140

—That in the *King v. Denham*, it was holden, that the Place should at least have the *Reputation* of a *Vill*: That nothing of this Sort appearing here, this Case must be governed by that of *The King v. Justices of Bedfordshire*.

Ante 9.

WALLACE *contra*, contended that, what was a *Vill* within the Act of Parliament is Matter of "Law; and by HARDWICKE, *Chief Justice*, in the Case of *Denham*, "must be left to the Judgment of the "Court, upon the Circumstances of the Case stated," that calling a Place a *Vill* is not making it such; that when the whole Facts that can induce a Belief or warrant a Conclusion upon the Premises, are brought forward for the Consideration of the Court; what the Party swears, as to *Opinion* or *Reputation*, must be immaterial: That the Facts disclosed upon these Affidavits offered *ample* Proof, that the Place in Question had been *properly* denominated a *Vill*; that exclusive of the Size of the Place and Number of Houses, *every* Requisite had been satisfied necessary to constitute a *Vill*—such as the Rites of *Marriage*, *Baptism*, and *Burial*, constantly performed there; and the Privilege of administering Sacraments; compleat Evidence of *Parochiality*: That this District having, to the great Improvement of the Revenues of the Church, been built upon, and leased out to *Laymen* of Fortune, not intitled to any ecclesiastical *Privileges* and *Immunities*, but in whose Families numerous Settlements by Services are acquired, the Duty of providing for them, was as strong in Equity as Law—that though the Court, in the Case of the *Justices of Bedfordshire*, said, that they would require the Affidavits in Support of the Application, to say, *at least*, that the Place had the *Reputation* of a *Vill*, before they would compel Justices to act contrary to their Ideas of Duty.—Yet that was a Case, *as brought before the Court by Affidavit*, in which there was a total Failure of all those Circumstances, from which the Court could at all conclude the Place to be a *Vill*.—The only Circumstance leading that Way, was expressly charged by the Court to have been an Imposition.—That all the other Cases in the Books, in which it has been by the Court hinted at, as necessary, to state the Place to have been a *Vill* by *Reputation*, were such as were defective as to *other* Proof, from which to conclude its being actually and legally such.

Cowp. 79, et post.

LORD MANSFIELD. This Place comprehends no more than the Site of the Cathedral and the Area around it; and consequently was in former Times within Sanctuary, and as such, sacred and inviolable as the Church itself. In modern Times to be sure there is no such thing as *Sanctuary*; but these Places have throughout all Ages, without Interruption, enjoyed those Immunities; as *Westminster-Abbey* now does, and other Places of the like Nature. The ancient Inns of Court, though not exactly upon this Principle, have also at all Times been privileged: And a similar Exemption was not questioned in a late Case, that of the *King v. Gardner*, with respect to that Part of the Court and Garden-Ground of *Catharine-Hall*, in the University of *Cambridge*, which lay within the old and *Extra-Parochial* Part of that Foundation. Would you say that *Christ-Church* in *Oxford* is a *Vill*. I am not satisfied from this Affidavit, that this Place is a *Vill*; and the Party applying do not even call it so.

BULLER,



BULLER, *Justice*. As the Party applying does not venture to assert, that this Place had ever any civil Officer, or was ever even reputed to be a *Vill*, the last of which, where the Facts of the Case do not, within some clear Principle of Law shew the Place to be of that Denomination, the Court has holden to be indispensibly necessary for the Purpose of founding an Application for a *Mandamus*; this Case falls within that which has been cited, (*The King v. Gardner*), and the Rule must be pronounced accordingly.

KING  
v.  
PETERBORO'  
*Justices.*

WILLES and ASHHURST, *Justices*—concurring.

Rule discharged,  
with Costs.

THE KING v. *Inhabitants of EYFORD (Glocestershire)* Hil. 25 Geo. III. MSS. The Defendants appealed to the Sessions against the Appointment of *John Player* and *Silas Wells*, substantial Housholders of the *Village of Eyford*, to be *Overseers of Eyford*, which Appointment was on such Appeal confirmed, and the following Case stated. Feb. 5th.

*Eyford* is an *Extra-Parochial Place*, consisting at present of a *Mansion-House* and a *Farm-House*, occupied by different Persons, but both together, with the Estate thereto belonging, of the yearly Value of 600 *l.* the Property of one Person.—Twenty-five Years ago there was in the same Place, a *Cottage*, now gone to Decay, the Scite of which was at the Time of the hearing the said Appeal covered by a Plantation: In 1727, the Occupiers of the two present Houses, acted as *Overseers of the Poor* of the *Hamlet of Eyford*, and in 1748, *W. Wanley*, the then Owner of the Estate, and Occupier of the *Mansion-House* aforesaid, acknowledged himself to be liable to maintain certain *Paupers* belonging to the said *Hamlet*, by a *Certificate* duly allowed, and the *Paupers* were accordingly relieved by his Tenant residing in the *Farm-House*, till within these Fifteen Years, during the latter Part of which Time the Estate in question came into the Possession of *Mr. Dolphin*.—*Mr. Dolphin* was a Justice of the Peace, and, dying, left his Widow in Possession of the *Mansion-House*—at which Time the *Farm-House* was likewise in the Possession of a Widow, and it is not until within these Two Years, that there has been any substantial Housholders in *Eyford* qualified to serve as *Overseers*.—From 1769 to the present Time, the Returns of Men qualified to serve in the *Militia* have been made to the Deputy Lieutenants, by the present Occupier of the *Farm-House*, who subscribed such Returns, as *Constable*.—That the Persons appointed *Overseers* are substantial Housholders in *Eyford*, occupying the two Houses aforesaid.—

An Extra-Parochial Place, though only consisting of two Houses, if stated to be a reputed Vill, is within the Statute of 13 and 14 Car. II. and an Appointment of Overseers for such a Place, is good.

A Rule having been obtained, to shew cause why the Order of Sessions confirming this Appointment should not be quashed.

Mr. BEARCROFT for the Appointment. The Question is, Whether the Appointment which has been made is an illegal Appointment? The Jurisdiction is exercised different from *Mandamus*, to compel *Justices to appoint*.—The Court will suppose the Justices to have done right, unless the contrary appears on the state of Facts acting as *Overseers* so long ago as 1727, is Evidence of its being Right.—In 1748, a *Certificate* from the then Owner of the Estate (allowed by two Justices) owning himself liable to maintain the *Paupers* therein named, as belonging to the said *Hamlet*, and who were accordingly relieved, is very strong: And another Mark sufficient to shew that it is a *Vill* is, that there is a *Constable*, viz. the present Occupier; and wherever there is a *Constable*, there is a *Vill*. And it is stated, that there are substantial Housholders.

Vide post, 21.

Mr. CLYFFORD on the same Side.—It is sufficient if a Place be a *Vill* by Reputation. LORD COKE says, that a *Vill* consisted “*de pluribus Mansionibus*,” and it is sufficient to answer that Description, if there is more than one.

LORD MANSFIELD. Who are the Persons that appeal?

Mr. CLYFFORD.—The Persons who are appointed.—The Value of this Estate is 600 *l. per Annum*? There are a great Number of Hands necessary to manage this Farm, and when they come to want; the Persons who have had the Benefit of their Labour, ought not to be permitted to send them to seek



KING  
v.  
EYFORD.

\* Ante, 6.

their Maintenance elsewhere. *Cro. Car.* 92 HILTON v. PAWLE, ante 5. — *ibid.* 349. NICHOLS v. WALKER and another.

In the Case of *Denham* and *Dalham*\*, it is stated, that it did not appear that there EVER were any Persons appointed to relieve the Poor.—LORD HARDWICKE is supposed to have said, where there are only two Houses, there cannot be Overseers, “for they must be perpetual Overseers.—That Case was different from this. There never had been any Overseers.

Suppose there had been formerly ten Families; though now reduced to two, the Parties from whose Labour much Benefit had arisen, should not for that Reason be deprived of their Settlement; which is the Recompence for that Labour, and the legal equivalent for the Benefit arising from their Service. Once a Vill always a Vill. *Co. Litt.* 115.

\* Post.

Ante 9.

Post 23.

Mr. BRAGG, on the same Side.—In the *King v. Denham*.—LORD HARDWICKE says, that it was the Opinion of PARKER Ch. J. in delivering the Opinion of the Court in the Case of *Doultong* and *Stockland*\*, that Settlements may be gained in *Extra-Parochial Places*, and that Justices may exercise the Powers given them by the Statutes of the 43 *Eliz.* and the 13 and 14 *Car. II.* where there is more than one House, and it comes under the Description of a Town or Vill.—*The King v. Belvoir Castle*, went on an Objection in Point of Form, viz. the Order directed “to the Churchwardens and Overseers of the Parish or Liberty of Belvoir.” Whereas it was particularly stated, that there “were none.” *The King v. the Justices of Middlesex (Kentish Town) Peart and Westgarth*.—*The King v. Uttoxeter*, and *The King v. Justices of Bedfordshire*, (*post.*) were all Cases of Attempts to separate Parts of Parishes, from other Parts of the same Parishes, and neither of them like this.—And in *The King v. Besland*, there is a dictum of Denison’s J. That, “there is no Law that says, there shall be an Appointment of two or more Overseers, uno statu; it may be of one, as it may happen that there is only one substantial Householder in a small Village, if he is appointed Overseer, and another substantial Householder comes into the Parish afterwards, cannot they appoint him also?” Here there were three Houses within these five and twenty Years.

Mr. WILSON—*Contra*.—The Question is, Whether this is such a Vill, as Justices are empowered to appoint Overseers for, before the Statute of *Car. II.* there could be no Appointment of Overseers in an *Extra-Parochial Place*.—And now only, if it be a Vill, Here the Sessions have not stated this to be a Vill, even by Reputation.—Nor is it stated in what Instance the Inhabitants acted as Overseers, nor that they were ever appointed. If Servants become chargeable to them, they cannot remove them, any more than have Paupers removed to them.

LORD MANSFIELD.—I think it should go back for the Sessions to state, whether this be a Vill by Reputation.

BULLER J. The Justices must state as a Fact, Whether it be a Vill by Reputation?

LORD MANSFIELD.—In the Case of *Denham*, the Court were very doubtful what is a Vill.—I am not satisfied, because only two Occupiers, that there cannot be Overseers of the Poor. In the Case of *Denham*, LORD HARDWICKE goes on the particular Circumstances of that Case.—Mr. J. LEE thought a Vill ought, at the least, to have the Reputation of a Vill or Town.—Under the Statute of *Eliz.* if only one Man, I don’t see that he may not be appointed Overseer.

Let it go back to have that Fact stated.

In Trinity Term following, it appeared by the restated Order, that the Sessions had found “that Eyford is a Vill by Reputation.”

Mr. WILSON. I am afraid that this is conclusive upon us. We wish very much to try it in an Issue.

BULLER J. This is decisive.

By the Court,

Let the Rule be discharged.

In



In the Case of *The King v. Sir Watts Horton, Mich. 27 Geo. III. Reported at length post.* It being contended, that where there is a *Constable*, there is necessarily a *Township*; and in this Case it was agreed on both Sides, that there was a *Constable*. Where there is a *Constable*, there is a *Township*.

BULLER, J. said, "It certainly is a *Township*. Wherever there is a *Constable* there there is a *Township*. There may be a *Constable* for a larger District than a *Township*, but not for a smaller. "The Doubt in many of the Cases, whether such Place was a *Township* or not, has arisen where "there was no *Constable*."

THE KING v. RONTON-ABBEY, *Inhabitants of*.—Hil. 28 Geo. III. B. R. 2. D and E, 207.—E. M. and her two Children were removed from the Parish of *Eccleshall*, to the Township of the Monastery of *Ronton-Abbey*, in *Staffordshire*. On Appeal to the Sessions they confirmed the Order, and stated, That the *Paupers* were settled within the Monastery of *Ronton-Abbey*, which is an *Extra-Parochial* Place, containing four or five Hundred Acres of Land, three Hundred and fifty of Arable and Pasture, and fifty of Wood, upon which there are now three Houses, one a very large Farm-House, occupied by Mrs. *Stubbs*; the other two small Houses; one with about an Acre of Land to it, the other with about four or five Roods to it, one of them occupied by T. M. a hired Servant of Mrs. S. and his Family; the other by J. K. a Day-Labourer, and his Wife; M's House being distant about a Quarter of a Mile from Mrs. S's House, and the other about the same Distance. Many Years ago there was a fourth House on another Part of the Abbey-Lands, which is down. The *Extra-Parochial* Lands are called *Abbey-Lands*. There are other Lands in the adjoining Parishes of *Ronton* and *Seighford*, called *Monastery-Lands*, Part of the said respective Parishes, and contributing respectively to the Relief of the Poor thereof. The several *Paupers* within *Ronton-Abbey*, who have received Alms, have received the same from the Occupiers of Land therein. Four credible Witnesses, who have lived for many Years near *Ronton-Abbey*, declared that they never heard it called a *Township* or *Vill*, nor never heard any Thing about it one Way or the other: In 1729, an Order of Removal was made, which Order of Removal taken from the Clerk of the Peace's File, was in the Words and Figures following, to wit. (The Order was directed to the Churchwardens and Overseers of the Poor of the Parish of *Seighford*, and the Overseers of the Poor of the Liberty of *Ronton-Monastery*, an *Extra-Parochial* Place within the County of *Stafford*, removing some *Paupers* from *Seighford* to *Ronton-Abbey*.) There was an Appeal against the Order, which appeared from the Clerk of the Peace's Books to have been quashed generally. In 1773, another *Pauper* was removed by another Order from the Parish of *Eccleshall* to the Liberty of *Ronton-Monastery*. With this last mentioned Order, one *Bowers*, who was another Overseer of *Eccleshall*, took the *Pauper* to *Ronton-Abbey*, and offered to deliver her to Mrs. *Stubbs*, then Resident there, who at first refused to receive her, but without assigning any Reason for such Refusal. *Bowers* then went to a Magistrate and procured another Order, and then returned and delivered one Copy of the Order, and the *Pauper* to Mrs. *Stubbs*, telling her, if she did not receive her, she would be liable to a Penalty of 5 l. Mrs. *Stubbs* then received her, and there was no Appeal against this last mentioned Order of Removal, nor did the *Pauper* ever come back into the Parish of *Eccleshall*. In the Year 1779, there was another Order for removing six other *Paupers* from *Gnosall* to *Ronton-Abbey*. Mr. *Starting* the Overseer of the Parish of *Gnosall*, went to *Edward Stubbs*, the Son of Mrs. *Stubbs*, then residing with his Mother, the said Mrs. *Stubbs*, with the *Paupers*, and this last mentioned Order; *Edward Stubbs* said we have no Overseer residing here, but we have appointed T. *Addison* our Overseer, and directed him to *Addison's* House, who then resided at *Eccleshall*, about a Mile distant from the Abbey, but rented some of the *Abbey-Lands*. *Starting* then went and delivered the *Paupers* to the said T. *Addison*, who was then Overseer of *Ronton-Abbey*. Notice of Appeal was given by *Addison* to the Parish of *Gnosall* against this last mentioned Order. The Appeal was afterwards heard, and it appeared in Evidence, that *Ronton-Abbey* did not, at the hearing of the said Appeal, set up the Defence of their

not

When the Sessions adjudge a Place to be a *Vill* by Reputation, as a Fact, this Court is precluded from going into the Question; notwithstanding the Sessions state all the Evidence particularly, on which they formed their Opinion.  
Vide post.  
K. v. Alice Stubbs.



KING  
v.  
RANTON-  
ABBEY.

not being liable to maintain their own Poor ; but the Appeal was quashed upon the Merits. Constables and Surveyors of High-Ways had been frequently appointed for the *Monastery-Lands*, but they never had any Jurisdiction over the *Abbey-Lands* ; and it did not appear that any Constable or Surveyor had ever been appointed for the *Abbey-Lands*. *Mary Keeling*, aged eighty-nine Years, and her Husband, lived within the *Abbey* sixty Years ago, and he rented a Tenement there sufficient to gain a Settlement. The said *Mary Keeling*, after the Death of her Husband, being distressed, upon Application to Mrs. *Stubbs*, has been for several Years relieved by a Piece of Land, which she lett for *twenty-eight Shillings* a Year, so long as she lived in the *Abbey*, and by a Quarterly Payment of *fifty-two Shillings* a Year, since she went into the Parish of *Penkridge* ; it appeared also, that some of her Family had been occasionally relieved by the above mentioned *Addison*.

The Sessions adjudged this Place to be a *Vill* by Reputation, and confirmed the Order of Removal, subject to the Opinion of this Court.

K. v. Eyford,  
Ante 19.

The COURT were of Opinion that, as the Sessions had adjudged, *as a Fact*, that this was a *Vill* by Reputation, they were precluded from going into that Question. On which the Counsel on both Sides said, it was intended to be argued as if the Sessions had adjudged it to be a *Vill* by Reputation, "on the Evidence stated" in the Case.—But

Sessions are not  
to state Evidence,  
but Facts, for  
the Opinion of  
the Court.

The COURT observed, that the Sessions were not to state the Cases for Purpose of taking the Opinion of this Court "on Facts ;" and that in this Case they had distinctly adjudged this Place to be a *Vill*.

Therefore, without Argument,

The Rule for quashing the Order of Sessions was discharged.



It now appearing that a PARISH, within the Meaning of the *Statute* of the 43 *Eliz.* c. 2. is a *Division* at this Time very well known; and that within the Meaning of the *Statute* 13 and 14 *Car.* II. c. 12. a VILL must have a *Chapel*, not only having *Sacramentals*, but to make it *independent* of the *Parish*, must have all other *Badges*, as *Sepultures*, &c. unless *specially found* to have been a VILL by *Reputation*:—And that a TOWNSHIP is a *Constabulary*, or that *Distriet* or *Space* over which a *Constable* has *Jurisdiction*. I come next, pursuing the Words of the *Statute*,

“FOUR, THREE, OR TWO,” to shew,

II. *What Number (together with the CHURCH-WARDENS) shall be appointed OVERSEERS.*

VINER. (*Poor*) 415. *Trin.* II *Ann.* B. R. *Anon.* Upon a Motion to quash an *Indictment* against B. for that he, with four others, being appointed *Overseers of the Poor* of such a *Parish*, refused to take upon him that Office, &c. it was objected that the *Statute* directs the Nomination but of four, three, or two, with the *Churchwardens*. And by PARKER, Ch. J. that is very odd (*true*) though in many Places more are appointed than four; for the Act says four, three, or two shall be nominated of the Inhabitants; at the Discretion of the *Justices* (*scil.*) they may nominate four, three, or two; it is not a Limitation of the *Justices* Power, but it is in the very authoritative Part thereof. *Where more than four are added*, they are not punishable by the Act, and they can be only added as *Assistants*.

Q. Whether an Appointment of five Overseers good.  
Vide K. v. Loxdale, Post.

By POWELL, J. The Question will be, Whether the Words of the Act will be any more than *directory*, or a *Limitation* of their Authority? In most of the *Parishes* about London, there are more than four, wherefore he said he need not determine this Point; but the *Indictment* was quashed for another Fault.

THE KING v. HARMAN, E. 12 G. II. B. R. *Bott.* 6. Motion to quash an Order of *Justices* of Appointment of Overseers for St. Clements Danes, and likewise an Order of Seizure for eleven Neglects with respect to the said Office.

Appointment of five Overseers  
Vide K. v. Loxdale, post.

*Hollings* for Defendants. The Power the *Justices* have is by 43 *Eliz.* which says, there shall be four three, or two Persons nominated for *Overseers*. In the present Case five have been nominated. The Order of Seizure sets forth, that Defendant was Guilty of eleven Neglects of Office, and therefore Orders 11*l.* to be levied, pursuant to the Act. It does not appear that Defendant had Notice of the Order of Appointment, before the Order of Seizure was made, the Summons should have been personally served. 5 *Mod.* 419. By the *Statute* the Penalty is 20*s.* for absenting from Monthly Meetings, or being negligent in their Office. Here are eleven Neglects charged; but only five of them for absenting from Monthly Meetings, four more are for absenting from other Meetings, not within the *Statute*; the tenth is, that his Maid refused to take the Rate Book; and the eleventh is, that he refused to take 7*s.* 3*d.* halfpenny, for half a Year's *Parish* Rate.

Upon



KING  
v.  
HARMAN.

Sir Wm. Lee.

Upon shewing Cause why the Order of Appointment of Overseers should not be quashed. Sir Thomas Abney argued, that here were three Appointments, viz. 18 April, 24 April, and 26 April, 1738, by which the Justices nominated *Harman*, and four other Persons, for Overseers of *St. Clements Danes*; on the *Certiorari* they have received two Summonses, and a Warrant of Distress, but the Court will not take Notice of them, because they ought not to be returned; for the Court will never quash *Processes* of Justices, but only Matters of Judgment.

CHIEF JUSTICE. We cannot take Notice of the Summons, or Warrant of Distress.

*Hollings*. In the Warrant, there is an Adjudication, and the Court will take Notice of that.

CHIEF JUSTICE. The first Consideration is the Appointment, and the next is, what is called on one Side a Warrant of Distress, and on the other Side an Order: If it is a Warrant of Distress the Court cannot take Notice of it, as in the Case of Bail or Recognizance: But in my Opinion, it appears on the Face of it to be an Adjudication, and as much so as an Order of Removal, for they *adjudge* the Party settled, and then there is a Warrant for his Removal. Now this is a Warrant of Distress, preceded by an Adjudication; for it recites the Neglects, and adjudges that he is guilty of them, and then directs the Distress. It cannot be determined what is an Order, but by Words of Adjudication. And taking it as an Adjudication, the Exception seems to be very strong; for it is, that they adjudge him to be guilty of the Neglects aftermentioned. The Servant's refusing the Rate-book, and his refusing the Rate, without appearing by whom given, and which are some of the Neglects of which they adjudge him guilty; are certainly Exceptions to this Order, and being connected with others in the Order, I think, form a strong Objection to it. As to the other Part of the Case, with respect to the Order of Appointment, I am doubtful whether this now comes before the Court in such a Way as for the Court to quash it. I think it will be a different Consideration if the Act of Parliament is to be construed, whether, upon the Face of such an Order where *five* are appointed, the Court can determine the Order void? But I cannot see how it can be called void, as to the *four* who act. *Drury's Case* 4 Co. (a) is very near this Kind of Construction. But now as we can only take Notice of it upon the Order, we cannot determine which to strike out, they being all equally nominated; and it differs from the Case of *Clerkenwell*; for here the Appointment is entire, and relates to all equally, and must be good or void in the whole; but as to the Appointment I have some Difficulty to determine upon this Return, that it is void *in toto*, which we must do, or confirm it *in toto*; but as to the Order or Warrant of Distress, I think the Exceptions are very strong; and as they are not defended, they will be sufficient to quash that Order.

(a) This was the Case of a Countess Dowager who retained a third Chaplain, who purchased a Dispensation to have two Benefices with Cure, and was advanced to them; the Question was, whether he was lawfully retained under 21 H. 8. c. 13. by which it is provided, "That every Countess, being a Widow, may have two Chaplains, whereof every one may purchase Licence or Dispensation." It was resolved, That when she retained two, the Statute was executed, for she could not have more than two capable to have Dispensation, and that the Retainer of the third did not divest the other two of their Privileges.

PAGE, J. I think both these Objections are well taken, and both the Orders should be quashed. I cannot see that it is Discretionary in the Justices to name above *four* Overseers. The Act of Parliament beginning with the greatest Number, shewed the Extent intended: As to saying there are no negative Words, there is no Occasion for them in a new Power; and the affirmative Words imply a negative; in the Case of Chaplains, every Man comes in separately, and therefore the Retainer may be void as to some; but in this Case they appear to be all nominated at once, and it is one Act, and they are equally innocent or guilty, and it must be void to the whole, they having exceeded the Number of *four*. Supposing this Appointment to be good, the Warrant is an Order, and the Warrant is grounded upon the Order which precedes it. As to the Usage, I think if it had been at the Time of the Act, and contemporary with it, would have been an Exposition, but this is at so great a Distance, that I think it cannot prevail.

Ch. J. I do not lay any Stress upon the Usage.

PROBYN, J. I don't think it necessary the Court should give any Opinion upon the Appointment, for it may come before the Court in a more proper Way, by *Indictment*; but the only Consideration is, as to the *Fines* levied by this Warrant of Distress. This is an Adjudication, for they *adjudge* the Neglect, and direct the Distress, and the Judgment and Execution may be in the same Instrument, as in Orders of Removal. Here are *eleven* Penalties for



KING  
v.  
HARMAN.

for *eleven* distinct Offences, quite different in their Nature, and they ought to be distinctly levied for each Offence; but here they are comprehended in *one* Judgment, and a *gross* Sum directed for the whole. If a Man be regularly appointed, he must have Notice, or he cannot be charged for Neglect; as to the Maid's refusing the Book, and his refusing the Rate, it was not said it was a Rate of the Parish; perhaps the Person who tendered it had no Authority. This is an Order, and in its Nature void, and ought to be quashed. Where a new Authority is created by Act of Parliament, and the Act is *particular* in its Directions, as to the Persons *in toto* appointed, without giving an additional Latitude to the Justices, it cannot be said that they can exceed the Number, and saying *so many* shall be appointed, is saying *no more* shall be appointed. Usages that can vary the Construction of an Act of Parliament, must be universal, and not only the Usage of a particular Parish. In the Case of *Bewdley*, it was an universal Usage, and for the Necessity of the Thing, the Opinion of all the Judges was to support that Proceeding, in regard all the Proceedings had been so for *seven* or *eight* Years past. General Usages, if they are immemorial, amount to a Law; but I don't go, only as to the Time, but to the Particularity of it. As to the Case of *Clerkenwell*, *four* were retained, which they had a Power to do, but here *all* are involved under *one* Appointment, which the Law does not give the Court a Power to quash as to Part, but it must be good or bad *in toto*.

CHAPPLE, J. This is as much an Adjudication as any that ever came before the Court, for the Words are, that they *adjudge*, &c. As to the Number, I think it would be more reasonable, that it should be confined to the Act, than that they should have a Latitude to extend beyond it. It has been held in the Court (in *Brecknack's* Case) that an Usage, though ever so long, will not take away the Effect of a *Charter*, much less an *Act of Parliament*. I think the Adjudication is bad in every Respect. It is not alledged that he accepted the Office, and he is to be punished for what are called Neglects, but it seems to me that they are all improperly called so, and here is an *entire* Judgment upon all. I am therefore of the same Opinion as to the Adjudication. It should be quashed.

Rule absolute for quashing the Order of Distress;

*And the Court will consider further of the Order.*

N. B. The Determination in this Case as reported in 2 *Seff. Cas.* 148. and from that Book taken into *Burn*, is *wrong*.—Vide *King v. Loxdale*, *post.* 26.

THE KING v. BESLAND, 19 G. II. B. R. *Bott.* 5. 1 *Wils.* 128. Two Justices made an Appointment of the Defendant, *only*, to be an Overseer of the Poor; and the Appointment was confirmed by the Sessions on Appeal. It was moved, to quash the Appointment, and the Order confirming it.

The Court will not quash the Appointment of *one* Overseer only, but will, if applied for, grant a *Mandamus* to appoint another.

LEE, Ch. J. The Objection is, that the Justices here appointed only *one* single Overseer, and not *two*, according to the 43 *Eliz.* But this is no Direction as to the Manner of Nomination. The Question then is, Whether, having appointed *one* Overseer, they have acted within the Authority of that *Statute*. It don't appear but there may be another Appointment by another Order, and the Court cannot say they have *not* appointed another; and if they have only appointed *one*, you may have a *Mandamus* for them to appoint another? I don't see but this is a good Appointment. In the *King v. Harman*\*, the Court were very tender in overturning that Order, and strongly inclined to think that the Order was good; and I am certain, there are many Parts of the Kingdom where a *single* Overseer is appointed.

\* Ante 21.

DENISON, J. Whatever the Merits were before the Sessions, we cannot tell; we must determine as it appears upon the Order. There is no Law that says, there shall be an Appointment of *two* or more

Court cannot quash an appointment of two Persons to be Overseers



seers, though one in fact, be not a substantial Householder, but it will stand as the Appointment of one; *sed quære; vide next Case; & K. v. Stubbs, post. 32.*

Overseers *uno statu*; (*ante 20.*) it may happen that there is only one substantial Householder in a small Village, if he is appointed Overseer, and another substantial Householder comes into the Parish afterwards, cannot they appoint him also? Suppose two are appointed Overseers, and one of them is not a substantial Householder, the Court cannot quash the whole Appointment, then it will stand as in the Appointment of one, which could not be, if an Appointment of one was illegal. There is no Occasion for the Court to give any Opinion where the Justices can appoint one Overseer only.

Both Orders confirmed.

Not more than four Overseers can be appointed for or in one Parish, unless it is divided into two or more Divisions or Townships.

\* 2 *Seff. Cas.* 148. and 3 *Burn.*

THE KING *v.* LOXDALE *et al.* *Hil.* 30 G. II. B. R. *Burn. M. S.* Vol. III. *Ed.* 16. 311. On a Rule to shew Cause why an Appointment of five Overseers for the Parish of *St. Chad*, in *Shrewsbury*, should not be quashed, it being objected that this Appointment was not warranted by 43 *Eliz.*

By Lord MANSFIELD, Ch. J. Upon reading the Case of the *King v. Harman*, (*ante 22.*) I find it was pressed in that Case, that the Usage had been, for more than four Overseers to be appointed: And Sir John Strange was instructed to argue it on that head, on this Maxim, that *Communis error facit jus*. In the printed Case of the *King v. Harman*\*, it is said, the Court refused to quash the Order. But this is a Mistake. Being desirous to know the Usage in a Variety of Parishes, we desired the Agents to inquire what had been the Usage in the large Parishes in *London* and *Westminster*, and more particularly with respect to the other Parishes in *Shrewsbury*. The Result is, in *Shrewsbury*, it appears there are four Parishes, in which the Number of Overseers has never exceeded four; but the Parish of *St. Chad*, in which the present Dispute arises, has five for one Year only: In the Parish of *St. Andrew's, Holborn*, there are eight Overseers; but then there are three Divisions there, and Overseers for each; and Orders of Removal are made from one Division to another: In *St. Giles's*, eight Overseers; but in 1756, only four appointed by the Justices, and four more serve voluntarily as Assistants: In other Parishes no more than four. This Account that has been given us is very satisfactory, for it lays the Usage out of the Case, and proves it to have been the contrary Way. This brings me to consider what are the Authorities and judicial Precedents in this Case. And this seems to be quite a new and original Case, on which there has never been any judicial Opinion given. There never was any Doubt till the *King v. Harman*; and there the Court gave no Determination on the Validity of the Appointment, as appears by the Rule "*and the Court will further consider of the Order.*" The Case of the *King v. Besland*\*, was very different from this; there it was impossible to have more than one Overseer. But there was no judicial Opinion in that Case, so that neither of these two Cases hath any Determination extending to the present Case. This Case therefore being an Original one, it must be determined on the true Construction of the 43 *Eliz.* which may be called the great Constitution of the System of Law concerning the Poor.

\* *Ante 25.*

As to the Time of appointing them.

To incline the Court to construe this Act with a Latitude, two other Clauses have been mentioned, that have been held merely Directory: One is, with respect to the Time of appointing: now the precise Time is not of the Essence of the Thing, where third Persons, and innocent ones, are affected; as in the Case, of the Town of *Launceston*, 1. *Roll's Abr.* 513. An Appointment after the Time was held to be good, rather than defeat the End of the Charter, and leave the Corporation destitute of a Magistrate by another Construction. So in the Case of the *King v. Sparrow* and others (*post*) where the Overseers were appointed more than a Month after *Easter*; and to have said in that Case, that there could not have been an Appointment after the Time, would be to say, that there is no Remedy for the Neglect of the Justices to appoint within the Time. The other Clause is, to be nominated by the Justices *in or near*. This is a loose, indefinite Expression. If a Justice lives 20 Miles off, if there is none nearer, he must be said to be near. It is a Word of Relation. I do not see how this Clause could be construed otherwise. And though some Part of the Act should be construed to be Directory, yet it cannot from thence be inferred that the whole is so. It is a Rule of Construction, that where Persons as Justices, Commissioners, or the like, have a special Authority by Statute, they have no Power but under that Statute; and



and if the Thing is done otherwise, and not agreeable to the special Authority, it is void. There is no Room for the Distinction, that there must be *negative* Words to circumscribe the Power. It was said at the Bar, that if a Man has a Power originally, and an Act of Parliament gives him something less than he had before; there, without *negative* Words, the Act will not take away that which he had before. But it can never be necessary for the Act to say, a Man shall *not* do, what he could *not* do before. The meaning of the Legislature was not to leave the Justices in *absolute* Discretion, but to *confine* their Discretion not to *exceed four*, nor to appoint *less than two*. There is another Rule of Construction: Where there are at different Times, different Statutes made, concerning the same Matter, though some of them should be expired, and not referred to by subsequent Statutes; yet, being in *pari materia* they shall *all* be taken together, and considered as *one* System of that Branch of positive Law, and giving light to one another. This has been so determined of the disabling Statutes concerning Leases by ecclesiastical Persons; so the Statutes relating to Bankrupts, some of which are temporary, are in *pari materia*, and shall be taken together. Thus all the Statutes since the Reformation concerning the Poor, I consider as one Body of positive Law; and they must be taken together. By the 39 *Eliz.* c. 3. *four* Overseers were to be appointed; and there was no Latitude at all. If the Question had stood upon that Statute, the Justices could *not* appoint a greater Number. There is a late Instance: By the *British Museum* Act, 26 G. II. c. 22. the Trustees, or the Major Part of them, were to do certain Acts. It was found impossible to get the major Part of them together, and they were forced to apply for a new Act, 27 G. II. c. 16. giving Power to the major Part of the Trustees *then present*, not less than seven to do those Acts. It is plain to me, that in making the 43 *Eliz.* the Legislature had the 39 *Eliz.* in Contemplation; they refer to it; and the 43 *Eliz.* was not to commence till the *Easter* following. The 39 *Eliz.* expired with the Session in December: They therefore continued it till the *Easter* following. This clearly accounts for the Expression *four, three, or two*; rather than *two, three, or four*; (for there is a great difference between these two Expressions;) and points out to a Demonstration, what the Legislature meant. Parishes were not so populous then; and *four* were thought too many; and therefore 43 *Eliz.* gives a Latitude to appoint fewer, and directs the Justices to be governed by the Greatness or Smallness of the Parish. It has been contended, that the 13 and 14 *Car. II.* is a legislative Exposition of the 43 *Eliz.* I do not see that that *Stat.* will vary the Question one way or the other. That Statute is to make each Township in the Nature of a separate Parish; and says, that two or more Overseers shall be chosen in each Township. I listened for a Case to shew that in these Townships they could appoint *five*. Upon inquiry it does not appear that more than *two* have been appointed. The *Stat. Car. II.* refers you, as to the Appointment, to the *Stat. 43. Eliz.* by *express* Words, and this Reference is the same as *repeating* the Statute. It was observed that there has been a greater Latitude in the Construction of Statute *Car. II.* that is, that it hath been extended to Counties not therein named. But it would have been absurd to say, that that Statute, reciting an Inconvenience in *Wales*, should extend to some other Place *only*. The Statute made in the Year 1740, for the Parish of *St. Martin's in the Fields* has great Weight with me. This proceeded from a Conviction in those that applied for the Act, that they could not appoint more than *four*. It shows that the Parliament thought it was a real Doubt, and that they thought it necessary that there should be a Boundary; for they have not left it at large, but confined the Parish not to exceed *nine* Overseers. There are two Acts passed since the Case of the *King. v. Harman*, viz. the said Act for *St. Martin's*, and the 17 G. II. c. 3. to remedy some Inconveniencies relating to Overseers, with regard to Rates and other Matters; and yet they make no Alteration in the Number of Overseers. In the Parish of *St. Clement's Danes*, they have restrained themselves to *four* ever since. And the precise Number is not immaterial, as was said at the Bar, either to the Parties themselves, for it is a burthensome Office, and the more there are at the same time, the quicker will the Rotation be; or to the Parishes for whom they are Trustees, for a Trust is not the better discharged, by a greater Number than by a few. There may be more Expence

Vide post.



KING  
v.  
LOXDALE.

in a large Number. They may be obliged to divide themselves into separate *Quorums*; which is no immaterial Consideration to the Persons with whom they are to act. If *five* may be allowed, there will be no Boundaries, and then there will be great Inconveniences. Upon the whole, the Words are precise; and the Usage, which alone occasioned any doubt, turns out the other Way. This Appointment is not warranted by Statute 43. *Eliz.*

Mr. Justice *Denison* was of the same Opinion. He said, that if this had been a Matter of doubt, it is strange that it should never have come before the Court, till the Case of the *King v. Harman* in the 13 G. II. In that Case they did not quash the Appointment, for the Sake of the Poor of that particular Parish. This is an original Creation of the Jurisdiction for the Maintenance of the Poor. The Number of Overseers is the essential Part of the Constitution. Where a Jurisdiction is created by Statute, you cannot vary from it. This Office is partly ministerial and partly judicial. The Statute of 13 and 14 *Car. II.* is tied up according to the Rules of the 43 *Eliz.* and one of the Rules is restraint. As it has rested so long, I am of Opinion that an Appointment of *five* Overseers cannot be warranted.

Mr. Justice *Foster*. I never had a Doubt. The Court has gone hitherto upon the prudential Reason of not overturning the Rates of so many Parishes. In Queen *Elizabeth's* Time there were no large and populous Parishes in great Towns and Cities. There were indeed Parishes of large Extent in the Country; but they are provided for by the 13 and 14 *Car. II.* If any Inconveniences arise from having too few Officers in particular Parishes, you must apply to Parliament. It would produce Confusion to have more Officers. The 43 *Eliz.* is the first Statute now in force, but not the first that provided for the Poor. It does little more than make the 9 *Eliz.* perpetual; and there were several Statutes before that.

Mr. Justice *Wilmot*.—The Circumstance that made me doubt was, the Notion of an Usage to have more than *four* Overseers in large Parishes. The Words of the Act are so strong, that had the Usage been otherwise, I should have doubted whether that could have controuled them; but the Usage being to appoint *four*, it furnishes a strong Argument. And the Act for *St. Martin's* is a strong Instance of the Sense of the Legislature. The Parliament finding *two* parochial Officers, to wit, the *Churchwardens*, added *others* for the parochial Administration. The 43. *Eliz.* relaxes the 39. *Eliz.* and gives a Discretion within the Number of *four*. In the 18th Clause, with respect to the Island of *Fowlness* in *Essex*\*, a Power is given to the Justices, to appoint such a Number of Overseers as the Exigencies of the Place shall require; which shews, that where the Legislature meant an indefinite Number, they have expressed it. In general, it would be inconvenient to have an indefinite Number; it would not lessen the Burthen; nor would the Parish have a greater Security, for each Man is answerable only for the Money he receives, and accountable for his own Acts only. *Bott. 9. same Case.*

Rule absolute. Appointment quashed.

N. B. Sir *James Burrow* observes, that the *King v. Besland*, was confirmed as not necessarily appearing to be a bad Order, for it might be, that *others* were appointed by other Orders.

Appointment of  
a single Overseer  
not to be quashed.

Power to appoint  
Overseers, &c.  
within the Island  
of *Fowlness* in  
the County of  
*Essex*, though  
not a Parish.

\* By 43 *Eliz. c. 2. s. 18.* It is provided, That whereas the Island of *FOWLNESS*, in the County of *Essex*, being environed with the Sea, and having a Chapel of Ease for the Inhabitants thereof; and yet the said Island is no Parish, but the Lands in the same are situated within divers Parishes, far distant from the said Island. Be it therefore Enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That the said Justices of Peace, shall nominate and appoint Inhabitants within the said Island, to be Overseers for the poor People, dwelling within the said Island, and that both, they the said Justices, and the said Overseers, shall have the same Power and Authority, to all Intents, Considerations, and Purposes, for the Execution of the Parts and Articles of this Act, and shall be subject to the same Pains and Forfeitures; and likewise, that the Inhabitants and Occupiers of  
Lands



*Lands there, shall be liable and chargeable to the same Payments, Charges, Expences, and Orders, in such Manner and Form, as if the same Island were a Parish.*

*In Consideration whereof, neither the said Inhabitants or Occupiers of Land, within the said Island, shall not be compelled to contribute towards the Relief of the Poor of those Parishes, wherein their Houses or Lands, which they occupy within the said Island, are situated, for or by Reason of their said Habitations, or Occupings, other than for the Relief of the poor People within the said Island, neither yet shall the other Inhabitants of the Parishes wherein such Houses or Lands are situated, be compelled by Reason of their Resiency or Dwelling, to contribute to the Relief of the poor Inhabitants within the said Island.*

" SUBSTANTIAL.



“SUBSTANTIAL HOUSHOLDERS THERE;” or,

III. *Who may or may not be appointed OVERSEERS; and how to be described in such Appointment.*

A Person in the Country for a Season of the Year only, shall not be appointed Overseer.

DALTON in his *Justice, &c.* 216. Chap. 73. Sect. 2. says, “The Justices of the Peace, who have the Appointing of Overseers, must be careful to chose such Men as in every Town are fittest, viz. Substantial Persons, who have Competency of Wealth, Wisdom, and good Conscience. And they must be Householders, and not Sojourners, however otherwise qualified.”

THE KING and QUEEN v. MOOR. *Mich. 2 W. and M. R. B. Carth.* 161. Moor being a Citizen of London, had a Country House in the Parish of Hornsey, where he usually dwelt in the Summer Season, and therefore he was chosen by the Parishioners to be one of the Overseers of the Poor of that Parish; and upon his Appeal to the Quarter Sessions, an Order was made to discharge him from his Office, in which Order the next two Justices of the Peace were required to appoint another Man in his Room.

This Order being removed into this Court by *Certiorari*, it was now moved, that it might be quashed, because the Sessions had nothing to do in this Matter; for the Statute 43 Eliz. gives no Appeal in this Case, but is positive that the two next Justices shall appoint, &c.

HOLT, Ch. Justice, was of Opinion, that an Appeal would not lie:

EYRE, Justice, doubted.

But because this Order did not recite, that Moor was appointed Overseer by the two next Justices, therefore it was not quashed, for the Court held, that nobody was hurt by the Order, for that it did not appear that Moor was legally chosen Overseer, therefore the Order did not affect any Body.

But the Court seemed to discountenance the Parish in chusing such a Man Overseer, who was Resident there but only some Part of the Summer, and was actually an Inhabitant of another Parish in London.

A Woman cannot be appointed Overseer. See *vide contra. K. v. Stubbs, &c. Post. 32.*

THE QUEEN v. CHARDSTOCK, *Eas. 10 Ann. Vin. Abr. Title POOR, 415.* It was moved for a *Mandamus* to J. H. and J. T. Justices of the Peace in the County of Dorset, &c. to nominate two substantial Householders to be Overseers of the Poor of the Parish of Chardstock in the said County, upon the Statute of 43 Eliz.; and there was an Affidavit, that at a Meeting of the Parish after Easter last, one J. B. and Mary F. were elected Overseers, and at a Meeting of the Justices, they approved of Mr. B. and refused the Woman, as being an unfit Person to serve as Overseer; and the old Overseers refusing to nominate any other, the Justices approved the said B. only.

By POWELL, J. A Woman is not to be an Overseer of the Poor; and there can be no Custom in a Parish to put her in, because of her being a House-keeper; because this is an Office created by Act of Parliament.

By PARKER, Chief Justice.—The Nomination must be by the Justices, and it seems the Overseers are to continue but one Year. The Parish here was obstinate, in not having another instead of the Woman; and the Justices should have nominated one of the old ones, since they were so stiff; but (because the Justices had done well in refusing the Woman) he directed that they should apply to the Justices to have another nominated; and if they refused, then to apply to the Court for a *Mandamus* the next Term.

THE



THE QUEEN v. ST. ANDREW'S, *Overseers of the Poor of. Mich. 2 Ann. B. R. 6 Mod. 77.*  
An Order of two Justices for one's taking upon him the Office of *Overseer of the Poor*, being removed, several Exceptions were taken against it by MOUNTAGUE: 1st, That it did not appear by it that the Party was an Inhabitant or a House-keeper, and you will not intend him to be either, for it is not like the Case in *Hob. 312.* where a Man shall be intended to be in his Senses, or a Witness credible, till the contrary appears: And the Way were for the Parish, to present these Officers to the Justices, to be by them confirmed. 2d Exception was, the Order appointed him *Overseer of the Poor* of that Part of the Parish that lies in *Middlesex*, (for the Parish of *St. Andrew* extends both into *London* and *Middlesex*; and for this the Case of the *House of Correction* for *Blackheath* was relied on. And the Court seemed to think the Appointment ought to have been for the whole Parish, but after, they might order him to meddle only with such a Division.

QUEEN  
v.  
ST. ANDREW'S

THE KING v. SHERINGBROOK, 2 *Lord Raym. 1394. B. R. Eas. Geo. I.* An Order of Justices made for appointing the Defendant *Overseer of the Poor*, being removed into this Court by *Certiorari*, was quashed upon Motion, because it did not appear by the Order, that the Defendant, *Sheringbrook*, was a *substantial Householder*, which is expressly required by the Words of the Act, 43 *Eliz. c. 2. s. 1.* And in the same Town, in the *King. v. Clerkenwell, B. R.* an Appointment was quashed for the same Reason. *Foley 4.*

In an Order appointing a Person Overseer of the Poor, it must set out, that he is a substantial Householder.

THE KING v. GREAT MARLOW, *Trin. 13 Geo. I. B. R. Foley 5.* Exception was taken to the Appointment of two Persons *Overseers of the Poor*, at the Sessions. The Case was, one *Phillips* and *John Gibbons*, were appointed *Overseers of the Poor* of the Town of *Great Marlow*, by two Justices of the Peace in *Easter Week*. There was an Appeal to the Sessions, suggesting that *Phillips* was not duly chosen, but that *A.* had a Majority of the Parishioners; and therefore the Sessions appoint *A.* and *Gibbons* *Overseers of the Poor*.

Mr. REEVES objected, that the Appointment of the Sessions did not mention that they were *substantial Householders*, that the Justices at Sessions could make no new Appointment, there being one before by two Justices below.

Bad, because not called substantial Householder, and because made by the Justices in Sessions.

The Court thought the Appointment of the Sessions to be bad on both Accounts, and ordered it to be quashed. Afterwards, Mr. LEE took Exceptions to the Appointment of two Justices.

That it was an Appointment for a Town, and not a Parish, but not allowed.

That it was an Appointment for a whole Year. The Court said it was well enough, and if they should quash it, there is no Appointment of this Kind that would stand. So held very good.

THE KING v. WEOBLY, *Overseers of. Mich. 20 Geo. II. B. R. 2. Str. 1261.* There were two Sets of *Overseers* appointed, and both quashed; one because the Persons appointed were described only as *principal Inhabitants*, instead of pursuing the Words of 43 *Eliz. c. 2. s. 1.* which are *substantial Householders*: And the other because it only called them *substantial Householders*, without adding *there*, or in the Parish; and this too was not in the Body of the Appointment (as it ought to be) but only in the Direction at the Foot of it.—Same Resolution said to have been in the *King v. Morral, M. 7 Geo. II. MSS. Bott. 2.*

It is not enough, that Overseers styled principal Inhabitants.

HAINS v. HANCOCK. *Eas. 3 Ann. B. R. Note.* A Writ of Privilege was moved for to have a Clergyman, who appeared to have no Cure of Souls, privileged from the Office of *Overseer of the Poor*.

Q. Whether a Clergyman in that Case, may have a Writ to discharge him from being Overseer.

And



HAINES  
v.  
HANCOCK.

And though HOLT, *Chief Justice* seemed against it, because by him their Privilege of Exemption was only extendible to their Spiritual Revenues, and if in any Case they were privileged, it was only from Common-Law Offices, and especially if they were *without Cure*; as here; Yet the other *three* Justices were strongly against him. But, however, for his Lordship's Satisfaction, desired it might be stirred again. 1. *Lev.* 303. *Archdeacon of Rochester* had such a Writ to discharge him from the Office of *Expenditor* for *Romney Marsh*.

N. B. "This was the Case of *Doctor Lee*, B. R. 22 Car. II. 1 Vent. 105. who having "Lands within the Level, was made an *Expenditor* by the *Commissioners of Sewers*; whereupon "he prayed his Writ of Privilege in this Court; and it was granted. For the *Register* is " *Vir militans Deo non implicatur secularibus negotiis*\*: And the ancient Law is, *Quod Clerici non ponantur in Officia*†, F. N. B. Clergymen are not to serve in the Wars."

\* A Man religiously engaged, shall not be incumbered with secular Affairs.

† A Clerk shall not be placed in Offices.

The same Case is reported in 1st, *Mod.* 282. *Trin.* 29 Car. II. and there said.—"Afterwards RAINSFORD and MORETON only being in Court, it was ruled he should be privileged, because he is a "Clergyman," F. B. 175. r. But (*the Reporter says*), "I think for another Reason, viz. because the "Land is in Lease, and the Tenant, if any, ought to do the Office."

Order appointing an acting Justice of the Peace, and Officer on Half-Pay in the Marines, Overseer of the Poor, quashed.

THE KING v. GAYER, ESQUIRE, Hil. 30 Geo. II. B. R. Burr. Mansf. 245. *James Gayer*, Esquire, and *Benjamin Copley*, were by Order of two Justices appointed Overseers of the Poor of the Parish of *Rockbear*, in the County of *Devon*.—Which Appointment, on the Appeal of Mr. Gayer, the Sessions quashed as to him, and stated this Case: "That it appearing unto them, that he had some "Years been, and was at the Time of the Nomination, and still an acting Justice of the Peace for "the said County, residing within the said Parish, and a substantial House-keeper there; and also "a Lieutenant of Marines in his Majesty's Service, on Half-Pay; and that there are other sufficient "substantial Householders within the said Parish, for the doing such Office."

Mr. NORTON having obtained a Rule to shew Cause, why the Order of Sessions, quashing the Order of Appointment should not be quashed.

The Council on both Sides went (*at large*) into the Argument, Whether the Reasons given were sufficient, particularly, whether the Office of *Justice of the Peace* and the Office of *Overseer of the Poor*, were compatible; and whether the Objection could be removed by appointing a Deputy? If it could, then, whether a *Justice of Peace* was liable to be appointed Overseer, in order to his executing the Office by Deputy?

LORD MANSFIELD said, the general Questions concerning the *Incompatibility of Offices*, and the *Power of appointing Deputies*, are a large Field indeed: But the present Question seems to turn in a very narrow Compass.

The Sessions, upon an Appeal, have a Right to exercise the same Latitude of Discretion in judging, who are fit to be nominated Overseers, as the two Justices had. They have given their Opinion; that Mr. Gayer was not a proper Person. They are not obliged to give any Reason for their Opinion; because the Legislature has entrusted them, upon an Appeal\*, with the Power or Authority of appointing Overseers.

\* Q. Vide R. v. Great Marlow, Ante.

If they had given no Reason, their Order undoubtedly had been good: We must have presumed that they acted upon proper Grounds.

It is true, that where the whole Reason is set out, and is clearly wrong, we may and ought to quash an Order manifestly made by Mistake, upon an erroneous Foundation; but then, the bad Reason given, must appear to have been their only Inducement. If there may have been other Grounds, they should be presumed sufficient: And the Order ought not to be set aside, because some of their Reasons, unnecessarily given, appear to be bad.

There



There was *no Necessity* for appointing Mr. Gayer: The Sessions state, that there were *other* sufficient *substantial Householders* within the Parish. They might think Mr. Gayer, under *all* the Circumstances, improper *unnecessarily* to be appointed: His being an *acting Justice of Peace*, residing within the Parish, and a *Lieutenant of Marines*, might be *two* Circumstances which weighed, among *others*. But it don't follow, neither is it said, that they looked upon *both*, or *either* of these Reasons, as an *Exemption* from being appointed, or a *Disability* to serve the Office of *Overseer*; and that they vacated the Appointment of two Justices *as illegal* upon *that* Account.—The Execution of a discretionary Power, where it is not necessary to give a Reason, ought to be supported, *unless* the *whole* Reason is set out, and *manifestly wrong*. Here the *whole* Reason, upon which the Sessions acted, is *not* given. They say, there were *other* Persons qualified. Supposing Mr. Gayer *liable* to serve the Office, they might think him *not* so proper as many *others*. And therefore we are not obliged to say, “that the *whole* Reason they went upon is bad;” allowing (*for Argument*) that there arose *no legal* Objection to the Appointment of Mr. Gayer; which, I think, there is no Occasion now to examine.

KING  
v.  
GAYER, Esq.

DENISON, Justice—concurred.

They were not *obliged* to give *any* Reason at all: And if it be *only an imperfect one*, we ought *not* to quash their Orders. I remember the Case of the *King v. Spalding*, where the Justices held a Man settled in a Parish, by Reason of an Apprenticeship; not saying, “that he had served *forty Days* in “the Parish, under it:” Yet the Court would not *intend* that they had done wrong.

As Justices are not obliged to give *any* Reason, if they give an *imperfect one only*, the Court will not for that, quash their Orders.

We will *intend* every Thing in Favour of the Justices in their Orders.

Now, here the Reason *does not appear* to be a *wrong* Reason: It is enough if they judged him an *improper* Person to be *Overseer*.

Every Thing shall be *intended* in Favour of Justices in their Orders.

FOSTER, Justice—concurred.

ORDER of Sessions affirmed.

THE KING v. ALICE STUBBS and others. *Eas.* 28 G. III. 2 D. & E. 395. B. R. *Alice Stubbs*, Widow, T. M. and J. K. who were described to be *substantial Householders*, were on the 6th of September, 1787, appointed Overseers of the Poor, for the Township of the *Monastery of Ranton-Abbey*, in the County of *Stafford*, for one Year next ensuing the Date thereof. On Appeal to the Sessions, this Appointment was confirmed, subject to the Opinion of this Court, on the following Case: The *Township of Ranton-Abbey* is an *Extra-Parochial* Place, containing three Houses only, and about four or five hundred Acres of Land. Those three Houses are respectively occupied by the *Appellants*. *Mrs. Stubbs* lives in the *Abbey House*, and occupies the greatest Part of the Land within the *Township*. The House occupied by T. M. is a small House, which he Rents, with about an Acre of Land belonging to it: He has lived in it two or three Years, with a Wife and Children, and is *poor*, and a Servant to Mrs. S.—K. is a *Labourer* and *poor*; but the House in which he lives, with four or five Roods of Land is his own.

A Woman may be appointed an Overseer of the Poor: where a District contains only three Houses, the Inhabitants of all three, may be appointed, notwithstanding two of them are Labourers and Poor.

*Leycester* obtained a Rule to shew Cause why the Order of Sessions, and the Appointment thereby confirmed, should not be both quashed, on three Grounds; First, on the Form of the Appointment, being made on the *sixth of October*, for the Year ensuing the Date thereof; Secondly, because one of the Persons was a *Woman*; and thirdly, because the other two were *Poor*, and therefore not within the Description of the Act of Parliament, namely, *substantial Householders*.

*Plumer*, *Syer*, and *Legh*, now shewed Cause. The first Objection being given up, on the Authority of the *K. v. Sparrow*, (Post). As to the next Objection, “That a *Woman* may not be appointed Overseer;” the Stat. 43 *Eliz.* has no such *Exception*. It mentions *substantial Householders*, which has no reference to *Sex*; and if not exempted in *express* Words, neither can she by any thing that may be *implied* from any Analogy to the Exemption of *Women* to serve other Offices. First, there is no *necessary* Incapacity by reason of her *Sex*, which disqualifies her from executing this Office. Secondly, if there were some Parts of the Duty, which a *Woman* could not execute *in Person*, she may appoint a *Deputy*.

Appointment of Overseers dated in *October*, for a Year next ensuing the Date, is good, because it shall be understood to be the Overseer's Year.



KING  
v.  
STUBBS and  
others.

\* "pending a  
Suit."

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v.  
STUBBS and  
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Point that a *Constable* could appoint a *Deputy* to execute all the Duties of the Office; but the Court thought, that for the particular Purpose then in question, which was merely *Ministerial*, he might. And in the Case of the *K. v. Clarke*, it was taken for granted, without considering whether or no, it had ever been decided. In *Cro. Car.* 389. where a Custom was set up to elect a *Constable* or *Tithing-man* in Rotation, was held bad; "for then a Woman, being an Inhabitant, may come in her Course to be *Constable*, which the Law will not permit." But, at all events, even if it were established, that a *Constable* could appoint a *Deputy*, that single Instance would not out-weigh all the others. And it would not follow, that an *Overseer of the Poor* could appoint a *Deputy*, because a *Constable* might, for the latter Office is *Ministerial*, and the former an Office of *Trust and Discretion*; since he is to exercise a Judgment on the Propriety of relieving the Poor, to punish the Idle, to make Assessments, and to have the Application of them. There is likewise another Distinction between the Offices of *Constable* and *Overseer*; the former is a Common-law Officer, and his *Deputy* may be sworn in as *Principal*; but an *Overseer* is created by Act of Parliament, which gives no Power to appoint a *Deputy*. And if it were allowed to an *Overseer* to appoint a *Deputy*, the Statute, which with great Caution expressly requires *substantial Householders*, would be evaded. And though the *Principal* in such Case might be held answerable for the Money, that would not obviate the Mischiefs arising from an improper exercise of Discretion. But exclusively of any Inference which is to be drawn from this Act of Parliament, the Legislature themselves thought that an *Overseer* could not appoint a *Deputy*; for it is enacted by 1 W. & M. c. 18. that *Dissenters*, who may be chosen *Overseers*, may appoint *Deputies*. Thirdly, It does not follow, that though a Woman may appoint a *Deputy Overseer of the Poor*, she herself shall be appointed the *Principal*, and be *compellable* to appoint a *Deputy*, 2 *Inst.* 34. if she be competent to serve the Office herself; it would be making her responsible for the Acts of her *Deputy*, when she, as *Principal*, is not liable to be placed in such a Station of Responsibility. *Stone's Case*, 1 *Lew.* 265. So in *Abdy's Case*, where the Objection, that he might execute the Office of *Constable*, (which it seems was served in the District, under a Custom, by Rotation) by *Deputy*, was over-ruled. So in the Case of the *Vicar of Dartford*, 2 *Str.* 1107. All this Doctrine is recognized in 2 *Hawk. P. C. c.* 10. s. 39. No Case has been cited to shew, that a Person is *compellable* to accept an Office, merely because he may appoint a *Deputy*; in the Instances cited of the *Great Chamberlain*, *Earl Marshall*, &c. who have the Power of appointing *Deputies*, it is only said, that they may, not that they must appoint them. And there are Profits, &c. annexed to those Offices, which would make it desirable to the *Principals*, to be able to appoint *Deputies*. But no Argument can be drawn from any particular Instances of Offices of Dignity, or which are Lucrative, to shew that in other Cases where the Office is not of that Description, the *Principal* shall be compelled to accept the Office, and appoint a *Deputy*, he being himself incompetent to execute it in Person. Now this is a burthensome Office; and therefore the Authorities apply stronger in its Favour: besides, to compel an incompetent or privileged Person, to appoint a *Deputy*, would be to destroy all Privileges and Exemptions whatever. And yet there are many Cases in which Exemptions have been actually allowed.

Ante. 29, 30.

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The Stat. 43 *Elix.* requires, that the Persons to be appointed *Overseers of the Poor*, shall be "substantial Householders;" and as they can only be appointed by virtue of this Act, it must be strictly pursued. In the *King v. Sheringbrook*, and the *King v. Great Marlow*, the Orders were quashed, because it did not appear that the Persons appointed were "substantial Householders," and because, instead thereof, they were called "principal Inhabitants;" the Appointment was quashed in the *King v. Weobly*.—Then if it be necessary to state it in the Order, it is necessary to prove it, or at least it should not be negatived. Therefore, even though "substantial," were a relative Term, that will not assist the Prosecutor in this Case, because it is expressly stated, that these two Men are poor Persons; it may perhaps be difficult to define what is "substantial" within this Act; but it is sufficient to say, that, in this Case, these Persons are stated not to be "substantial," and the Office of *Overseer*

of



of the Poor is of great Importance; great Trust is reposed in him; and therefore the Statute requires that he should be of "Substance and Responsibility."

THE COURT TOOK TIME TO CONSIDER.

Afterwards ASHURST, Justice, delivered the Opinion of the Court. Three Objections have been made; first, to the Form of the Appointment of Overseers, it being made on the 6th of October, by which the Overseers are appointed for one whole Year from the Date thereof.—Secondly, That one of the Persons appointed was a Woman, who, as such, could not legally be appointed to such an Office.—Thirdly, That the other two were not "substantial Householders," and therefore could not legally be appointed.

As to the first, it was disposed of in the Course of the Argument; it being determined, in *The King v. Sparrow*, that such an Appointment is good. As to the second, we think that the Circumstance of one of the Persons appointed being a Woman, does not vitiate the Appointment: The only Qualification required by 43 Eliz. is, that they shall be substantial Householders; it has no Reference to Sex. The only Question then is, Whether there is any Thing in the Nature of the Office, that should make Women incompetent? And we think there is not.—There are many Instances where, in Offices of a higher Nature, they are held not to be disqualified; as in the Case of the Office of High-Chamberlain, High-Constable, and Marshall; and that no common Constable, which is both an Office of Trust, and likewise, in a Degree, judicial. So in the Case of the Office of Sexton.—As to the Case in *Viner, Title POOR*, 415. that is no conclusive Authority. It is to be collected from the Case, that there were other Persons in the Parish proper to serve; and, if so, the Court held that the Justices had not acted improperly in refusing to approve of a Woman; where there are a sufficient Number of Men qualified to serve the Office, they are certainly more proper; but that is not the Case here; and therefore, if there is no absolute Incapacity, it is proper in this Instance, from the Necessity of the Case. And there is no Danger of making it a general Practise; for as the Justices are invested with a general discretionary Power of Approbation, it is not likely they will approve of such an Appointment, when there are other proper Objects. As to the third Objection, with respect to the two other Persons appointed, we think there is no Foundation for it in this Instance.—The Word "substantial" is a relative Term. If there were a great many opulent Farmers, there the Appointment of a Day-Labourer might be improper; but here there were no other Persons to serve. They are both Householders, with some Land annexed to their Houses, and one of them a Proprietor.

No better Persons can be had than the Place affords; and the Want of them is no Reason why the Poor should not be provided for. Therefore we are all of Opinion, that the Appointment ought to be allowed, and the

Order of Sessions confirmed.

By the 26 Geo. III. c. 107. s. 130. No Serjeant, Corporal, Drummer, nor any Private, from the Time of his Enrollment, until discharged, shall be compelled to serve as a Peace or Parish Officer, &c.

But as Doctor BURN observes, the Act provides no Exemptions for the Officers.

By the 18 Geo. II. c. 15. s. 10. All Freemen of the Company of Surgeons incorporated by this Act, who have been or shall be examined and approved pursuant to the Rules of the said Company, for so long Time as they shall use the Art or Science of Surgery, shall be exempted from the Offices of Constable, Scavenger, Overseer of the Poor, and all other Parish, Ward, and Leet Offices, and from serving upon any Jury, Leet, or Inquest: And if any such Person shall be chosen into any of the said Offices, or returned to any Jury, or Inquest, or be disturbed by Reason thereof, such Person producing a Testimonial, under the common Seal of the said Corporation, of his Examination, Approbation, and Freedom, to the Person by whom he shall be so appointed, or by or before whom he shall be summoned, shall be discharged from the same.

PROUSE'S

KING  
v. SPARROW,  
and  
others.

Women may be  
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Attornies and  
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also next Case;

though Custom  
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**PROUSE'S Case**, Mich. 10 Car. B. R. Cro. 389. *Prouse*, an Attorney of the King's Bench, was elected *Tithing-man* of *Taunton*: In which *Town* a Custom is pretended to be, that every one shall be a *Constable* or *Tithing-man*, according to their several Houses; and he having purchased two Houses in the same *Town*, was, in a Leet there held, elected *Tithing-man*: And thereupon he brought a Writ of Privilege to be discharged, because he is to be Attendant in this Court. But the *Justices of the Peace* would not allow thereof, but desired the *Justices of Assize* to direct whether it should be allowed, who would not meddle therewith, but ordered, it should be moved in this Court: Whereupon **MAYNARD** now moved, that this Writ is not to be allowed; for though, in Truth, Attornies and Clerks of the Court have such a Privilege to be discharged when they are generally elected, because their Attendance being required here, they shall not be compelled to attend such an Office; yet when there is a special Custom, that they shall be elected in Course, according to the Situation of their Houses, that Custom ought to prevail against such Privilege: For otherwise, one Attorney may purchase many of the Houses in the *Town*, and then there shall not be sufficient Persons to do the Service: As in Truth in this Case, he hath purchased seven Houses in the said *Vill*, wherefore he ought to be charged. But all the COURT held, that it cannot be a good Custom; for then a *Woman* being an Inhabitant in one of the said Houses, it may come to her Course to be *Constable*, which the Law will not permit. So this Custom pretended, cannot hold Place against a Person, who is, by this Office, to be Attendant here: Whereupon it was ordered, that he should be discharged.

*N. B.* Though this is not a direct Authority, that Attornies are exempt from the Office of Overseers of the Poor, yet it was so far considered such, as to have inclined the Court in determining the next Case, to pronounce them, on the Principle of this Case, discharged from other Parish Offices.

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London, as well  
as Attornies, &c.  
privileged from  
serving Parish  
Offices.

**ABDY**, Alderman of London's Case. Trin. 16 Car. B. R. Cro. 585. *John Abdy*, an Alderman of London, having an House at ———, in the County of *Essex*, where it was pretended that *Constables* should be elected out of the Inhabitants in every House, by Presentment every Year in the Leet of Sir *William Hicks*, Lord of the Manor and Leets there. The said Alderman Abdy, by the Name of *John Abdy, Esquire*, was nominated in a Leet holden such a Day, to be *Constable* there for the Year following. And because he refused, one *John Duke* being Steward there, imposed a Fine upon him, and denied him his Privilege to be freed, by Reason of his being an Alderman; whereupon this being suggested, it was moved, to have a Writ out of this Court, directed to the Lord of the said Manor, or his Steward, to discharge him, because he being an Alderman of London, ought to be there resident the greatest Part of the Year, and if absent is finable.—And all the Court held, that he ought to be discharged by his Privilege, as Attornies attending in Courts are discharged of such Offices as *Constables* and other Offices in the Parish. And although it was said, he might execute it by Deputy, and his personal Attendance is not requisite by the Custom of the said Manor. Yet not allowed; whereupon it was awarded, that a Writ should be directed to the Lord of the said Manor to discharge him.

It is said, an Attorney shall not be excused by Privilege from Offices which may be executed by Deputy, but only those which require personal Duty, as Churchwarden, Constable, &c. 2 Lill. Abr. 374.

By the 5 Hen. VIII. c. 6. The Wardens and Fellowship of Surgeons in London, shall be discharged of Constableship, Watch, and all Manner of Office bearing Armour, and also of Inquests and Juries in London.

Physicians men-  
tioned in this  
Act, exempted  
from Offices in  
the City of London.

By the 52 Hen. VIII. c. 40. The President of the Commonalty and Fellowship of Physicians, and the Commons and Fellows of the same, shall be discharged to keep Watch and Ward in London, and shall not be chosen Constable or any other Officer in the City, &c. 1.

Yet



Yet it seems to have been holden, that the Equity of this Act, doth not extend to *other* Physicians not mentioned in it; perhaps for this Reason, because Physicians have no special Custom for their Discharge, as Surgeons are said to have. 2. Hawk. 64.

Q. Whether any others are?

And it seemeth that a practising Physician, being chosen *Constable* in pursuance of a Custom in respect of his Lands in a Town, has no Remedy for his Discharge; for that there are no Precedents of this Kind, and his Calling is private; yet if he be chosen *Constable* of a Town, which hath sufficient Persons besides to execute the Office, and no special Custom concerning it, *perhaps* he may be relieved by the King's Bench. 2 Hawk. 63.

Yet perhaps the Court of King's Bench would relieve him.

By the 3d Sect. of the above Statute. *Any of the Fellowship of Physicians being admitted by the said President and Fellowship, may practise the Science of Physic, including Surgery.*

Sed quare.

Being by this Sect. empowered to practise Physic, either as *Physician, Apothecary, or Surgeon*, they may *perhaps* be thought to come within the Spirit of the

6 Will. III. c. 4. made perpetual by the 9 G. I. c. 8. which directs, *That all Persons using the Art of an Apothecary within the City of LONDON, and seven Miles thereof, being free of the Society of Apothecaries of LONDON, and who shall be examined and approved, so long as they shall Use the said Art, shall be exempted from the Offices of CONSTABLE, SCAVENGER, OVERSEER OF THE POOR, and all other PARISH, WARD, and LEET Offices, and from serving upon Juries; and if any such Person shall be chosen into any of the said Offices, or returned to serve on any Jury, such Person producing a Testimonial under the Common Seal of the Corporation, of such his Examination, Approbation, and Freedom, shall be discharged, f. 3. and by f. 4. of the same Act, All Persons using the said Art of an Apothecary within any other Parts of this KINGDOM, WALES, or BERWICK, and who shall be brought up and serve in the said Art as an Apprentice SEVEN YEARS, shall likewise be exempted from the Offices and Duties aforesaid, so long as they shall Use the said Art.*

Apothecaries within London, or seven Miles thereof, exempted from Parish, &c. Offices, and serving on Juries;

and all Apothecaries within other Parts of the Kingdom, Wales, and Berwick, exempted.

By the 1 W. & M. Stat. 1. c. 18. *If any Person dissenting from the Church of ENGLAND, shall be appointed to bear the Office of HIGH-CONSTABLE, PETTY-CONSTABLE, CHURCHWARDEN, OVERSEER OF THE POOR, or any other PAROCHIAL or WARD-OFFICE, and such Person shall scruple to take upon him the said Offices, in regard of the Oaths, or any other Thing, such Person may execute such Office by a DEPUTY that shall comply with the Laws, provided the DEPUTY be approved, as such Officer should have been: sect. 7. and by*

A Dissenter may appoint a Deputy to execute Offices.

Sect. 2. of the same Act, *Every Minister of a Congregation, that shall take the Oaths herein required, and make and subscribe the Declaration, and subscribe such of the Articles as are required by this Act, shall be exempted from serving on any Jury, or from being chosen to the Office of CHURCHWARDEN, OVERSEER OF THE POOR, or any other PAROCHIAL or WARD OFFICE, or any other Office, in any Hundred, City, Town, &c.*

Minister of a Congregation exempted.

By the 10 & 11 W. III. c. 23. f. 2. *All and every Person and Persons who shall apprehend any Person guilty of any the Felonies in this Act mentioned, (viz. Burglary, Shop-lifting, and Horse-stealing,) and shall prosecute him, her, or them, so apprehended and taken, until he, she, or they, shall be convicted of any the aforesaid Felonies, such Apprehenders and Takers, for his, her, or their Reward, upon every such Conviction, without a Fee or Reward to be paid for the same, shall have forthwith, after every such Conviction, a Certificate, which shall be under the Hand or Hands of the Judge, Justice, or Justices, before whom every such Conviction shall be had, certifying such Conviction, and also within what Parish or Place the Felony was committed, whereof any such Person or Persons was or were convicted as aforesaid. And also, that such Felon or Felons, was or were discovered and taken, or discovered or taken, by the Person or Persons, so discovering or apprehending any the said Felon or Felons. And in Case any Dispute shall happen to arise between any of the Persons so discovering or apprehending any the said Felon or Felons, so convicted as aforesaid, touching their Right or Title to the said Certificate, that then the said Judge, Justice, or Justices, or the major Part of them,*

Person having convicted a Felon, may have Certificate thereof, to exempt him from Parish Offices,



them, so respectively making such Certificate as aforesaid, shall in and by his or their Certificate direct and appoint the said Certificate into so many Shares, to be divided amongst the Persons therein concerned, as to the said Judge, &c. or the major Part of them shall seem just and reasonable, which said Certificate shall and may be ONCE assigned over, and no more. And the original Proprietor of such Certificate, or the Assignee of the same, whomsoever of them shall have the greatest Interest therein, by virtue thereof, and of this Act, shall and may be discharged of, and from, all Manner of Parish and Ward Offices, within the Parish or Ward wherein such Felony or Felonies shall be committed, and such Party or Assignee is hereby declared to be discharged therefrom; which said Certificate shall be enrolled by the Clerk of the Peace of the County, in which the same shall be granted, for which shall be paid unto such Clerk of the Peace, One Shilling and no more.

and may be once Assigned.

Not assignable after Use once made of it.

Sec. 3. Provided nevertheless, that if any Person having such Certificate, shall at any Time make Use of the said Certificate to exempt him from any Parish or Ward Office, such Person so making Use of the said Certificate, or any other Person or Persons, claiming any Interest therein, shall not assign over the said Certificate to any Person or Persons whatsoever.



“ IV. TO BE NOMINATED YEARLY IN EASTER WEEK.”

THE QUEEN v. SEARLE, *Trin. 12 Ann. B. R. 1 Sess. Cases, pa. 42. Ed. 1760.* Nomination of Overseers of the Poor of *Honniton*; the Justices having Authority to appoint fit Persons and sufficient Housholders, it is not sufficient to recite, that these Persons are sufficient Housholders, *as appears by the Certificate of the Churchwardens*; but the Justices must determine that they are sufficient Housholders.

Secondly, As to the Limitation of the Office, the 10th of *April* is the Time of Nomination, and they appoint for *the Year*, which is ill; for they must be appointed *at Easter*, or within a Month after; and *Easter* being moveable, they may be in *above* a Year, or *less*, and then there would be no Office.

Sir Peter King. These Orders are to be construed as Orders of Regulation, and not Orders of Judgment, as Settlements, &c. and it is not usual for this Court to meddle with Orders of Regulation, as for Rates, &c. The Words were, that upon Certificate of the Churchwardens of *Honniton*, that *A. B.* and *all of them*, Housholders of *Honniton*, are fit to be Overseers of the Poor.

The COURT held, that these Words, *all of them*, &c. were the Words of the Justices, and not of the Churchwardens; and the Appointment for *a Year*, according to the Act of Parliament, is good.

It is not sufficient in an Appointment, to say that the Persons appointed are substantial Housholders; as appears by the Certificate of the Churchwardens; but the Justices must determine them to be such.

Appointment of Overseers for a Year held good; though *Easter* is moveable. Vide *K. v. Jones*, 2 Sess. Cas. 328.

Ante. *K. v. Marlow*.

THE KING v. ST. GEORGE, *the Inhabitants of. Trin. 9 G. Fortes. 320.* The Nomination of Overseers of the Poor, was, that such and such *by Name*, were appointed to *set the Poor on Work*, &c. and mentioned the several Duties in the Act, but did not in *express* Words appoint them OVERSEERS; and for that Reason this Nomination was quashed.

Overseers of the Poor must be nominated in express Terms.

THE KING v. CLERKENWELL. *East. 13 G. B. R. Foley 4.* The whole Court seemed to think the appointment of Overseers of the Poor on a *Sunday*, to be a good Appointment, for it may be in *Easter Week*, and this is the first Day of the Week.

May be appointed on a *Sunday*; *sed quare*; vide *K. v. Butler*, and *K. v. Bridgewater*. Post.

But the Appointment was quashed, because it does not say they were substantial Housholders.

THE KING v. HELLING. *East. 6 G. III. B. R. 3 Burr. Mansf. 1904.* On shewing Cause against quashing an Order made upon *Easter-Wednesday*, 1766, by two Justices, appointing the Defendants Overseers of the Poor of *St. Andrew's*, Holborn, above the Bars, and *St. George the Martyr*. It was observed, that

Order made on *Easter-Wednesday*, 1766, appointing Overseers for the present Year, 1766, is good.

It had been objected, that this is not an Appointment under the Statute of 43 *Eliz. c. 2.* being “for this present Year, 1766.”

But this is the usual Form in this Parish. And the Order says, “And to do *all* such things as their Duty requires;” that is (amongst other things) to stay in their Office until others are appointed.

On the other side, it was admitted, that they could not go out of the Order; but by the 43 *Eliz. c. 2. sect. 1.* the Overseers are to be nominated *Yearly*, and this Act giving a *Jurisdiction*, they are obliged to conform *exactly* to it, consequently they can nominate only *for a Year*, (neither more nor less,) whereas this Appointment being made on *Easter-Wednesday*, and appointing them “for the Year, 1766,” they were not authorized or intitled to continue any longer than the *End of that Year*. It is not an Appointment *for a Year*.

Lord MANSFIELD. The *real* Objections, I take it for granted, are not before the Court.

The only Question before us is, “Whether the Order is good upon the *Face of it*, or not.” Now this Order plainly means the Overseers’ Year; and that Year is from *Easter to Easter*. You would

Overseers Year, is from *Easter to Easter*.



KING  
v.  
HELLING.

make it bad by understanding it to mean the *Year of our Lord*. But you cannot construe this Order to be a bad one, by understanding it so: for it manifestly means quite another sort of Year.

WILMOT, J.—Was silent, being a Parishioner.

YATES, J.—Was Absent.

ASTON, J.—Concurred with *Lord Mansfield*, and said, that if the Construction may be taken two Ways, one of them making the Order good, the other making it bad, he should take it in the Sense that should make it good.

By the Court. Rule discharged. Order affirmed.

Mayor or Head  
Officer in Towns  
Corporate hath  
not the sole Ap-  
pointment of O-  
verseers.

THE KING v. BUTLER and others, Hil. 8 G. III. K. B. 1 Blackst. Rep. 650. Motion, to quash an Appointment of the Defendants, to be Overseers of the Poor of the Town of Guilford, made by two of the Corporation Justices on *Easter Monday*, 20 April, 1767. There being another Appointment made by W. S. the Mayor, and T. P. one of the County Justices, of two other Persons on *Easter-Sunday*, 19 April, which was insisted on, to be the only valid Appointment; as being prior, in Point of Time, though alledged by the Defendants to have been made clandestinely, and fraudulently, at one o'Clock in the Morning. The Stat. 43 Eliz. was strongly relied on, in favour of the Mayor's Appointment; which, in Sect. 8. enacts, that "Mayors, Bailiffs, or other Head Officers of every Town Corporate, being Justices of the Peace, shall have the same Authority, within their respective Jurisdictions, either in Sessions, or out of it, as is given by the said Act to any Justices of the Peace; and no other Justice or Justices to enter or meddle there."

This *Dunning*, Sol. Gen. argued, was to be confined to the Mayor, or other presiding Officer only; and that he alone has the Power of appointing Overseers; especially, as by the same Sect. Aldermen of London are invested with the Power in their respective Wards. In Sect. 9. Accounts are to be made up before the said Head Officer in the singular Number. By Sect. 10. In Case no Appointment of Overseers be made in a Town Corporate, the Penalty of 5*l.* is laid upon the Mayor, Alderman, (*viz.* of London,) or Head Officer only; whereas, in Counties, it is laid upon every acting Justice of the Peace. And, in Sect. 11. the Warrant for recovering the Penalties is also grantable in the same Manner.

The Court will  
not quash an Ap-  
pointment of O-  
verseers after  
their Year is ex-  
pired.

But by Lord MANSFIELD, Ch. Jus. Cui bono is this Application now made, to quash the Appointment, after the Year is expired? Upon this ground alone, the Rule must have been discharged. But I would not have it thought, that I put it off upon this Ground, because I have any Doubt on the Question. The Doctrine endeavoured to be set up is a very strange one. What, shall a Mayor of a Town Corporate, (where there may be a dozen Parishes, where the right of voting for Members perhaps, may be by Scot and Lot; and he the returning Officer,) shall he alone appoint all the Overseers in the Town? Had such a Power been ever dreamt of before, it must have been contested over and over, and would long since have been corrected by Parliament. The Statute only means to give Justices in Corporation and Head Officers, where there are no Justices, the same Power as Justices in Counties; in Sessions (where there are Justices) as well as out it. *Quod omnes Justic. concesserunt*. I question whether there is any Determination, that an Appointment on a Sunday is good?

Vide ante 41.

An Appointment  
of Overseers on a  
Sunday bad.

ASTON, J.—I have a Note from Mr. J. Bathurst of the Case of the King and Clerkenwell, Eas. 13 Geo. I. that an Appointment made on *Easter-Sunday*, shall be good; it being a Work of Charity. Vide ante, determined on another Point, not said to be substantial Householders.

LORD MANSFIELD. Notwithstanding that Reason, I should think an Appointment on a Sunday, is *prima facie*, clandestine and bad.

YATES, ASTON, WILLES, Justices, agreed, that the  
Vide K. v. Bridgwater, Post. Rule be discharged.

THE



THE KING v. MERCHANT and another, Justices of Bridgwater, Eas. 9. G. III. Bott. 14. Six Appointments of Overseers of the Poor, made by two Sets of Justices for Bridgwater, were removed into the Court of King's-Bench. It appeared that two had been made on Easter-Sunday, two on Monday, and two on Tuesday, the usual Way of making Appointments in that Town; but which were first made, on the respective Days, did not appear. The Court seeing no Reason to presume that those made by the Defendants, were subsequent to those made by the Justices, declared that, if their Appointment made on a Sunday, bona fide, was Prior to that made by the others on the same Day, it was good: Therefore an Affidavit of Priority was necessary to induce the Court to quash either.

KING  
v.  
MERCHANT &  
another.

THE KING v. BRIDGWATER, Overseers of, Tr. 14. G. III. B. R. Cowp. 139. Upon shewing Cause, why several Appointments should not be quashed, the Case appeared to be a Contest between two adverse Sets of Borough Justices. Each Set met before Midnight of Easter Eve: and each began making their Appointments of Overseers, the instant the Clock had struck twelve; and so kept on renewing the same Appointment for an hour or two. But one Set of them made a fresh Appointment at eight o'Clock on the Sunday Morning; supposing that there would be a Contest concerning the Priority of those Appointments, which were made soon after Midnight; and perhaps all of them bad.

An Appointment  
of Overseers on a  
Sunday is bad.

Mr. Hotchkin shewed Cause, and cited 3 Burr. 1595. Swan v. Broome\*, to have the Appointments good.

LORD MANSFIELD, Ch. Just. The Conduct of the Justices in this Case is a shameful Prostitution and abuse of their Office, for Election purposes; and I wish any body could be found who would prosecute both Parties. It would have been more for the Interest of either side, to have waited for a legal Appointment on the Monday. I do not know that there is any Authority, which says that an Appointment on a Sunday is good, but it certainly is not a day for such Purposes as these; and therefore I will not give my Sanction to any of the Appointments. Let all the Appointments be set aside, and a Mandamus be directed to the Justices to make a new Appointment; and let the Mayor give two Days Notice of the Time and Place of meeting for such new Appointments.

The three other JUDGES concurred.

N. B. The Matter was afterwards compromised between the Parties.

\* This was a Question in the Court of King's Bench, upon a Writ of Error from the Court of C. B. upon a Recovery. Where it was held; that if the Return-Day of a Writ of Summons, be on a Sunday, and the Voucher dies on that Day, the Recovery is bad.



"OR WITHIN ONE MONTH AFTER EASTER;" or,

V. *Whether an Appointment of Overseers at any Time AFTER, be good within the Statute.*

An Appointment of Overseers of the Poor, by Justices of the Peace, though not made within a Month after Easter is good.

\* *Harvey v. Broad.*  
† *Strange, 387.*

\* As reported, 2 *Self. Cases, 185.*

Post.  
Vide *K. v. Skinn, and K. v. Baker.*  
Post.

\* Who said, My present Opinion is, that this is only directory; when a Time is limited in a Charter for making Elections, we never grant *Mandamus* to go to Election till that Time is expired, and if they cannot elect after, to what purpose is the Writ granted. 2 *Self. Cases, 186.*

THE KING *v. SPARROW and others*, Justices of Ipswich, Hil. 13. G. II. B. R. 2 *Strange, 1123.* A *Mandamus* issued, tested 1st June, directed to the Justices of Ipswich, to appoint Overseers of the Poor; to which they returned, that they had in obedience to such Writ made an Appointment: and that being removed by *Certiorari*, appeared to bear Date the 13th June.

It was objected by Mr. Solicitor-General, in Order to quash the *Mandamus* and Appointment, that it appeared, that the Month after Easter (which is the Time given by the Statute, to make the Appointment in) was expired before the Writ issued, Easter Day being the 22d of April; and the Court was bound to take Notice of that, according to *Salk. 626\**. and *Hoyle v. Lord Cornwallis. Trin. 6. G. I.†* The Act designed the Justices should do it within a limited Time, and therefore puts it in Easter Week, or within one Month after Easter; now if it may be done at any Time, it will introduce a great Confusion, and it will be many years before it comes round to the right Time again. There can be no Inconvenience in this, because the Churchwardens are Overseers, and take Care of the Poor; and there is no Penalty upon the Justices, which goes to their Use. This is a Part of the Act, which was never yet thought to be directory only.

"Mr. Hollings, on the other side\*, argued, that the Appointment was not void, though not made within a Month after Easter, because that was only directory to the Justices, as Rates are directed to be made Monthly, yet not void if otherwise; from the whole Tenor of the Statute it appears, that it is intended that the Justices should have Power over the Officers during the whole Year, and and there are no negative Words that determine the Time of appointing Overseers.

"The Statute directs to what Age Children shall be bound, yet that was held to be only directory in the Case of *Charlbury v. Ascot*. As to Bastards, it says by Justices residing in or near the Parish, yet that is not necessary. The King *v. Morris.* (Maurice.) Hil. 8 G. II.

"Such a Construction as they contend for is very inconvenient, for if an Appointment is made within the Month, and afterwards quashed, or if the Overseer dies after the Month, no new one could be appointed."

The COURT upon the Argument (except Mr. Justice Page\*) inclined to think the *Mandamus* and Appointment were wrong; but upon further Consideration, they all held the Appointment good, and confirmed that, and allowed the Return, the Chief Justice (Sir William Lee) delivering the following Resolution:

The COURT must judicially take Notice, that this is made without the Month; but then the Question is, whether it is void or not? The adding a Penalty is an Argument that it is not so; for it was foreseen there would be Inconveniences if it was not done in Time, and it might therefore be proper to enforce a speedy Execution of the Power; and this was the Construction as to taking Pledges on *Westm. 2d. c. 2.—2. Roll. Abr. 259.* Though it is a new Law, yet against the Justice and Meaning of it, no negative shall be implied. *Magna Charta* says, *Communia Placita non sequantur Curiam nostram*; and yet if the Common Pleas gives Judgment to abate the Plaintiff's Writ, which is reversed in the King's-Bench, that Court shall proceed upon the Writ, 2 *Inst. 23.* So also as to an Assize in the proper



proper County, 2 *Inst* 25. The Statute 2 *Edw.* VI. c. 4. requires *two* or *more* Justices; and yet 3 *Inst* 136. it is held, that where there is but *one* Justice he may execute the Authority.

KING  
v.  
SPARROW, &c.

The 43 *Eliz.* c. 2. being for the Maintenance of the Poor, must be construed liberally; and so said *Pratt*, Ch. J. *Trin.* 7. G. I. in the Case of the *K. v. Rufford*, where a *Mandamus* to appoint Overseers, in an *Extra-Parochial* Place, was granted after the Month was expired; and so it was *Trin.* 5. G. II. in the Case of *Uttoxeter*\*; and though there were Cases on the 13 and 14 *Car.* II. c. 12. yet they must derive their Authority from the former Law. Here are no *negative* Words, as in 12 *Car.* II. c. 25. s. 13. *as to the Price of Wines*, where the Words "*and at no other Time*," are added.

Ante 8.

\* Post.

It is also considerable, that this is a Thing which is not in the Power of the Parish to procure, and is therefore a Construction *ex necessitate*.



“ UNDER THE HAND AND SEAL OF TWO OR MORE JUSTICES;” or,

VI. *By whom, and how to be appointed.*

To be nominated and appointed by Justices of the Peace.

THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, *who have the appointing of OVERSEERS*, must be careful to choose such Men as in every Town, are fittest, &c. *Dalt. Just. 216. Chap. 73, s. 2.*

And in the *King v. Chardstock (ante 30.)* By PARKER, Ch. Justice. The Nomination is to be by the Justices, &c.

Sessions have not an original Power to appoint Overseers.

THE QUEEN *v. The Overseers of MALDEN REDBRESH. Hil. 10 Ann. B. R. VINER—Tit. SESSIONS OF THE PEACE, 347.* An Order is made at the Sessions, upon an Appeal against the Appointment of Overseers of the Poor, which was discharged, and a new Appointment was made of other Persons.

POWELL, Justice.—There must be two substantial Inhabitants appointed, and if these are discharged at the Sessions, it must go back again to appoint others; but the Order was quashed for a Fault in the Caption.

And in THE KING *v. GREAT MARLOW, (ante 31.)* Two Justices appoint A. and B. Overseers.—On Appeal, suggesting that C. had a Majority of the Parishioners, the Sessions appoint B. and C. Overseers. It being objected, that Justices at Sessions could make no new Appointment, the Court ordered it to be quashed.

THE KING *v. FLAG and CHELMERTON, Inhabitants of.—Mich. 13 Geo. B. R. Fol. 7.—Mr. Parker* moved to quash Orders for the Appointment of two Persons to be Overseers of the Poor of these two Villis. The first Order was made by two Justices of the Peace, to appoint two Persons Overseers of the Poor of these two Villis; they appeal to the Sessions; the Sessions appoint, that these two Villis, shall choose several Overseers for the future, and that they shall collect severally in their Villis; and when they have collected, then to distribute those Assessments jointly as before; and confirmed the Order of Justices.

The first Order of Justices was quashed, because it was not mentioned, that these two were substantial Inhabitants or Householders.

Sessions have no original Jurisdiction to appoint Overseers.

The Order of Sessions was quashed, because the Sessions had no original Jurisdiction to appoint Overseers.

\* Sect. 6.

And Doctor BURN observes,—that the Reason is, because the Statute gives a Power of appealing to the Sessions against the Order of Appointment\*; which Power, by this Means, would be taken away.

Must be appointed under the Hands and Seals of two Justices.

THE KING *v. ARNOLD, Trin. 4 Geo. B. R. Str. 101.* At Nisi prius in Middlesex, before PRATT, Ch. Justice. Indictment against two Defendants, for that they being Churchwardens, and two others, Overseers, in making a Poor's Rate, &c.

Parol Evidence of such Appointment not to be taken.

The CHIEF JUSTICE held the Prosecutor, to shew an Appointment of the Overseers under the Hands and Seals of two Justices; as the Statute requires, and he rejected parol Evidence, because, he said, it must be produced, that he might judge whether it was a sufficient Appointment.

He



He quoted *Willoughby v. Dixey, C. B.* where a Will entered in the Spiritual Court Books to be delivered out to the Executor, was refused to be read, till Application and Refusal of the Executor was proved. And the same in *Sir Edward Seymour's Case* as to a Deed.

KING  
v.  
ARNOLD.

Defendant acquitted.

In the *King v. Butler, (ante 42.)*, where there were two Sets of Appointments of Overseers, one by two of the Corporation Justices of *Guilford*, and the other by the *Mayor* and one of the County Justices.—The 8th Sect. of the Stat. 43 Eliz. c. 2. was strongly relied on; which enacts that, “ Mayors, Bailiffs, or other head Officers of every Town corporate, being Justices of the Peace, shall “ have the same Authority within their respective Jurisdictions, either in Sessions, or out of it, as “ is given by the said Act to any Justices of the Peace; and no other Justice or Justices to meddle there.”

Mayor or Head Officer in Towns corporate, hath not the sole Appointment of Overseers.

This DUNNING, *Solicitor General*, argued, was to be confined to the Mayor, or other presiding Officer only; and that he alone has the Power of appointing Overseers, &c.

LORD MANSFIELD.—The Doctrine endeavoured to be set up is a very strange one.—What, shall a Mayor of a Town Corporate, (where there may be a dozen Parishes, where the Right of voting for Members perhaps may be by Scot and Lot; and he the Returning Officer,) shall he alone appoint all the Overseers in the Town? Had such a Power been ever dreamt of before, it must have been contested over and over, and would long since have been corrected by Parliament. The Statute only means to give Justices in Corporations and Head Officers, where there are no Justices, the same Powers as Justices in Counties; in Sessions (where there are Justices) as well as out of it.

N. B. In the *King v. Sparrow (ante 54.)* THE COURT said, “ The Stat. 2 Edw. VI. c. 4. requires two or more Justices; and yet 3. Inst. 136. it is held, that where there is but one Justice, he may execute the Authority.—The 43 Eliz. c. 2. being for the Maintenance of the Poor, must be construed liberally, and so said PRATT, Ch. J. &c.

THE KING v. FORREST, and others. Hil. 29 Geo. III. B. R. III. D. and E. 38. An Appeal was made to the Quarter Sessions of *Middlesex* by three Persons, on Behalf of themselves and others, *Parishioners* of *St. Pancras*, against a Warrant of Appointment made by four Justices, of *Thomas Forrest, John Powell*, and one *Jones*, to be Overseers of the Poor of the same Parish.—And a special Case was reserved for the Opinion of the Court.

The Parishioners, as well as the Persons appointed for Overseers, may appeal to the Sessions under the 43 Eliz. c. 2. against the Appointment.—Where an Act of Parliament empowers two Justices of the Peace to execute a judicial Act, they must meet and execute it together: therefore an Appointment of Overseers under 43 Eliz. signed by two Justices separately, is bad.

The Appellants exhibited their Petition and Appeal, setting forth, that the Parishioners of *St. Pancras* had always been accustomed to assemble in open Vestry, on Tuesday in Easter Week, in Pursuance of Notice given, for the Purpose of returning proper Persons to the Magistrates of the Division, to be by them appointed to the Office of Churchwardens, Overseers, and Constables. That there being three Divisions with a separate Overseer for each, and two or more Persons having always been nominated for each Division, the Parishioners had always proceeded to make their Election by voting; and on a Return being made by the Vestry Clerk of the Proceedings to the Magistrates, they had invariably appointed such Persons as had the Majority of Votes. That on Tuesday in last Easter Week, a Number of Parishioners attended, and six Persons were put in Nomination for the Office of Overseer of the Poor, for the Year ensuing: That there appeared for one *Hall*, 136; for *Young*, 118; for *Forrest*, 94; and for *Powell*, 79 Votes; yet *Jacob Leroux*, Esquire, an acting Magistrate in the Parish, who attended the Vestry and voted, without waiting for the Return, signed a Warrant, appointing the said *Forrest* and *Powell*, together with one *Jones*, OVERSEERS for the ensuing Year; and then sent such Warrant to three other Justices, that they might sign it; and who separately signed the same at their respective Houses.

That the Appointment so made in Favour of the Persons in the Minority, being in direct Opposition to the usual Custom in the Parish, and without any Cause, inasmuch as *Hall* and *Young* were in every respect eligible to the Office; and the Warrant being also illegally signed, the Petitioners conceive themselves aggrieved.

On hearing the Appeal, it was objected by the Respondents, that no such Appeal from Parishioners not included in the Appointment, lay; which Objection was over-ruled.

It



KING  
FORREST, &c. v. It was admitted by the Respondents, that the *Warrant* was signed by *one* of the Justices, and then sent by him, to the *three* other Justices, who *separately* signed the same at their respective Houses; and that no *two* of them had signed it in the *Presence* of each other.

Whereupon the Court of Sessions vacated the Order of the Justices.

A Rule having been obtained to shew Cause why the Order of Sessions should not be quashed.

ERSKINE and MARRYAT in Support of the Order of Sessions, were stopped by the Court.

\*For the Parishioners to nominate Overseers, instead of the Justices, as directed by the 43 Eliz. c. 2. f. 1.

FIELDING and GARROW, *contra*, abandoned the Question relative to the Usage\*, which was stated in the Case, because it was in direct Opposition to the 43 Eliz. c. 2.—But made *two* Objections to the Order of Sessions.

*First*, That no Body but the Person who was appointed Overseer could appeal under 43 Eliz. c. 2. otherwise every *Parishioner* might appeal, and even upon separate Grounds; but it never could have been the Intention of the Legislature to open such a Door to Litigation.

*Secondly*, The Appointment was good, notwithstanding all the Magistrates did not sign it together.

\* Vide King v. Coln, St. Aldwin's, post.

In the Case of an Order of Removal, where the Justices are to examine into the Facts, and make an *Adjudication* with respect to the Settlement of the Party to be removed, it is necessary that they should *act together*, because they form a *Court of Judicature*, and pronounce a *Judgment*\*: But that is different from the present Case, where the signing the Appointment is a mere *ministerial Act*. No Examination of Witnesses takes Place; and they merely *approve* of the Nomination of *Overseers*, as they do that of *Constable*; which may be done as well when they are acting separately, as when they are together.

LORD KENYON, *Chief Justice*.—The Clause in the 43 Eliz. is conceived in the most general Terms. It enacts that, “if any Person shall find himself aggrieved, &c. he may appeal, &c.” A Case may reasonably be imagined to exist, in which the *Parishioners* would feel themselves aggrieved by the Appointment of *Overseers*, when we recollect the enormous Sums of Money which are received for the Relief of the Poor; as for Instance, if the Magistrates were to appoint Persons who were *insolvent*. As to the other Question: Perhaps at this time of Day no great Inconvenience would follow, from permitting the Appointment to be made by a *single* Magistrate. But we are to decide this Question on the Statute 43 Eliz. c. 2.; the first *Section* of which expressly declares, that the Overseers shall be nominated by two or more Justices of the Peace, *whereof one shall be of the Quorum*. Now these Words are very material in the Decision of a Question arising upon this Statute.—For though in modern Times all the Justices in the Commission (*except one*) are of the *Quorum*, yet at the Time when that Act passed, some Persons were selected on account of their *superior Knowledge*, and appointed to be of the *Quorum*. However, I do not wish to decide on that Sort of Argument: But it is admitted, that in the Case of *Orders of Removal*, they must *act together*; and for this Reason, “that they should assist each other, and that the Result of their Conference should be the Ground of their Determination.” Now I cannot distinguish *this Case* from *that*.—This is not merely a *ministerial Act*: If it were, like signing a Rate, that might perhaps vary the Question: But it is a *judicial Act*, wherein the Justices are to exercise a Discretion; and in order to make this a good Appointment, the Justices should have acted together.

Vide K. v. West, post.

Custom to elect Overseers by Parishioners, not good, being in Opposition to the 43 Eliz.

With respect to the Usage which is stated in the Case; no Question can be entertained about it.—Because, as the Statute 43. Eliz. commenced in the Time of legal Memory, no Usage can prevail to oppose it.

ASHURST, *Justice*.—The Justices in appointing *Overseers* do not act *ministerially*; the Statute has vested a *Discretion* in them, and they should *act together*. And, it being a Matter of *Discretion*, they should *confer together*, for the Purpose of a Communication on the Subject-Matter on which they are to determine: But this cannot be done when they are not together, and when no Conference can take Place. And, on the other Point, I agree with my Lord.

GROSE,



GROSE, *Justice*. — (a) The Usage which has been attempted to be set up in this Case, is contrary to the *Statute*. Neither can any Doubt be entertained on the Question relative to the Appeal. As to the other Point, I agree that the Justices should be *together* when they sign the Appointment. This is not a mere *ministerial* Act; if it were, the Justices would have nothing more to do, than to *confirm* the Appointment presented to them by the *Parishioners*; but they are to exercise a *Discretion* upon the Subject. And the general Rule is, that when an Act of Parliament requires the Concurrence of *two* Magistrates, they should *both act together*. This Point has been determined, not only in the Case of Orders of Removal, but in Orders of Bastardy also, in *Billings v. Prim* and another, in the Court of Common Pleas.—(*Post* Title BASTARDS.)

(a) BULLER, *Justice*, sat this Day for the Chancellor.

General Rule is, that when an Act of Parliament requires the Concurrence of *two* Magistrates, they should *both act together*.

Rule discharged.

Order of Sessions, quashing the Appointment, confirmed.



## VII. "WHEREOF ONE TO BE OF THE QUORUM."

2 Salk. 473. 4-  
5 Mod. 322.

Many Orders, &c. were formerly quashed, because it was not set forth therein, that *one* of the Justices was of the *Quorum*.

And notwithstanding the Statute 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12. s. 2. which required "*the Justices, on Appeal to them at their Quarter-Sessions, by Persons aggrieved by any Judgment of two Justices, to do them Justice, according to the MERITS of their Cause.*" And,

The 5 Geo. II. c. 19. stiled, "An Act to oblige the Justices of the Peace at their General-Quarter Sessions, to determine Appeals made to them, according to the Merits of the Case, notwithstanding Defects of Form in the original Proceedings."

These Words (*one of us being of the Quorum*) were considered so much of the *Essence* of the Order, &c. and *Matter of Substance*. As P. HOLT, Chief Justice. "For this being a *special Authority*, it *must appear* to be pursued.—2. Salk. 474." as to require another Remedy for the Omission of them: And therefore was passed.

The 26 Geo. II. c. 27. entitled, "An Act to confirm certain Acts and Orders made by Justices of the Peace, being of the *Quorum*, notwithstanding any Defect in not expressing therein, that such Justices of the Peace are of the *Quorum*."

Preamble.

WHEREAS Authority is given by divers Acts of Parliament, to two or more Justices of the Peace, whereof one or more are to be of the *QUORUM*: And whereas divers Acts, Orders, Adjudications, Warrants, Confirmations of Indentures, and other Instruments, done, made, and executed, by two or more Justices of the Peace, without expressing that they are, or that one of them is of the *QUORUM*, have been, and may be, for that Reason ONLY impeached, set aside, and vacated: Be it enacted, &c. That from and after the 24th of June, 1753, no Act, Order, Adjudication, Warrant, Indenture of Apprenticeship, or other Instrument, already made, done, or executed, or hereafter to be made, done, or executed, by two or more Justices of the Peace, which doth not express that one or more of the Justices, is, or are, of the *Quorum*, shall be impeached, set aside, or vacated, for that Defect ONLY, any Law, Statute, or Usage, to the contrary notwithstanding.

No Act, Order, &c. of two or more Justices, to be vacated for Defect only, in not expressing that one or more of such Justices are of the *Quorum*.

3 Burn.  
Vide K. v. For-  
rest & another.

The Necessity that *one* of the Justices making such Orders, &c. shall still, *in fact*, be of the *Quorum*, I conceive is not taken away by this Statute; though chiefly, if not altogether, done away by other Means, viz. by inserting all the Justices in the Commission (except one) in the *Quorum* Clause; which in modern Times hath been universally done, it probably not being found as necessary to select some Persons on account of their *superior Knowledge*, to be of the *Quorum*, as it might have been at the Time the Act of the 43d of Eliz. was passed.

Therefore, the only Justices of the Peace concerning whose Power to make such Orders, &c. a Question could have arisen under that Part of the Statute of the 43 Eliz. were those of Corporate Towns, whose Charters might contain no *Quorum* Clause, or where there was but one Justice of the *Quorum*.

And notwithstanding the 8th Section of that Statute, (*which vide next Chapter*), whereby is given to Officers of Corporate Towns, and Aldermen of London, the same Authority, within their Limits, as Justices of the Peace of the County, without saying that One of them should be of the *Quorum*.

ALBRIGHTON v. SKIPTON. *Eas.* 6 G. B. R. Str. 300. Upon an Appeal from an Order of two Justices (*one of the Quorum*) the Sessions, reciting that they had perused the Charter of Albrighton, and it not appearing thereby, that the two Justices were either of them of the *Quorum*, therefore they quashed the Order.



By the COURT. The Order of Sessions must be quashed; not for want of any Power in the Sessions, to look into the Jurisdiction of the Justices, for that they certainly have; but because that want of Jurisdiction, is not sufficiently alledged, since they might have a Jurisdiction, though it did not appear upon the Charter of *Albington*. The Sessions should have said in general, that it appeared to them, that the two Justices were neither of them of the *Quorum*, and that would have been good Cause to quash the Order of the two Justices. But now this is in Part remedied by

The 7 G. III. c. 21. which is intitled, "An Act to obviate Inconveniences which may arise with respect to the Execution of several Acts of Parliament, in such Cities, Boroughs, Towns Corporate, Franchises, and Liberties, as have only one Justice of the Peace of the *Quorum*, qualified to Act within the same;" reciting,

WHEREAS Authority is given by divers Acts of Parliament, to two or more Justices of the Peace, whereof one or more are to be of the *Quorum*: And, whereas many Inconveniences have arisen in such Cities, Boroughs, Towns Corporate, Franchises, and Liberties, as have only ONE Justice of the Peace of the *QUORUM*, qualified to act within the same: Be it enacted, &c. That from and after the passing of this present Act, all Acts, Orders, Adjudications, Warrants, Indentures of Apprenticeship, or other Instruments, which shall be made, done, or executed, by Virtue of any Act or Acts of Parliament, made or to be made, by two or more Justices of the Peace, qualified to Act within such Cities, Boroughs, Towns Corporate, Franchises, and Liberties, though neither of the said Justices are of the *QUORUM*; shall be valid and effectual in Law, to all Intents and Purposes, as if ONE of the said Justices had been of the *QUORUM*; any Law, Statute, or Usage, to the contrary notwithstanding.

ALBINGTON  
v.  
SKIPTON.

Two or more  
Justices, though  
not of the *Quo-*  
*rum*, impowered  
to carry certain  
Acts into Execu-  
tion, within Ci-  
ties, Boroughs,  
&c.



“IN OR NEAR THE SAME PARISH OR DIVISION;” or,

VIII. *What Justices are to be so considered, within the 43d Eliz. and, Whether an Appointment of OVERSEERS shall be good without these Words.*

Officers of Corporate Towns have within their Limits, the Authority of Justices of the Peace of the County,

and Aldermen of London.

A Parish extending itself into two Counties, or into two Liberties.

By the Statute 43 Eliz. c. 2. s. 8. it is enacted, *That the Mayors, Bailiffs, or other Head Officers, of every Town and Place Corporate, and City, within this Realm, being Justice, or Justices of the Peace, shall have the same Authority, by virtue of this Act, within the Limits and Precincts of their Jurisdictions, as well out of the Sessions, as at their Sessions, if they hold any, as is herein limited, prescribed, and appointed to Justices of the Peace of the County, or any two or more of them, or to the Justices of the Peace in their Quarter Sessions, to do and execute for all the Uses and Purposes in this Act prescribed, and no other Justice or Justices of Peace, to enter or meddle there: And that every Alderman of the City of London, WITHIN HIS WARD, shall and may do and execute, in every respect, so much as is appointed and allowed by this Act, to be done and executed by one or two Justices of Peace of any County within this Realm.*

And by the 9th Sect. of the same Statute, it is also enacted, *That if it shall happen, any Parish to extend itself into more Counties than one, or Part to lie within the Liberties of any City, Town, or Place Corporate, and Part without, that then, as well the Justices of Peace of every County, as also the Head-Officers of such City, Town, or Place Corporate, shall deal and intermeddle only, in so much of the said Parish as lieth within their Liberties, and not any further: And every of them respectively, within their several Limits, Wards, and Jurisdictions, to execute the Ordinances beforementioned, CONCERNING THE NOMINATION OF OVERSEERS, the consent to binding Apprentices, the giving Warrant to levy Taxations unpaid, the taking Account of Churchwardens and Overseers, and the committing to Prison, such as refuse to account, or to pay the Arrearages due upon their Accounts: And yet, nevertheless, the said Churchwardens and Overseers, or the most part of them, of the said Parishes that do extend into such several Limits and Jurisdictions, shall, without dividing themselves, duly execute their Office, in all Places, within the said Parish, in all Things to them belonging, and shall duly exhibit and make one Account, before the said Head Officer of the Town, or Place Corporate, and one other before the said Justices of Peace, or any such two of them as is aforesaid.*

Though these Sections do not strictly come within the meaning of this HEAD; yet, as creating or giving Power to Magistrates within limited Jurisdictions or Divisions; they are not wholly inapplicable, nor will they, I trust, be thought altogether improperly placed here.

It is now well known, that any Justice of the Peace of a County, is a Justice in or near the Parish or Division, for the Purposes in the Act; unless perhaps subject to the Construction put upon the Expressions in *Ashley's Case*, (*Post* 53.) viz. *the next Justice*: and which seems reasonable, and adopted by Lord Mansfield, in the *K. v. Loxdale*; it having been frequently determined, that these Words are only directory, and mere Words of Relation; as in an

*Ante* 26.

*Anonymous Case*, M. 8. W. III. B. R. 2 Salk. 473. Exceptions were taken to an Order of Removal, That it did not appear by the Order, that the Justices were of the Division, or that either of them were of the Quorum.

\* See *vide* 26 G. II. c. 27. *ante* 50.

The last was held a good Exception\*, but the first was over-ruled, for in that the Statute is only directory.



In *Eliz. Afbley's Case*, Trin. 9 W. III. B. R. 2 Salk. 480. Exception was taken to an Act of two Justices, because it was not said, that the two Justices *were of the Division*, BUT NOT ALLOWED: For the COURT held the Statute as to this, to be only *directory*, and not *restrictive*, or *qualificatory*, as that of the *Quorum*. And in the Report of this same Case, in 12 Mod. 138, the COURT said, This is but *directory*; for there may be *no* Justices of the *Division*. *Division* is not known in our Law, but of the *Counties* into *Hundreds*; and by *that* Expression, in that Statute, is meant to go to *the next Justice*, (*Vide K. v. Loxdale.*) And in 12 Mod. 546. By HOLT, Ch. J. Where an Act of Parliament says, Justices of Peace of such a *Division* shall do so and so, it is only *directory* QUOAD the *Division*, and any of the Justices of the County may do it. And in the

*King v. Sparrow*, as reported in 2 Sess. Cases, 140. on an Appointment of Overseers, LORD CHIEF JUSTICE said, "It has been held, that the Justices being of the *Division*, (*as the Statute mentions*), is only *directory*;" and in another Part of the same Case, he says, "Among the Rules laid down, 3 Co. 7. "for construing Statutes, ONE IS, that the Judges ought to give force to Remedies given by a Statute."

In the *King v. Loxdale*, (*ante* 26.) as to an Appointment of Overseers, LORD MANSFIELD said, As to the other Clause, to be nominated by the Justices *in or near*, &c. this is a *loose, indefinite* Expression. If a Justice lives *twenty Miles* off, *if there is none nearer*, he must be said to be *near*. It is a word of Relation. I do not see how this Clause could be construed otherwise.

The Words "in, near," &c. in 43 Eliz. are merely *relative*, and the Power thereby given may be executed by any Justice of the County, *if there is none nearer*.

Doctor Burn says, In some of the ancient Statutes, not now in Force, as particularly by the 22 H. VIII. c. 12. the Justices were desired to *divide* themselves, for the better Execution of the Regulations respecting the Poor. And thence came the Clause in the subsequent Statutes, that the Justices of the *Division* were to do such and such Things. But as there is no Law at present, which requires them to *divide* for the aforesaid Purposes, there is properly no *Division* in the Sense which the Statutes intended; and consequently it cannot be necessary to *set forth* now, that the Justices are *in or near the Division*.

Though as Doctor Burn has above observed, and all the Determinations on this Subject fortify his Opinion, that there are no such *Divisions*, and that it is not necessary to *set forth* that the Justices are *in or near the Division*; yet it certainly is prudent, for many obvious Reasons, so far to consider the Act of Parliament *restrictive*, as to get Appointments or Orders made by the *next* Justices; and which from the foregoing *dicta* of Lord Holt and Lord Mansfield, should seem *necessary*.



Now come we more particularly to consider the aforementioned Statute of the 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12. sec. 21. which recites, "That the Inhabitants of the Counties of LANCA-SHIRE, CHESHIRE, DERBYSHIRE, YORKSHIRE, NORTHUMBERLAND, the BISHOPRICK of DURHAM, CUMBERLAND, and WESTMORLAND,

" AND MANY OTHER COUNTIES IN ENGLAND AND WALES; or,

IX. *Whether other Counties than those named in the Statute, shall be taken to be within the general Words.*

*Warwick, not being any of the Counties named in this Statute, quare, whether within the Statute.*

*Hale inclined that no other Counties than those named were.*

*and in Mich. Term so ruled. Sed Vide same Case.*

*\* This Case does not appear any where reported.*

*It is said, that, for another Reason the Court gave Judgment, and did not rule that no other Counties were within the Act. Though Hale strongly inclined to think, that no other Counties were: sed vide next Case.*

SKELLINGTON v. NORTON. Trin. 27. Car. II. 2 Lev. 142. In Trespass, a special Verdict found this Statute, and that the *Parish* of *Kenilworth*, in the County of *Warwick* (not being any of the Counties named in this Statute) is a large Parish, having two Townships; but it is not found that it is so large, that *parochial* Distribution cannot be made; and the Question was, if the County of *Warwick*, not being named in the Statute, shall be taken within the general Words (and divers other Counties). And *Hopkins*, Serjeant, cited a Case to have been adjudged in C. B. that the Statute did not extend to other Counties than those which are expressly named; and to this, *HALE*, Ch. J. inclined, but the Court would see the Precedent before they would give Judgment; by which

They adjourned.

BUT afterwards, in *Mich. Term*, it was adjudged, that the Statute did not extend to any other Counties, but only those that are named therein. *Ibid.*

In *Freeman's Reports*, 401. the same Case is reported thus. *HALE*, Chief Justice, said—By the Words it seems to be intended for all Counties in *England*, because the Words are (or other Counties.) But *Serjeant HOPKINS* cited the Judgment in C. B. in the Case of *Wilson* and *Bonner*, between *Chipping-Campden*, and *Broad-Campden*\*, in Gloucestershire, where the Judges held, that this Act extended to no Counties but those named. *Ibid.* 412, it is said,

That, in *Mich. Term* afterwards, The COURT gave Judgment for the Defendant; because, though it was found to be a large Parish, yet it was not found (to be so big, that by Reason of the Largeness thereof, they could not reap the Benefit of the Act of the 43 Eliz.) according to the Words of the Statute; and for that Reason, the Court gave Judgment; and so did not positively rule, that no other Counties were within the Act, but those named: But *HALE* did now strongly incline, that no other Counties were within the Act, and said the Inconveniencies would be very great; for by that means the poor *Boroughs* would be charged with *Poor*, and the *Vills*, where Men of good Estates lived, but perhaps no poor, would be at no Charge at all.

DOLTING alias DOULTING v. STOKE-LANE, alias STOCKLAND. Hil. 11 Ann. B. R. Fol. 98. and *Fortesc.* 219. The Case was—A Person was born at *Dolting*, and by an Order of two Justices he was sent to *Stockland*, as the Place of his last legal Settlement, having been hired, and serving there for one whole Year; they appeal to the Sessions, and insist that he ought to be sent to *Brokeham-Lodge*,



*Lodge*, which was an *Extra-Parochial Place*, because he had lived there as a Covenant-Servant for many Years last past, and had had several Children there; the Sessions upon this quash the first Order, and he was sent to *Brokeham-Lodge*.

Chief Justice PARKER giving the Resolution of the Court.—

The Difficulty arises on the 13 & 14 Car. II. Chap. 12. s. 21, 22.

First Question is, Whether this Act be general, and extends to all the Counties of England?

I think it is a Mistake to say, that that Clause extends to no other Counties than those named, because the Words are express; for besides the Counties there particularly named, it goes on and says, and many other Counties in England and Wales; so that Wales must be excluded, if it be to be confined to the Counties named; so it must extend to all Counties.

Second Question is, If it be general, then, whether it be confined to Towns and Villages, or may extend to all Extra-Parochial Places, that are not so?

It is recited indeed, "that by Reason of the Largeness of the Parishes in those Counties named, and others, the Benefit of the 43 Eliz. could not be had:" But it does not say, that those Towns and Villages must be within Parishes; but that the Poor within every Township or Village, within the Counties aforesaid, shall be provided for, within the Township and Village wherein he inhabits, or wherein he was last lawfully settled; which shews it extends to all Towns and Villages in any County if they can't reap the Benefit of 43 Eliz. Therefore Extra-Parochial Places, though, perhaps, not within the direct View of the Legislators, yet are within the express Words; the Poor in every Town and Village. And the Justices may in Towns and Villages execute all the Power in Towns and Villages—as they have within any Parish or Parishes, by 43 Eliz.; the Consequence of which is, that they may be settled in these Places, and may be removed from them; and though there were no Officers before, yet by this Clause, the Justices may appoint standing Overseers, in these Places, to take Care of the Poor.

However, this Order of Sessions is naught, because this is not within a Town or Village, and therefore, though Extra-Parochial Towns and Villages are within this Law, yet not other Places, which are neither Town nor Vill. If it were said at *Brewcomb's Lodge* generally, and no more, that might be intended a Vill; but this is said to be a certain Extra-Parochial Place, called *Brewcomb's Lodge*; so that this may be but one House; for it must consist of several Houses and Inhabitants; so that it not appearing to be any more than one single House, it is not within the Act of Parliament, and so the Order ought to be quashed.

The last legal Settlement must be expounded, such Settlement as can be by this Act, &c. it is of Consequence, whether he can be sent back to this Extra-Parochial Place; suppose one go and live as a Servant in an Extra-Parochial Place, being neither Town nor Village, would this discharge him of all other Settlements? As he shall not stay where he is not settled, so he must go where he is last legally settled, where he could be sent; last is last in Law, and an Extra-Parochial Place, is the same, as if it were in Ireland.

The same Case in *Foley*.—Now if it was to extend only to those Counties that were named in the Act, it would not extend to one County in Wales, for none of the Counties named are in Wales; so that the Clause must be taken generally. Now, if this is a general Clause, the next Thing to be considered is, Whether this does extend to Extra-Parochial Places, or only to Townships and Villages within Parishes; but what was the Reason of that? It was because the Parishes were so large, as those Villages and Townships could have no Benefit of the Act of 43 Eliz. Chap. 2. without this further Provision had been made by this Act of 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12. So Extra-Parochial Places, though not being within the Purview of the Act of Parliament, yet being within the same Mischief, we are all of Opinion, that it ought to extend to Extra-Parochial Places: Then, if there can be no Settlement, there may be no Removal. But suppose there be no Officers in those Extra-Parochial Places, in such Cases the Persons who are aggrieved ought to complain to the Justices, and they ought to appoint Officers

DOLTING  
STOKELANE.

Statute 13 & 14  
Car. II. Ch. 12.  
extends to all the  
Counties in  
England and  
Wales, viz. as to  
appointing Overseers  
of the Poor  
in Townships,  
&c. where Pa-  
rishes are too  
large.

Extra-Parochial  
Places (if reput-  
ed Towns or Villages)  
are within the  
meaning of it.

Settlements may  
be gained in  
Extra-Parochial  
Places, and Over-  
seers appointed,  
if none there be-  
fore to take Care  
of the Poor.

But not if they  
be not Towns or  
Villages.

In such Case a  
Man must be  
sent to his last  
legal Settlement.

Vide Titles,  
Settlement by  
SERVICE, RE-  
MOVAL. Post.

Same Case as re-  
ported in *Foley*.  
Vide Mr. Far-  
mer's Argument  
in the K. v. Ut-  
terson, post.



\*K. v. Rufford,  
ante 8.  
K. v. Denham,  
ante 9.  
K. v. Belvoir,  
ibid. 9.  
K. v. Showler,  
ante 12.  
K. v. Tamworth,  
ante 13.  
K. v. Bedford  
Justices, ante 14.  
K. v. Peterboro'  
ante 16.  
K. v. Eyford, 19.  
K. v. Ronton-  
Abbey, ante 21.

cers, and the Justices ought to appoint *Overseers of the Poor*, as they do in other Places, pursuant to the Act of 43 Eliz. \* But although *Extra-Parochial Places* are within the Act, yet we think this Order ought to be quashed, because they have not brought themselves within the Act; for it does not appear by the Order, whether this *Extra-Parochial Place* was a *Township* or *Vill*, or what it was; and the Act only extends to such *Extra-Parochial Places*. It is said here, that he served as a *Covenant-Servant* for several Years, at a *certain Place*, called *Brokeham-Lodge*, which is only *one House*, and that this Clause does not extend to; but supposing he cannot gain any legal Settlement in this Place, yet whether his living there for several Years, he cannot after that go to what Place he pleases; and we think he cannot, for the Law takes Notice only of his *last legal Settlement*; and it is like this Case; suppose a Person would come into a Parish, not renting *ten Pounds a Year*, they refuse him; then he applies to the Place where he was last legally settled to give him a Certificate, they refuse so to do; then he goes into an *Extra-Parochial Place*, and lives some Years there; do you think this sufficient Reason for the Person to come and live where he pleases afterwards? No, sure, there is no Reason in that, for the Law takes Notice of his last legal Settlement; and thither he ought to be sent, if likely to become chargeable, so that we think he cannot be sent to *Dolting*, which was the Place of his Birth, but ought to be sent to *Stokeland*, as having gained a Settlement by being hired, and serving for a Year there; so we are all of Opinion that the Order of Sessions, which quashed the Order of Justices, must be quashed.

Hinam Vin.

CLIFTON v. CHURCHAM, Hil. 12 G. II. *Andrews*, 314. An Order was made by two Justices for the removal of a *Pauper* and his Children, from *Clifton* to the *Parish* of *Churcham*; which Order, upon Appeal, was quashed: And the Order of Sessions set out, that the Party was last legally settled in the *Hamlet* of *Hindham*, within the said *Parish* of *Churcham*, and that the said *Hamlet* hath distinct Officers of its own, and provides for its own Poor.

And it was moved by Mr. Taylor, to quash this Sessions Order, because by 43 Eliz. c. 2. a *Township* or *Hamlet* cannot provide for their Poor, or have proper Officers appointed: And the Statute of 12 & 13 Car. II. c. 12. s. 21. which impowers *Townships*, in large *Parishes*, to provide for their own Poor, extends only to the Counties therein mentioned, 2 Lev. 142. S. C. 3 Keb. 422. 460. 494. 539.

Act 13 & 14  
Car. II. c. 12.  
extends to all  
Counties.

But BY THE COURT, the Act of Car. II. extends to *all Counties*, it being equally beneficial to *all*; and the Counties there specified are mentioned only as Instances. And so LEE, Ch. J. said it was determined, upon great Debate and Consideration, in the Case of *Dolting* and *Stoke-lane*, which Case hath been ever since adhered to.

And he denied the Cases cited, to be Law: and said, that a *Pauper* may be sent to an *Extra-Parochial Place*, for which Officers are appointed.

The Motion was therefore denied.



It now appearing that this Act is general, and held to extend to all Counties in England, Wales, &c. and to Towns, Villages, and even Extra-Parochial Places, having the Reputation of Villages the next Part of it to be examined is,

“ BY REASON OF THE LARGENESS OF THE PARISHES, CANNOT REAP THE BENEFIT OF THE 43d of Eliz;” or,

X. *What Description of Parishes have been adjudged such, within the Meaning of the 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12.*

THE KING v. UTTOXETER, *Inhabitants of.* *Eas. 6 G. II. 1 Sess. Cases, 163.* Mr. Serjeant Birch took Exceptions to the Order of Sessions, made at Stafford, that three Villages should pay the Poor within those Villages, and that Uttoxeter (the Parish in which those Villages are) should pay its own Poor, within the Parish, exclusive of those Villages.

First Exception, That Stafford is not a County within the Meaning of 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12. which extends only to the northern Counties, and cited 2 Lev. 142. (*Skillington v. Norton, ante 54.*) 3 Keb. 422. 529.

Second Exception, That the Order is too general, for it ought to say, that this Parish is so large that it cannot come within the Benefit of the 43d Eliz.

Third Exception, That the Appeal of the three Villages is joint, which ought to have been separate, and the Villages in this Respect to be considered as Parishes.

Fourth Exception, That the Order that these Villages should maintain their own Poor, is also wrong, being joint, for by the Statute, every Vill must maintain their own Poor; and, cited Salk. 480. where it is held, that the Sessions cannot annex one Parish to another.

Mr. Wyrly. This being an Appeal from a Rate, the Sessions had no Power to consider any thing else, and could not bring this Matter in Question, for the Equality or Inequality of the Rate was before them, and they could not settle the Bounds of those Villages.

To which it was replied, that it was determined in *Dolting and Stoke-land*, that the Statute 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12. extends to all Counties. *Ante 54.*

Mr. Reeve said, by 43 Eliz. c. 2. Justices have a Jurisdiction on Appeal for Poor's Rate, and here the Appeal is by the Inhabitants of the three Villages, and the Sessions quash the Rate as to these three Villages; as to that ordering Part, that they should maintain their own Poor separately from Uttoxeter, it was a Matter not before them, for only the three Villages appealed.

As to *Stillington and Norton*, that has been determined otherwise since in *Dolting and Stoke-land*, where it was resolved, that 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12. would extend to other Counties than those named in the Statute; as to *Brokeham-Lodge*, it did not appear that there was more than one House, and as to a single House, the Court was of Opinion, that Justices could not appoint Officers, which was the Reason why they did not determine the Settlement.

Mr. Abney, on the same Side, insisted on the Case of the *Q. v. Dolting*; and so was the *K. v. Rufford*, *Ante 2.* where a *Mandamus* was granted to appoint Overseers.

Exceptions taken to Order of Sessions, that three Villages in the Parish of Uttoxeter, should maintain their own Poor, distinctly from the rest of the Parishes under the 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12.



As to the Exception that the Order is *too general*, it is sufficient.

As to the *third Exception*, "That an Appeal being *joint* is wrong," though every Man may have a separate Rate, yet they may join, because the Words of the 43d Eliz. c. 2. are *Party and Parties aggrieved*.

Mr. Serjeant *Birch*, in support of the Exceptions. The Case of *Dolting* stands alone, and nothing determined as to *Parishes*. As to the *second Exception*, it ought to appear that they are right.

In a common Order of Removal, it is necessary to shew it was upon Complaint. That the Justices *Quorum unus\**, that the Party was likely to become chargeable and removeable, and must adjudge the Place of his last legal Settlement; in the present Case, the *Largeness of the Parish is the only Point of Jurisdiction*.

\* Not so now.

In this Case, the Largeness of the Parish only Point in Question.

As to their paying *separately* from *Uttaxeter*, it ought to have been shewn, that those *Vills* had *Overseers*, a Case in *Salk*. 480. that Justices cannot annex and consolidate *Parishes*.

Mr. *Fazakerly*: It is now contended, that the 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12. extends to *all Parishes in England*, &c. which, if it should prevail, would make great Confusion, and alter the present Method, by dividing *every Parish* that has *Vills*. That the Statute is not general, appears by the Words, many other Counties; the Case of *Dolting*, &c. are no Authorities, because the present Case relates to *Vills* within *Parishes*, and the others are, that the Statute extends to *Places* that are not within *Parishes*.

They had no Jurisdiction to make this Rate *jointly*, and that was not a Matter proper for an Appeal, but should have stood a Distress; Officers of *one Parish* might as well have rated the *next*, for inequality, &c. are proper only for Justices inquiry, and they ought not to quash Orders, where the Parties had no right of Appeal.

Order only says, for *such Vills* OVERSEERS were duly appointed, but does not say how long, perhaps but a few Days before.

Mr. *Wyrly*: As at Common Law, no Provision was for the Poor, so all the Statutes made for that Purpose, are taken as Penal, and as laying a new Tax or Burthen on the Estates; and upon that Consideration was the Resolution in *Stillington v. Norton*. So the Exception, that the 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12. does not extend to the County of *Stafford*, goes on this Reason, "That inferior Jurisdictions ought to set out their Power; neither can they determine a Right which will affect the *Parishes* for ever, as that of the Boundaries."

\* LORD RAYMOND.

CHIEF JUSTICE\*: It is a Case of considerable Consequence, and we must have Copies of the Orders: The Reason of *Mandamus's* to appoint *Overseers* in *Extra-Parochial Places* was, the Poor in such Places should not starve: If a Parish is such a one, as "by reason of the Largeness thereof, the Poor cannot be so conveniently maintained, then it comes within the Intent of the Statute, and whether this Point ought not to be set out.

Mr. Justice PAGE: Where *Vills* are thus separated, it might bring *Ten Shillings* in the *Pound* on *one Vill*, that happened to have most Poor; it seems to put too great a Power in Justices.

ADJOURNED.

Justices on Appeal, not confined to quash or confirm the Rate appealed from; but they might make a new one.

*Trin. Term following*, 2 *Barnard*. 170. This Matter coming now on again, Judge LEE said, that he doubted whether the Appeal by the *three Vills* was not regular enough. Then as to the Power of the Justices upon Appeal, he observed, that it was certain, they were not confined either to quash or confirm the Rate appealed from, but they might make a new one; and he did not know whether they were tied up to precise Forms in their Orders.

The Statute which gives these Appeals, he observed, requires that they should be by the Party grieved, but he remembered a Case in this Court, which was determined upon Debate and search of Precedents; that an Order made on such Appeal would be good, though it did not appear upon the Face of it, that the Appeal was by the Party grieved; and the Order was confirmed notwithstanding such Exception.

Then as to the Form of the present Order, he did agree, that the Sessions had declared their Opinion in it, that the *three VILLS* ought to maintain their own Poor *separately*; but when there comes afterwards



wards another Clause in the Order, which seems entirely independent of the former Clauses, and in these Words, "And we do further Order, that so much of the Rate, as requires the PARISH OF UTTOXETER

" AT LARGE, to be any ways contributory to the Relief of the Poor of the THREE VILLS shall be quashed."

So that he did not see, why this Order was not a general Order.

For which Reason he thought it might be confirmed.

But the rest of the COURT inclined to be of another Opinion.

Accordingly the Matter was ordered,

To stand farther over.

2 Barnard. Where same Case is reported, 135, 170. and in 198. Mich. 6 G. II. The Chief Justice now delivered the Resolution of the Court upon this Matter. He said, they were all of Opinion, that one Part of the Order of Sessions was bad, which appointed Overseers over the three VILLS; because it did not appear, whether they intended to appoint them over the three VILLS jointly, or over each of them separately. But the rest of the Order was thought good. Accordingly the first Part of it was quashed, and the rest confirmed.

THE KING v. CRAKMARSH \*, Inhabitants of. Trin. 8 G. II. B. R. 2 Barnard. 1734. 458. An appointment of Overseers being returned upon a Certiorari.

\* This is one of the Vills in the Parish of the Uttoxeter.

Serjeant Birch took two Exceptions to it;

First, that it does not appear to be under the Seal of the Justices;

Secondly, that this Appointment of Overseers, is for the Vill, not for the Parish of Crakmarsh.

With regard to the first of these Exceptions, the CHIEF JUSTICE said,

That where a Coroner's Inquest is sent up into this Court, he did agree the Seals of the Jurors must be affixed to it, because there the Original itself is sent up; but here the Transcript only is returned, and as it is said to be under the Hands and Seals of the Justices, he thought it sufficient.

With regard to the second Exception, he said, that though the Statute of 43 Eliz. has been construed to extend only to Parishes; yet the Statute of 13 & 14 Car. II has been held to extend to Extra-Parochial Places; and that since that Statute, Overseers are to be appointed by the Inhabitants of those Places, equally as they were before by the Inhabitants of Parishes at large; and if they do not make such Appointment a Mandamus will lie to compel them to do it.

Judge LEE said, he remembered the Court was of the same Opinion in the like Case of this very Township, and there they founded their Judgment on the Case of the K. v. Stoke-lane.

Mr. Abney said too, in the Case of the King and Rufford, there was a Mandamus to the Justices of the County of Nottingham, to appoint Overseers, and they returned, that the Place was Extra-Parochial; but that Return was not allowed of; and he said, the Court was of the same Opinion in the Case of the K. v. the Inhabitants of Belvoir.

Accordingly the present Motion was refused\*.

\* Ante 9.

\* N. B. In the King. v. Uttoxeter (Post.) Mr. Bearcroft, in arguing against the separate Appointments, said, "As to the separate Appointment, said to have been confirmed by this Court in 1734, the Question was never before the Court; for upon searching the Office it appears, that the Order was filed the Day after the Certiorari was moved, and that no adverse Proceedings were had."

"Lord Mansfield. The Confirmation of the separate Appointments in 1734, is shewn to be no Authority: the Question does not appear to have been raised."

I therefore have introduced the above Case here, merely to shew how far, either way, it affected the Question before the Court, in the Case of the King v. Uttoxeter.



*Mandamus* granted to appoint *Overseers* for a *Hamlet*, where there never had been any before, under 13 & 14 Car. II.

THE KING v. WESTMORLAND, *Justices of. Trin. 19 & 20 G. II. 1 Wilf. 138.* Mr. Harrison moved for a *Mandamus* to be directed to the *Justices* to appoint *Overseers of the Poor* for the *Hamlet* of *Nethergraveship, Watsfield, and Churchfield*, (there never having been any *Overseers of the Poor* there before,) upon the *Statute 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12.* which gives Power to appoint *Overseers (in large Parishes)* in particular *Hamlets*, as the *Statute 43 Eliz.* does in *Parishes at large*; AND IT WAS GRANTED upon an Affidavit, that there was *Poor* belonging to this *Hamlet*, which were chargeable to the *Hamlet* of *Kirkland*, which could not remove them, because there were no *Overseers of Nethergraveship, &c.*

*Justices* ought not to appoint *Overseers* for separate Parts of a *Parish*, unless it appears, that the *Parish* is so large as to make it necessary to call in Aid the 13 & 14 Car. II; and then the separate Part must be shewn to be a distinct VILL.

THE KING v. MIDDLESEX, *Justices of. Trin. 27 & 28 G. II. Bott. 17.* On a Rule to shew Cause, why a *Mandamus* should not go, to compel the *Justices* to appoint *Overseers* for the *Township of Kentish-Town*. It appeared by the Affidavit, that this *Parish* has always had two *Overseers*: That a Rate has been made, as one Rate for the whole *Parish*; that their *Appointments* have been for the whole *Parish*, but that each *Overseer*, had collected and paid within his own *Division*; and if at the end of the Year, there is a Surplus in either of their hands, it is so much of it paid over into the hands of the other *Overseers*, as to make them both equal: They have one *Workhouse*; one *Overseer* looks over it one Week, the other the next. It was objected to this Rule, that it would dismember the *Parish*, which has been united to this Time: That when 43 *Eliz.* was made, and before the 13 & 14 Car. II. each *Parish* maintained its own *Poor*: That 13 & 14 Car. II. was made to accommodate large *Parishes*, where some Parts lay at a great Distance from others; and it was necessary for their Convenience, to have an increase of Officers: If that *Statute* was to extend to all *Towns, Parishes, and Villages*, the populous Parts of the *Parishes* would be most burthened, and the Out-parts of them, and the greatest Extent of Land, would be in a great Measure excused.

To intitle the Petitioners to what is now prayed, it should be shewn that they are such a *Parish* as cannot receive the Benefit of the 43d *Eliz.* without the Aid of the 13 & 14 of Car. II. It is not sworn that two *Overseers* are not sufficient. It does not appear that this *Vill of Kentish-Town* is not a distinct *Vill or Township*; so it is not brought within the 13 & 14 Car. II. It was answered, that this Writ determines nothing of itself, but is a means of trying this Fact, and that the *Justices* may try the special Matters\*. That this was so populous a *Parish*, that it required more Attendance than any in the North.

\* BULLER, J. in the K. v. Peterborough *Justices*, said, "The Court must have probable Ground laid before them, to shew that the Place is a *Vill*, or they will not interpose."

By the COURT. If this is a Case that falls within the 13 & 14 Car. II. a *Mandamus* is a Writ of Right, and the Court must grant it. It has been determined, that this *Statute* is not to be confined to the Counties mentioned in the *Statute*. This has never been considered as a separate *Parish*: the two *Overseers* have been usually appointed for the whole *Parish*: What is declared from the Affidavit shews that they can do very well under the 43d *Eliz.* without calling in Aid the 13 & 14 Car. II. for they have two *Overseers*, and the Methods they have used to collect their Rates, and to take Care of their *Poor*, is very just and reasonable.

To bring this within the *Statute*, they must shew this to be a distinct VILL.

We expected they would have shewn, that they had separate *Overseers*, maintained their own *Poor* separately, and had a separate Rate.

RULE DISCHARGED.

PEART and another v. WESTGARTH and another. Hil. 5 G. III. B. R. Burr. 1610. Upon shewing Cause against a *Mandamus* "to appoint four OVERSEERS for the whole *Parish* of STANHOPE, in the County Palatine of Durham," the Question was, Whether the several Districts within it, were one entire *Parish, Township, and Village*, within the intent and meaning of the several *Statutes* made for the Relief of the *Poor*; and for that Purpose have had, and of Right ought to have one joint Appointment of OVERSEERS OF THE POOR, for the joint Relief and Maintenance of the *Poor*, in and through-

out



out the PARISH; or, whether the said several Districts, being divided into six several Constableries, constituted four distinct and separate Townships or Villages, within the intent and meaning of 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12. s. 21.

PEART  
and another,  
v.  
WESTGARTH.

It was at the last Assizes at Durham, tried upon a feigned Issue, by the Consent of the Parties; and a Verdict was found for the Plaintiffs (with 1s. Damages, and 40s. Costs) subject to the Opinion of this Court, upon the following Case.

That from the 43d Eliz. to the 9th G. I. (1723) the Parish of STANHOPE had one joint Appointment of OVERSEERS OF THE POOR, of the said Parish; and during all that Time, the Poor of the said Parish, were jointly relieved and maintained by entire and general Rates upon the whole PARISH.

During the Time abovementioned, there were four Churchwardens and four OVERSEERS OF THE POOR; which four OVERSEERS were respectively nominated out of each of the four QUARTERS or DISTRICTS, within the said PARISH, called Forest Quarter, Newlandside Quarter, Park Quarter, and Stanhope Quarter, viz. one out of each of these Quarters; and in each of these Quarters there was one of the said OVERSEERS and one Churchwarden, who collected the Poor's Rates, in their several Quarters or Districts; but the Money collected by the several Churchwardens and Overseers was levied under one entire Assessment, upon the whole PARISH, and carried to one general Fund, and was applied to the joint Relief of all the Poor of the said Parish.

The Parish is twenty Miles in length, and eight Miles in breadth. The PARK, FOREST, and STANHOPE Quarters, are each a distinct Constabulary; and the NEWLANDSIDE Quarter, consists of three Constableries; but these three Constableries, compose and are considered as one Quarter only.

On the 17th July, 9 G. I. at the General Quarter Sessions, holden at the City of Durham, in and for the County of Durham, it was ordered, "That the several Townships or Constableries of STANHOPE, FOSTERLEY, NEWLANDSIDE, EASTGATE, and WESTGATE, should separately maintain their own proper Poor."

But the Motion for this Order having been opposed on the Behalf of the Constabulary of FOREST, was to be confirmed, unless Cause shewn at the next Quarter Sessions.

From that Time there have been separate Appointments of OVERSEERS OF THE POOR, for each of the said four Quarters or Districts; and each of the said Quarters maintained their own Poor separately; excepting that about twelve Years ago, two Townships or Constableries called Bishopley and Fosterley, within Newlandside Quarter, separated themselves from the rest of that Quarter, and have ever since had separate Overseers; and maintained their own Poor separately.

The Case further stated, that Orders of Removal had from Time to Time been made since the Year 1729, to the Year 1761, from one of the said Districts to another; and Appeals made by one Quarter against another, concerning Orders of Justices relating to the Poor of each.

The Question was general.—Whether the Plaintiffs were intitled to recover? But the particular Question debated was, Whether the several Places or Districts were one entire PARISH, TOWNSHIP, or VILLAGE; or, whether the said several Places, being divided into six separate Constableries, constituted four distinct and separate TOWNSHIPS or VILLAGES within the 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12.

This Case was first argued by WALKER for the Plaintiffs, and Mr. DAWSON for the Defendants. Mr. WALKER argued against the Division of this Parish into separate Townships.

He stated the 21st Sect. of 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12. which directs, that in the Counties of Durham, &c. where, by reason of the Largeness of the Parishes, they cannot reap the Benefit of the Act of 43 Eliz. c. 2. the Poor within every Township or Village shall be maintained and set on Work, within the respective Township and Village; and there shall be yearly chosen, according to 43 Eliz. c. 2. two or more OVERSEERS OF THE POOR, within every of the said Townships or Villages, who shall execute all the Powers for the Relief of the Poor within the said Township or Village, as the said Act directs.

And



PEART  
and another,  
v.  
WESTGARTH.  
\* Ante, 60.

And he insisted, that in Order to intitle themselves to a *Division*, it must be *shewn*, "That the *Parish* was so large, that they could not otherwise have the Benefit of the 43 Eliz. c. 2." To prove this, he cited the *King v. the Justices of Middlesex*\*, relating to the Inhabitants of *St. Pancras* and *Kentish-Town*. And he mentioned a Case of *East and West Bradfield*, near *Sheffield*, in *Yorkshire*: and he said, that in *Wolfsingham* Parish, (the next Parish, to this, and under the same Circumstances of *seven Constableries*;) a *Division* was made by *Consent*, not by an *Order of Sessions*.

It does not appear that this Parish cannot have the Benefit of the 43 Eliz. c. 2. The contrary rather appears.

There are no *Facts* to warrant this *Division*; nor can it be supported under the 13 & 14 Car. II. The *Sessions* had no *Power* to make it. Neither the *Sessions* nor the *Court* have *Power* to make a *Division*, but upon *Facts*, which shew the *Parish* to be so large, that it cannot have the Benefit of the 43 Eliz.

It shall be presumed, "That the Act may be put in Force;" unless the contrary appears.

He added, That it comes out, upon Experience, that *Parishes* are too small, instead of too large; and that the Legislature should rather, upon Principle, collect several into one, than divide one into several Parts.

Mr. DAWSON, *contra*, argued for the *Division*; premising that the present Point, has never been judicially determined.

The Question depends upon 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12. and 43 Eliz. c. 2.

The *Plaintiffs* ought not to recover: Because, *First*, The *Parish* is so large, as to be within these Statutes; and, *Secondly*, The *Sessions* had a *Power* to make this *Division*.

*First*, Though it is stated, "That this *Parish* was one entire *Parish*, from the 43 Eliz. till 9 Geo. I." yet it is also stated, that there were four *CHURCHWARDENS* and four *OVERSEERS*; one out of each *QUARTER*. Indeed, it is not expressly stated, "that it is a populous *Parish*." But this sufficiently appears by the *Circumstances*: And it appears that it was so, at the Time of making the Act of 43 Eliz.

The present *Order of Sessions* was made 9 Geo. I. for the separate *Divisions* of this *Parish*, to maintain their own *Poor*, unless Cause was shewn by the *Constabulary* of *Forest Quarter* at the then next *Sessions*. No Cause was shewn: And they have acquiesced under that Order, ever since; and have, now, maintained their own *Poor* separately, for forty Years.

As to the Cases mentioned on the other Side.—The *King v. the Justices of Middlesex*, was for a *Mandamus* to appoint *Overseers* of the North *Division* of *Kentish-Town*; but the *Mandamus* was denied; because it appeared, "that the *PARISH* could reap the Benefit of the 43 Eliz." And it did not appear, that the North *Division* of *Kentish-Town* was a *Township* or *Vill*. As to *Bradfield* Case, no *Order of Sessions* was made there, or any Thing done to support a *Division*. And, as to the *Wolfsingham* Case, it was given up without Argument.

Therefore, there has been no judicial Determination at all, as far as appears upon this Matter.

The COURT, upon this first Argument, thought the *Justices* had no *Power* to divide *Parishes*, (to fitter *Parishes* into Pieces, as *WILMOT*, *Justice*, expressed himself;) and,

LORD MANSFIELD said, he believed the Point of Policy was as Mr. Walker said, namely, "That *Parishes* should rather be larger than smaller, than they are."

It was ordered to stand for further Argument.

And it was again argued, by Mr. WEDDERBURNE, for the *Plaintiffs*; and Mr. CLAYTON, for the *Defendants*.

Mr. WEDDERBURNE enforced the Arguments which had been urged by Mr. WALKER, and observed that, all along from the 43 Eliz. to 9 Geo. I. the *Parish* had only one joint Appointment for the whole



whole Parish: so that it was manifest, not only that they *could*, but that they actually *had* for many Years reaped the Benefit of the 43 Eliz. And no Authority for this Division appears in the Case.

The Quarter-Sessions had no Power to make it.

The Truth is, that the *rich* Part of the Parish, want to separate themselves from the *Poor* Part, and throw the Burthen upon them.

Mr. CLAYTON, *contra*; inforced Mr. DAWSON's Arguments; and particularly that of the Division having been acquiesced under for forty Years; and the Annual Appointments of Overseers by two Justices having been accordingly, ever since the Year 1723.

LORD MANSFIELD said he had no Doubt on the *first* Argument.

The Policy of this Law of the 13 & 14 Car. II. was mistaken: It went upon a *wrong* Principle. The Divisions ought rather to be *enlarged*, than *diminished*.

As to the Question itself.—Consider *first*, What was done. *Secondly*, Upon what Foundation?

It ought to appear, "That there was an INABILITY in the Parish, to have the Benefit of the Act of 43 Eliz. Now here, *no* such Inability appears; but quite the contrary, for a great Number of Years: So that there is *no* Foundation for the Division."

The Acquiescence under it was upon a false Notion, "That the Sessions *had* such a Power;" which they had *not*. And there is no Inconvenience in setting right this wrong Usage which has obtained for forty Years.

In the Case of *Kentish-Town*, all the Judges held, "That the Foundation of such a Division of a Parish, must be an Inability of having the Benefit of the 43 Eliz."

Here the Foundation is wanting.

Therefore Judgment must be for the Plaintiffs.

WILMOT, Justice—also thought, that the larger the Circle, the better: Therefore it would be better to *enlarge* than to *lessen* the Divisions.

The Statute 13 & 14 Car. II. goes upon this Basis, "That the Parish is so large, as that it cannot have the Benefit of the 43 Eliz." This, therefore, is a Fact that ought to be quite *clear* and *certain*: Whereas on the contrary, it appears in the present Case, "That this Parish actually *had* that Benefit from 1602 to 1723, above 120 Years."

The Sessions do not seem to have had any Sort of Power to make such an Order; therefore their Order is a mere Nullity. It was not made upon any Appeal; but upon a Motion made on Behalf of some of the Quarters, and opposed by another.

The subsequent Usage for forty Years, cannot vary the Right. For, we cannot *presume*, "That *omnia ritè acta sunt*;" because we see that it was founded upon that Order of Sessions; and it does not appear that the Parish is so large, that it cannot have the Benefit of the 43 Eliz."

Therefore they ought to appoint running Overseers over the whole Parish.

By the COURT\*.

Judgment for the PLAINTIFFS."

THE KING v. BEEDING, otherwise SEAL, Inhabitants of.—Trin. 13 Geo. III. Cald. 90. The Sessions for the County of *Suffex*, upon the Appeal of *George Boughy, Esquire*, quash a Rate duly allowed, for the Relief of the Poor of the said Parish, and state the following Case:

That the Parish of *Beeding*, otherwise *Seal* is a large and extensive Parish, Part of which said Parish is called the Tithing of *Bewbush*: And that the said Tithing is twenty Miles from the Church of the said Parish of *Beeding* otherwise *Seal*, and that it cannot reap the Benefit of the Act of Parliament of the 43 Eliz. without Inconvenience: And that the said Tithing was rated generally to the Poor of the said Parish of *Beeding* otherwise *Seal*, at large, and not as a separate Tithing, till the Year 1758; when upon

PEART  
and others,  
v.  
WESTGARTH.

Policy of 13 & 14  
Car. II. mistaken.  
Divisions ought  
to be enlarged  
rather than diminished.

Inability to reap,  
&c. of 43 Eliz.  
ought to appear;  
but the contrary  
appearing here,  
there is no Foundation  
for the Division.

\* Denison and  
Yates, Justices,  
were absent.

To support the  
separate Division  
of a Parish under  
Stat. 13 & 14  
Car. II. it must  
appear clearly,  
1st, That the  
Parish is so large,  
that it cannot  
reap the Benefit



of 43 Eliz.

2d, That regular Officers have been appointed; And, 3d, That proper Levies have been made. A private Agreement will not alter the Law.

upon the Appeal of *Francis Smart, Gent.* an Order of Sessions was made in the Words following: It is ordered by this Court, *all the Parties consenting*, that the said Poor Rate be quashed, as to the Inhabitants of the *Tithing of Bewbush*, within the said *Parish*; the said Appellant, *Francis Smart*, hereby undertaking to pay the Churchwardens and Overseers of the Poor of the *other Part* of the said *Parish* of *Beeding* otherwise *Seal*, all Charges and Expences they have been at in regard to the Maintenance and other Expences of the Poor of the said *Tithing of Bewbush*, after a Deduction of what the Overseers of the Poor of the said *Parish* have received from any of the Inhabitants of the said *Tithing of Bewbush*, since *Easter* last; and also to enter into a Bond in a Penalty of 200*l.* to the said Inhabitants of *Beeding*, to save harmless and keep indemnified from Time to Time, and at all Times hereafter, the Parishioners and other Inhabitants of the said *Parish* of *Beeding* (except the said *Tithing*) from all Charges and Expences, that may happen to them in regard to the Poor of that *Part* of the said *Parish* of *Beeding*, called the *Tithing of Bewbush*; they the said Parishioners and Inhabitants of the said *Parish* of *Beeding* undertaking, not to rate or tax the said *Part* of the said *Parish* of *Beeding*, called *Bewbush*, towards the Relief of the Poor of the *other Part* of the said *Parish* at any Time or Times hereafter; and that different Officers shall or may hereafter be appointed to the said *Tithing of Bewbush*.

That from that Time the said *Tithing of Bewbush* has never been rated to the *Parish* of *Beeding* generally, but have separately maintained their own Poor: But it did not appear, whether there had been any Overseer appointed, or any Poor-Rate made for the said *Tithing* before the Year 1772, or not; when the Lands lying in the said *Tithing* were included in a Rate made by the said *Parish* of *Beeding*.

And it not appearing unto us, whether the Bond, mentioned in the said recited Order of Sessions was ever entered into or not, it is ordered, that the said Rate be quashed as to the said *Tithing*.

*Skillington v.*

*Norton, ante. 54.*

DUNNING and BURRELL shewed Cause in Support of this Order of Sessions; insisting that this Case had found *precisely that*, which, from the Report in 2 *Lev.* 142\*, seems to have been the only Requisite to Success upon that special Verdict, viz. "That the *Parish* is so large, that Distribution parochial cannot well be made."

That indeed, without an express Finding, the Situation of this Place, a little insulated *Tithing*, at the Distance of twenty Miles from the *Parish*, of itself evidenced the Inconvenience, and pointed out the Necessity of its being aided: That the Burthen upon *Parish-Officers*, who execute their Offices without any Recompence for their Trouble, was otherwise grievous and intolerable: That the Phrase of "reaping the Benefit of the *Stat. 43 Eliz.*" in the *Stat. of Car. II.* must mean a full and perfect Benefit; for that there was scarce any District so large, as to be incapable of being in some Degree benefited by it: And that here a full and perfect Benefit was stated not to be in their Power: But that in *Peart and Westgarth*, it appeared always to have been in their Power, and for a long Period actually enjoyed.

*Ante 61.*

As to the other Objection, that a *Tithing* does not fall within the Description of the Act; it was a Word of an Import much less vague than *Division*, the Term used in the Case of the *King* against the Inhabitants of *St. Giles's in the Fields*; that it had a known, definite, legal, Import, consisting of ten Families, with a proper Officer, when only three constituted a *Vill*, which was the very Phrase of the Act.

BEARCROFT, in Support of the Rule to quash this Order, insisted, that the Agreement of 1758, could not be considered as a legal *Division* of the *Parish*; that it was not the Act of the Sessions, but a mere Matter of Accommodation and Compromise between the *Tithing* and *Parish*, which could at most be no further obligatory than with respect to the specific Matter, than the Subject of Controversy; that the only legal Way of executing the Powers given by the *Stat. 13 & 14 Car. II.* was for two Justices to appoint Overseers for this *Division* separately: That unless at the Time of making the Rate, a legal Separation existed, the Rate was regular: That there was not a single Circumstance here



to shew *Inability*; and therefore the Case of *Peart* and *Westgarth* was in point: That the Object of the Treaty had been the private Purposes of an Individual, whose Property the *Tithing* almost altogether was, without the least Regard to the Public: For had public Convenience dictated the Measure, it would have been adopted Years ago, as well as settled then in a very different Mode.

KING  
v.  
BREEDING.

LORD MANSFIELD. Without going into the Doctrine upon the Construction of the *Stat. 13 & 14 Car. II.* which is laid down in *Peart* and *Westgarth*; there was no Pretence for quashing this Rate. The Order of the Sessions is every Way wrong. The Rate for the whole Division could only have been quashed; for it was by Agreement only, that this separate Division could exist, as such; and that Agreement has necessarily been abandoned in Argument, as never having been carried into Execution. The Rate, therefore, at the Time it was made, does not appear to be open to any Exception: And the true legal Way of raising the Question is, by appointing Overseers.

ASTON, *Justice*.—Whatever may be the Policy of the Act, it must appear clearly,

*First*, That the Place is so large, as not to be able to receive the Benefit of the *Stat. 43 Eliz.*

*Secondly*, That regular Officers have been appointed; and,

*Thirdly*, That proper *Levies* have been made: But there is nothing here, but an unexecuted private Agreement; the not enforcing of which, is probably an Inconvenience, felt by an interested Individual, but not affecting the *Parish* or the Public.

WILLES and ASHURST, *Justices*, concurring.

Rule absolute;

Order of Sessions quashed; and

Rate affirmed.

THE KING v. UTTOXETER, *Inhabitants of. Eas. 20 Geo. III. B. R. Cald. 84.* Two Justices nominated and appointed *John Ward, Stephen Wilcox, and Edward Cope, OVERSEERS of the Poor of the Township of Uttoxeter, in the County of Stafford*; and, by another Order, appointed *James Stubbs, and William Ford, OVERSEERS of the Poor of the Vill of Creighton and Stranshall, in the same County*; and also, by another Order, appointed *John Finnemore and John Goodrich, OVERSEERS of the Poor of the Township of Crakmarsh, in the same County*: Two Justices also appointed *A. B. and C. D. OVERSEERS of the Poor of the Township of Loxley, in the same County*. The Sessions, on Appeal by the *Inhabitants of the said Township of Uttoxeter*, confirm all these Appointments, and state the following Case:

An Appointment of separate Overseers for the Subdivisions of a Parish, cannot be supported; unless the Fact is expressly found, that the Parish would not otherwise receive the Benefit of 43 Eliz.

That the Parish of *Uttoxeter* is *five Miles in Length, and five in Breadth, and contains the Townships of Uttoxeter, Crakmarsh, Creighton, Stranshall, and Loxley*. The Town of *Uttoxeter* is a large Market Town, much burthened with Poor. The Townships of *Crakmarsh, Creighton, Stranshall, and Loxley*, are, in general, divided into considerable Farms.

The said Townships were and are one entire Parish; and did till the Year 1730, jointly relieve and maintain the Poor in and throughout the Parish.

It appears by the *Vestry-Book* of the said Parish, that from the Year 1643, to the Year 1703, Overseers have been elected for the said respective Townships in the following Manner, viz. Two Overseers of the Poor for the Town of *Uttoxeter*; one for *Loxley*; one for *Crakmarsh, Creighton, and Stranshall*; and one for the *Woodlands*. The *Woodlands* is Part of the Township of *Uttoxeter*. It does not appear, from the *Vestry-Book*, or other Evidence, that, from the Year 1703 to 1727, any Overseers were elected for the said Townships, but two Overseers were elected for the said Parish, and Sidefmen for the said Townships.

On the 10th of November, 1730, in Pursuance of a *Mandamus* from the Court of King's Bench an Assessment for the Relief and Maintenance of the Poor of the said Parish of *Uttoxeter*, upon all



KING  
v.  
UTTOXETER.

the Inhabitants and Occupiers of Land within the said *Parish*, was duly signed by two Justices of the Peace.

In *Trinity Term*, in the 5th and 6th Years of *Geo. II.* in the Year 1731, a *Mandamus* issued from the Court of *King's Bench* to the Justices of the County of *Stafford*; reciting, that there were divers Householders within the said *Parish* of *Uttoxeter*, able to contribute to the Relief of the Poor of the said *Parish*; and that there were no *Overseers* of the Poor of the said *Parish* appointed to make Rates on all and every the Inhabitants and Occupiers of Lands, Houses, and other Things rateable within the said *Parish*, for the Relief of the Poor of the said *Parish*, and ordering the said Justices, to appoint two or more *Overseers of the Poor* for the said *Parish* of *Uttoxeter*. In Pursuance of the said *Mandamus*, on the 30th of *July* following, two Justices of the Peace, for the County of *Stafford*, appointed two *Overseers of the Poor* for the *Parish* of *Uttoxeter*.

At the General Quarter-Sessions for the County of *Stafford*, held on the 5th of *October*, 6 *Geo. II.* and in the Year 1731, the Inhabitants of the *Vills* of *Crakemarsh*, *Creighton*, and *Stramshall*, appealed against the Assessment, made on the 12th Day of *August* preceding, for the Maintenance of the Poor of the *Parish* of *Uttoxeter*; and on full Hearing of Counsel, and Consideration of the Evidence given, as well for the said *Vills*, as for the *Township* of *Uttoxeter*, the COURT was of Opinion, that the Inhabitants of the said *Vills* of *Crakemarsh*, *Creighton*, and *Stramshall*, (for which *Vills* *Overseers* of the Poor had been duly appointed, and Poor's Rates duly made and allowed, before the making of this said Assessment or Rate appealed against,) ought to maintain, and accordingly did order that they should maintain their own Poor, distinctly and separately from the other Parts of the said *Parish* of *Uttoxeter*: And the COURT did further order, that such Part of the said Assessment or Rate appealed against, as charged the Inhabitants of the said *Vills* of *Crakemarsh*, *Creighton*, and *Stramshall*, for, or towards, the Maintenance of the Poor of the said *Parish* of *Uttoxeter*, in respect of what they hold or occupy within the said *Vills*, should be quashed and discharged; and the same was accordingly by the Court quashed and discharged.

The said Order, in *Michaelmas Term* following, was removed by *Certiorari* into the Court of *King's Bench*; and the Court of *King's Bench* in *Michaelmas Term*, the 6 *Geo. II.* ordered, that the Order of Sessions, as to such Part of it, as orders that, the Inhabitants of the *Vills* of *Crakemarsh*, *Creighton*, and *Stramshall*, in the *Parish* of *Uttoxeter*, shall maintain their own Poor, distinctly and separately from the other Part of the said *Parish* of *Uttoxeter*, be quashed for the Insufficiency thereof: And as to the other Part of the said Order, for quashing and discharging such Part of a certain Assessment or Rate made for the Maintenance of the Poor of the said *Parish* of *Uttoxeter*, as charges the Inhabitants of the said *Vills* of *Crakemarsh*, *Creighton*, and *Stramshall*, towards the Maintenance of the Poor of the said *Parish* of *Uttoxeter*, in respect of what they held within the said *Vills*, be affirmed.

1733.

In *Michaelmas Term*, in the 7th Year of *Geo. II.* a *Mandamus* issued from the Court of *King's Bench*, to the Justices of the County of *Stafford*, reciting, that there were divers Householders within the said *Parish* of *Uttoxeter* able to contribute to the Relief of the Poor of the said *Parish*; and that there were no *Overseers* of the Poor of the said *Parish*, appointed to make Rates on all and every the Inhabitants and Occupiers of Lands, Houses, and other Things rateable within the said *Parish*, for the Relief of the Poor of the said *Parish*; and ordering the said Justices to appoint two or more OVERSEERS of the Poor for the said *Parish* of *Uttoxeter*.

On the 15th of *April* 1734, two *Overseers* were appointed for the *Vill* of *Crakemarsh*, two other *Overseers* for the *Vill* of *Creighton*, two other *Overseers* for the *Vill* of *Stramshall*, two other *Overseers* for the *Township* of *Uttoxeter*, and two other *Overseers* for the *Vill* of *Loxley*; by five separate Appointments; each Appointment signed by the same two Justices of the Peace for the County of *Stafford*.

On



On the 27th of *May* following, a *Certiorari* issued to remove the said *five* Appointments in the Court of *King's Bench*, which were accordingly removed; and on *Saturday* next after the *Morrow* of the *Holy Trinity*, 1734, the said *five* Appointments were affirmed by the Court of *King's Bench*.

KING  
v.  
UTTOXETER.

Since the Year 1734, *Overseers* have been *separately* appointed for *each* of the said *Townships*, and the *Poor* of the said *Townships* have been *separately* maintained.

WALLACE, *Solicitor General*, DUNNING, and LEYCESTER, shewed Cause in Support of these Appointments; and contended, that it was not necessary to shew by Argument, that there was an *Inability* in this *Parish* to receive the Benefit of the *Stat. 43 Eliz. c. 2.* as it was stated, as it appeared from the Case itself, that they had not received the Benefit of it: That though, by that Act, no more than *four Overseers* could have been appointed, yet from the Year 1643 to 1703, there never were less than *five* appointed in this *Parish*; and that as *twenty* Years of this Period were antecedent to the *Stat. 13 & 14 Car. II.* it was evident from this Irregularity at that Time, that they could not have the Benefit of the Act of the 43 *Eliz.*; and that this was therefore, *probably*, one of the many Cases, that produced the Act of *Car. II.*

That the Court would also see *strong* Reasons, before they would be induced to interpose and overturn a Practice that had prevailed ever since the Year 1734, especially when fortified by such an Usage as is stated before the Act of *Car. II.*

BULLER, *Justice*. But should not the Case have *expressly* found, that the *PARISH* could not receive the Benefit of the *Stat. of Eliz.*?

DUNNING. If that Fact is to be collected from the Circumstances stated; if it arises, by Inference, from the finding, it need not be *directly* and in *Terms* expressed: That it was a Maxim to presume every Thing in Favour of *Orders*, though, as to *Convictions*, the Rule was otherwise: That in these last, unless enough is stated to prove them *right*, the Court takes them to be *wrong*; but that in *Orders*, unless enough is stated to prove them *wrong*, the Court will *presume* that they are *right*: That, from all the Facts stated, the clear Result in the Minds of the *Justices* must have been, that this *Parish* could not have the Benefit of the *one* Statute, without the Aid of the *other*: It may be said indeed here, that the *Districts* of the *Parish* are not *now* as they were *anciently*; but still the only Question is; if they are altogether of such a Nature and Extent, as proves their *Inability* unassisted, of reaping the Benefit of the *Stat. of the 43 Eliz.*; and then, as Trade and Population fluctuate, the Discretion of the Magistrate is to vary their Limits.

That the Case of the *King v. the Justices of Middlesex*, and of *Peart and Westgarth*, which would be relied upon on the other Side, were totally different from the present: That in the *first*, the Appointment of *Overseers*, and also the *Rate*, had been uniformly *joint*, and for the *whole Parish*, down to the very Time of the Question being moved; and in the other, down to the Year 1723. Ante 60.

That it was *evident*, therefore, that these *Parishes* must have had the Benefit of the 43 *Eliz.*: That there was no Argument to oppose to this in the *first* Case; and only a *modern* Practice in the *last*: But that the present Case came within the very Terms of the Resolution in the *King v. the Justices of Middlesex*; which were, that the *Stat. 13 & 14 Car. II.* applied only to *Parishes*, in which, at the Time of Passing that Act, the Benefit of the Statute of the 43 *Eliz.* could not be had: Which was, upon the Fact found, evidently the Case of the *Parish* of *Uttoxeter*.

That the *Mandamus* of 1733 had properly not been opposed: That no return to it is stated: And that, on the contrary, soon afterwards *four* separate Appointments appeared to have been made and confirmed in this Court.

That the Determination of this very Case, as stated in 1731, was decisive: As that Part of the Order of Sessions, which quashed the Assessment of *Vills* for the Maintenance of the *Poor* of the *Parish*, was affirmed: And, though it was also true, that that Part of the Order, which directed



KING  
v.  
UTTOXETER.

that the *Vills* should maintain their Poor *distinctly* and *separately* from the *Parish*, was quashed; yet that the *Court*, in doing this, went upon a mere *Defect of Form* in the *Order*, it not appearing from thence, whether the *Sessions* intended to appoint *Overseers* over the *three Vills jointly*, or over *each separately*: And that it had been the strong Inclination of *one* of the *Courts* (LEE, J.) to have affirmed the *Order generally*.

BEARCROFT in Support of the Rule to quash these Appointments, insisted, that the Case of *Peart* and *Westgarth* concluded upon the Question; it having been there adjudged, that unless *Inability* to receive the Benefit of the 43 *Eliz.* is *expressly stated*, the *Court* will take it to be otherwise.

That *there*, in the *Parish* of *Stanhope*, it was also in itself much more probable, that they *could not* have the Benefit of the Act; the Extent of that *Parish* being twenty Miles in Length and eight in Breadth; and this *only five* in *each*: And there the *Court* disregarded a Custom of *forty Years*.

\* N. B. This is the K. v. Crakmarsh, ante 59.

That as to the *separate* Appointment, said to have been confirmed by this *Court* in 1734\*, the *Question* was never before the *Court*; for, upon searching the Office, it appears that the *Order* was filed the Day after the *Certiorari* was moved, and that no *adverse* Proceedings were had.

LORD MANSFIELD, without hearing the other Counsel.

The Case of *Peart v. Westgarth* decides the Question.

The *Inability* to receive the Benefit of the 43 *Eliz.* must appear.

In this Case, though there were *separate* Overseers from 1643 to 1703, yet all the *Townships*, during that Period, *jointly* relieved the Poor: And the Case cited shews, that an Acquiescence for *forty Years*, will not alter the Law.

The Confirmation of the *separate* Appointments in 1734, is also shewn to be no Authority: The Question does not appear to have been raised: But *Peart v. Westgarth* is a *direct* Authority; and the Point was then very well considered: And there the *Court* thought, that the Policy of the *Statute* in the Time of *Car. II.* was a mistaken one; and that it proceeded upon a wrong Principle, and that it was much better, for the Purpose of maintaining the Poor, to *enlarge* the Districts, than to *narrow* them.

ASTON, WILLES, and ASHURST, *Justices*, concurring.

Rule absolute; and Order of Sessions, confirming  
The Appointments, quashed.

Where a *Parish* consists of several *Townships*, some of which maintain their own Poor, and have *Overseers* separately appointed, the *Court* will grant a *Mandamus* for the separate Appointment of *Overseers* for the remaining *Townships*. Where such a *Parish* has immemorially had more than four *Overseers*, that is a Proof that they cannot have the Benefit of the 43 *Eliz.* and en-

THE KING v. SIR WATTS HORTON, *Baronet*, and another, *Mich. 27 Geo. III. 1. D. and E. 374.* A Rule had been obtained last Term, calling upon the *Defendants*, who were *Justices of the Peace* for the County of *Lancaster*, to shew Cause why a *Mandamus* should not issue, commanding them to appoint *two Overseers* for the *Township* of *Pilsworth* in the said County.

The *Affidavits* grounding the Motion stated, that the *Parish* of *Middleton* consists of *eight* separate and distinct *Townships* or *Villages*, to wit, *Middleton*, *Thornham*, *Hopwood*, *Pilsworth*, *Birtle cum Bamford*, *Ashworth*, *Ainsworth*, and *Great-Lever*; each of which has immemorially had a *separate* CONSTABLE and Churchwarden.

That *Ainsworth* and *Great-Lever*, from Time immemorial, and *Ashworth*, for about *seventy Years*, have had *separate* Overseers.

That before the Separation of *Ashworth*, there was a *joint* Appointment of *six* Overseers, for the *six* *Townships*; *one* out of *each*, who made a *general* Rate or Assessment, for the Poor of all the *six* *Townships*; and that each Overseer acted within his own *Township*; but that, at the End of the Year, there was a *general* Settlement of all Disbursements, and the Expences borne equally by all.

That



That since the *Separation*, there has been a like *joint* Appointment of *five* Overseers of the remaining *five* Townships; who have acted in the same Manner, as before the Separation.

That the *Parish* of *Middleton* could not reap the Benefit of the *Stat. 43 Eliz.* in relation to the Maintenance, Relief, and Government of its Poor, on Account of its Largeness, being *fourteen* Miles in Length and *ten* in Breadth, and also on Account of its *great* Population, and because *three* out of the *eight* Townships, maintained their own respective Poor.

titles each Town-  
ship to have se-  
parate Overseers.  
Wherever there  
is a *Confraternity*,  
there is a Town-  
ship.

That the *Defendants* were requested at the last Annual Meeting, to appoint *two* Overseers for the Township of *Pilsworth*, which they refused.

For the *Defendant's* Affidavits were read, which stated, that the *Parish* of *Middleton* consists of *four* distinct and separate Townships, viz. *Middleton*, *Ashworth*, *Ainsworth*, and *Great-Lever*; and that the Township of *Middleton* consists of *five* separate *Hamlets* or *Precincts*, and not separate Townships.

Affidavits for the  
Defendants.

That the Rates and Assessments had been made *generally* for the Township of *Middleton* at large, and not for *each* separate District; and that the Overseer's Accounts had been made out in the same Manner.

*Erskine* and *Shepherd* shewed Cause against the Rule, and contended, that in Order to lay a Ground for the Court to grant the *Mandamus*, it would be necessary to shew *two* Things;

*First*, That this District of *Pilsworth* is a Township; and,

*Secondly*, That it cannot enjoy the benefit of the *Statute 43 Eliz.*

As to the *first*, it appears, that *Pilsworth* is only a *Hamlet*, which, with *four* others, constitutes the Township of *Middleton*, and is not a Township of itself; for it is stated, That the Overseers have been appointed, and the Assessments made, from Time immemorial, *generally* for the Township of *Middleton*, and not for the *five* Districts *separately*.

*Secondly*, It does not follow, that though *Pilsworth* should be a Township, yet that it must be separated. The Affidavits should have stated special Grounds, for the Court to see that *Pilsworth* was precluded from enjoying the benefit of the *43 Eliz.* but they only state generally, that the *Parish* of *Middleton*, of which it is a Part, cannot reap the Benefit of that *Statute*, without alledging any other Reasons than those of the *Largeness* and *Population* of the *Parish*; and that *three* Districts had already been separated from the other *five*.

In the Case of *Peart* and *Westgarth*, where the *Parish* was larger than in the present Instance, the Court did not think that a sufficient Reason for dividing it: And as to the Extent of its Population, no additional Increase is stated from whence any *new* Inconvenience has arisen: But, on the contrary, the Circumstance of the *three* Townships having been separated, affords a Reason for refusing the Rule, as the Number of Inhabitants in the remaining Districts must be considerably less, than that of the *whole Parish* before such Separation took Place.

The Township of *Middleton* has hitherto enjoyed the Benefit of the *Statute* of *Eliz.* without Interruption. And even in the Case of *Peart* and *Westgarth*, where there had been a contrary Usage for forty Years under an Order of Sessions, this Court was of Opinion, that, as the *Inability* of the *Parish* to reap the Benefit of the *Statute* of *Eliz.* did not appear, the Overseers ought not to be appointed by virtue of the *13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12.* In the Case of the *King v. Uttoxeter*, the same Rule was established.

It is stated in the *Affidavits*, that each of the *five* Overseers did the Duty of his particular District; the same Reason was relied upon in the Case of the *King* against the Justices of *Middlesex*, where Overseers had always been appointed for the *Parish* of *Kentish-Town*, which included *Pancras*; out of which latter Place *one* of the Overseers had constantly been taken, who did the Duty of that particular District. That it was urged as a Ground for dividing the *Parish*, but the Court said, that it was only an internal Regulation, and refused the *Mandamus*.



KING  
v.  
SIR WATTS  
HORTON.

BEARCROFT and COCKELL, *contra*, contended, that where there is a *Constable*, there is necessarily a *Township*. Here it is agreed on all Sides, that there is a *Constable*.

But what is decisive in the present Case is, that it appears to have been always necessary for the *Parish* of *Middleton* to have *five* Overseers, which is a Proof that it could not enjoy the Benefit of the 43 *Eliz.* which confines the Number to *four*.

They were then stopped by the Court.

ASHURST, *Justice*. This is a very plain Case. It has been argued against the Rule, that if the Court should grant a *Mandamus* to appoint *separate* Overseers for the *Township* of *Pilsworth*, one of the *five* remaining Districts, it will necessarily follow, that the others will be intitled to the same Privilege. But that Argument applies equally the other Way; for as soon as the other *three* Townships were separated, the remaining *five* had a *Right* to be so.

It is clear that the *Parish*, as a *Parish*, cannot have the Benefit of 43 *Eliz.* because it has always had a greater Number of Overseers than are allowed by that Act. Therefore, upon that Ground, as well as upon the former, that the *three* other Townships have had separate Overseers, I am of Opinion that the *five* remaining ones are also intitled to have them.

BULLER, *Justice*. The Parties applying for this Rule must necessarily make out *two* Points before they can succeed.—

*First*, That this is a *Township*. And,

*Secondly*, That it cannot have the Benefit of the 43 *Eliz.*

The *last* is the Point which has been most relied on: for, as to the *first*, it certainly is a *Township*. There may be a *Constable* for a larger District than a *Township*, but not for a *smaller*. The Doubt in many of the Cases, whether such a Place was a *Township* or not, has arisen where there was no *Constable*.

Then the remaining Question is, Whether the *Township* of *Pilsworth* can have the Benefit of the 43 *Eliz.*? What is a decisive Answer against that is, that the *three* other Townships have *separate* Overseers.

We must consider what is meant by the *Benefit* of the *Statute*.

It is, that the *Parish* may maintain their own Poor, as a *Parish*; for unless they can do it, as such, they cannot have the Benefit of the *Statute*. Now it is here stated, that *three* of the Townships maintain their own Poor; but unless they *all* join, they cannot reap the Benefit of the *Statute*.

It has been argued, that the Parties applying for the *Mandamus* should have shewn special Reasons to the Court, why they cannot have the Benefit of the *Statute*. But in fact they have done so: For they have stated the *Largeness* of the *Parish*, and its great Population, which Circumstances are not denied by the other side.

Independent of these Reasons, another Ground laid for the *Mandamus* is, that the *five* remaining Townships require *five* Overseers: If from Necessity they must have *five* Overseers to govern their Poor, that affords a strong Argument to prove, that even if these *five* comprehended one *Parish*, independent of the other *three*, yet they could not enjoy the Benefit of the 43 *Eliz.* which allows only *four* Overseers.

The Cases that have been mentioned were all rightly decided, but they do not apply to the present. As to the Case of *Peart* and *Westgarth*, the *Parish* had enjoyed the Benefit of the *Statute* of *Elizabeth* for one hundred and twenty Years. After such a Length of Time the Court said, that they must have shewn to them some strong Reasons to induce them to believe, that it could not be continued, before they would appoint Overseers in a different Manner for that pointed out by the *Statute* of *Elizabeth*, notwithstanding any intervening Custom for forty Years; but no sufficient Reason appearing, they directed one joint Appointment for the whole *Parish*.

Next,



Next, as to the Case of the *King* against the Justices of *Middlesex*, it appeared most clearly, that the Parish of *Kentish-Town* could have the Benefit of the Statute of *Elizabeth*. There were two Overseers appointed for the whole Parish, which was sufficient to answer the Purposes of the Statute.

KING  
v.  
SIR WATTE  
HORTON.

Then, as to the Case of the *King* and *Uttoxeter*, the Answer to it is, that the Parish did not shew that they could not have the Benefit of the 43 *Eliz.*

By the Court.

Rule absolute.

" WITHIN



" WITHIN THE SEVERAL AND RESPECTIVE TOWNSHIP AND VILLAGE;" or,

XI. *Whether a TOWNSHIP or VILLAGE shall be considered AS a PARISH, for the Purpose of maintaining its own Poor.*

In the Case of *Spittlefields* and *Stepney*, which *vide* at length (*Post*) *Title REMOVAL*.—The Pauper being settled at *Spittlefields*, (which is a separate *Township* in the Parish of *Stepney*,) was sent by *Order* to the Parish of *Stepney*. And *Stepney* not having appealed, the Court held it conclusive upon *Stepney*, and said, that Justices in their Orders, are not obliged to take Notice of the Divisions of Parishes into *Hamlets* and *Townships*, which maintain their own Poor *separately* and *distinctly*; and said, that *Stepney* here might have shewn, upon an Appeal, that the Person did belong to the *Hamlet* of *Spittlefields*, which might have been a reasonable Cause to discharge the *Order*; two *Hamlets* within a Parish are the same as two Parishes, yet *Churchwardens* are *Overseers* of the Poor of the whole Parish, (though so divided,) and have a Superintendency over the whole *Hamlets* and *Townships*. *Vin. Tit. Removal*, 468.

A *Township* or Subdivision of a Parish, should be considered as a PARISH, for the Purpose of maintaining its own Poor.—And an Order of Justices calling it a PARISH, shall be a sufficient Description. Justices of the Peace are not obliged to take Notice of the Divisions of Parishes into *Hamlets*.

THE KING v. KIRKBY-STEPHEN, *Inhabitants of*. *Trin. 10 Geo. III. Burr. S. C. 664*. Two Justices removed *W. B.* his Wife, and Children from the *Township* of *Kirkby-Stephen*, in the County of *Westmorland*, to the *Township* of *Wharton*, in the same County.

The Sessions, on Appeal, quashed the Order, and stated the following Case:

That the PARISH of *Kirkby-Stephen*, consists of ten different *Townships*, who maintain their Poor respectively, and have separate Overseers: Of which the said *Townships* of KIRKBY-STEPHEN and WHARTON are two.

That the Pauper was originally settled in the said *Township* of WHARTON, and rented a Tenement of 22*l.* per Annum, in the said *Township* of WHARTON for four Years, and lived upon it for three Years and upwards; and in the fourth Year, went to the said *Township* of KIRKBY-STEPHEN, to assist his Sister as a Shopkeeper; and lodged there with her upwards of forty Days; during which Time, he went daily to occupy and manage his Farm at WHARTON.

That he afterwards went to *Newport* in *Shropshire*, where he married, and had five Children; and being likely to become chargeable there, was removed, by an Order of two Justices of the County of *Salop*.

That sometime in February 1768, the Overseers of *Newport* brought the Pauper, his Wife, &c. with the said Order, to one *Petty*, then Overseer of the *Township* of *Kirkby-Stephen*; and delivered him the said Order: Who said, "that the Pauper did not belong to KIRKBY-STEPHEN, but to WHARTON;" and then went away, leaving the Order with the Overseer of *Newport* and the Pauper.

A Copy of this Order was admitted in Evidence by the Sessions, on Proof of Notice to the Overseers of KIRKBY-STEPHEN, to produce the Original; and which appeared to be directed to the Churchwardens and Overseers, &c. of the Parish of *Newport*, and to the Churchwardens and Overseers,



seers, &c. of the *Parish* of KIRKBY-STEPHEN, and to each, &c. stating that, upon Complaint, &c. of the above (*Officers*) of the *Parish* of Newport, they (the said Justices) did adjudge the lawful Settlement of the *Pauper* to be in the *PARISH* of *Kirkby-Stephen*, and accordingly ordered them to the said *PARISH* of *Kirkby-Stephen*.

KIRKBY-STEPHEN  
v.  
WHARTON.

That about a Week after the Time he was brought to KIRKBY-STEPHEN, as aforesaid, the *Pauper* went to WHARTON, and delivered the original *Order* removing him from *Newport* to the *PARISH* of KIRKBY-STEPHEN, to *John Hartwell*, who, he had been informed, was *Overseer* of WHARTON, who said "he would do nothing in it, till they had a Meeting;" and returned the *Order* to the *Pauper*.

That sometime afterward the *Pauper* was applied to by R. F. an Inhabitant of WHARTON, for a *Copy* of the *Order of Removal*: which the *Pauper* wrote, and gave him; which was the *Copy* read in Evidence.

That the *Pauper* remained in KIRKBY-STEPHEN, and was maintained by his Sister in the *Township* of KIRKBY-STEPHEN for near a Year and a Half; when, his Sister dying, he asked Relief from the *Township* of KIRKBY-STEPHEN.

It did not appear any *Appeal* was made against this *Order of Removal* from *Newport*: But the *Pauper* had that *Order* from the Time *Petty* left it; and was carried, together with it, by the *Overseers* of the *Township* of KIRKBY-STEPHEN, before Two Justices of the County of *Westmoreland*; where the *Order* was either left with the Justices, or delivered to M. T. one of the *Overseers* of KIRKBY-STEPHEN; the *Pauper* not having afterwards seen it.

Mr. WALLACE for quashing the *Order of Sessions* argued, that the *Pauper's* legal Settlement was in the *Township* of WHARTON, where his Tenement and Farm lay: His *House* was there, and not in the *Township* of KIRKBY-STEPHEN. And the *Township* of KIRKBY-STEPHEN are not precluded, by any Thing stated, from disputing the *Pauper's* Settlement, with another *Township* in the same *Parish*. The *Order* removes from *Newport* to the *PARISH* of *Kirkby-Stephen*; and the *PARISH*, it is true, have not appealed against it. But as the *Parish* at large consists of several *Townships*, it may be too late to dispute the Settlement being within the *Parish*: But there can be no pretence to say, that this should fix it in one of its *Townships* rather than another, and preclude that one from disputing it with another.

Mr. DUNNING and Mr. WILSON shewed Cause, on Behalf of the *Township* of WHARTON. They agreed that the legal Settlement was in the *Township* of KIRBY-STEPHEN; where the *Pauper* lodged, slept, and resided above forty Days; not as a casual Residence, but as a complete change of Residence, and from whence he was irremovable all the Time he was there. He had left WHARTON and changed his Residence, which was once there. But, be that as it may, they insisted, that the *Township* of KIRBY-STEPHEN was bound and concluded by the *Order of Removal* from NEWPORT to KIRBY-STEPHEN, unappealed from. This original *Order* calls KIRBY-STEPHEN "a *Parish*," though it is only a *Township*: But that Mistake will not vary the Law. They ought to have appealed: And upon an *Appeal*, they might have availed themselves of that Mistake, or of the Merits, if they had any. But not having appealed they are concluded, as against every Body, as against all the World.—And they cited *Viner Abridgm. Tit. Removal, 468*, as in point.

Vide P<sup>o</sup>  
REMOVAL.

Mr. WALLACE and Mr. MORTON contra, on the Behalf of the *Township* of KIRKBY-STEPHEN, urged, That the *Paupers* were never received by the *Township* of KIRKBY-STEPHEN; that the legal Settlement was clearly in WHARTON; that the merely lodging in KIRKBY-STEPHEN was a casual Residence, and could give no Settlement; and that the *Township* of KIRKBY-STEPHEN were not concluded by the not appealing from the original *Order of Removal* from *Newport*; the *Order* being directed to the *Officers* of the *Parish* of KIRKBY-STEPHEN.

BLACKSTONE, *Justice*. Thought this Case within the Rule mentioned in *Thackham* and *Findon*. (2 *Salk.* 459 \*.) "That an *Order* unappealed from binds the *Parish* upon which it is made, till another Settlement is gained." And he recited the Case of *Spitalfields* and *Bramley*.

• P<sup>o</sup>  
REMOVAL.

K

LORD



KIRKBY-  
STEPHEN  
v.  
WHARTON

LORD MANSFIELD. The original Order, made for the Removal from *Newport* to the PARISH of *Kirkby-Stephen*, must mean the *Township* of *Kirkby-Stephen*. The *Township* was as a *Parish*, for this Purpose of a Removal to it; the Poor within the *Parish* not being maintained by the *whole* *Parish*, but by the particular *Townships* to which they *respectively* belong.

The *Township* of KIRKBY-STEPHEN ought, in this Case, to have appealed: They could not get rid of this *Order* any other Way. And, if they had appealed, the Truth must have appeared: and when the *Facts* had appeared to the Justices, upon the whole Truth being disclosed, the Paupers might, in the End of the Enquiry, have been sent to WHARTON.

By the Court.

Rule discharged.

Order of Sessions affirmed.

Sir JAMES BURROW observes, That this Case is elsewhere reported, stating the Court to have *quashed* the *Order of Sessions*; but he assures that Reporter that he examined the Rule Book and found the Order "AFFIRMED."



XII. "If in any Place there shall be no such Nomination as is before appointed."

These are the Words of the Statute 43 Eliz. c. 2, by which it is enacted,

"Sect. 10. That if in any Place there shall be no such Nomination of OVERSEERS as is before appointed, every Justice of the DIVISION shall forfeit 5*l.* to the Poor of such Place, to be levied by the CHURCHWARDENS and OVERSEERS, or One of them, by Distress, by Warrant from the Sessions.

"If there shall be no such Nomination in *Easter-Week*, or within *One Month* after *Easter*. For the Clause doth not suppose, that no Overseers at all are appointed within such Place, but only not within such Time; for the Penalty is required to be levied by the Churchwardens and Overseers, or One of them." 3. Burn. 330.

XIII. Every Justice of the DIVISION shall forfeit 5*l.*

Here DOCTOR BURN again observes, that "this proceeds upon the Supposition of the Justices being obliged to divide; for in that Case the Appointment was to be by the Justices in or near the Division, and not otherwise: But now the Justices at large are all equally concerned; and therefore it seemeth, that this Penalty cannot now be levied on any particular Justice. But if in any Place no Overseer shall be appointed, a *Mandamus* will go to the Justices at large, to compel them to appoint."

I have not been able to discover that any Attempt was ever made to levy this Penalty, so as to raise the Question for a legal Determination; yet it should seem reasonable, that if Justices in or near any Parish, usually acting there on such Occasions; and, more particularly, if properly required, should refuse or neglect, they would make themselves liable to the Penalty within the Meaning of the Statute; which Construction Courts of Justice would perhaps be inclined to adopt, rather than drive Parishes to the Necessity of expensively suing out Writs of *Mandamus*, to compel Magistrates to do that which it was their Duty to have done without, under the Act of Parliament.



It now appearing,

FOR WHAT PLACES OVERSEERS SHALL BE APPOINTED ;

IN WHAT NUMBER ;

WHO MAY BE SO APPOINTED, AND HOW, IN THE ORDER APPOINTING THEM, THEY ARE TO BE DESCRIBED ;

WHEN THEY ARE TO BE SO APPOINTED, and

BY WHOM AND HOW :

The present *established* Form of which APPOINTMENT Doctor Burn has given in his very useful and excellent Work, already frequently referred to ; the next Thing to be observed is,

#### XIV. " THE APPEAL AGAINST THE ORDER OF APPOINTMENT."

By the 43d of Eliz. c. 2. sect. 6. It is provided, *That if any Person or Persons shall find themselves grieved with any Sess or Tax, or other Act done by the said Churchwardens or other Persons, or by the said Justices of Peace ; that then it shall be lawful for the Justices of Peace, at their general Quarter Sessions, or the greater Number of them, to take such Order therein, as to them shall be thought convenient, and the same to conclude and bind all the said Parties.*

It was formerly doubted whether an Appeal from the Order of Appointment would lie ; for,

In the QUEEN v. MOOR, ante 30. By HOLT, Chief Justice. By the Stat. 43 Eliz. Overseers of the Poor must be appointed by the Two next Justices of the Peace ; and an APPEAL will not lie ; but EYRE, Judge, doubted,

Probably because an Appeal was not given by the above Statute against the appointment, in express Words, the Chief Justice so held and conceived it not to be within the general Words, "*or any other Act.*"

However these Doubts have been long since removed, and the Jurisdiction of the Justices in Sessions, to receive and determine such Appeals, fully and in divers Cases recognized by the Court of King's Bench. And in the King v. Malden-Redbreth, (ante 46,) the King v. Great Marlow, (ibid.) and the King v. Chalmerton, (ibid.) that Court quashed Appointments made by the Justices in Sessions on Appeal: the Sessions having no original Jurisdiction to make such Appointments. And it is said, that the Reason is, because the Statute gives a Power of appealing to the Sessions against the Order of Appointment ; which Power by this Means would be taken away.

And in the 4th Sect. of the 17th Geo. 2. c. 38, intitled, " An Act for remedying some Defects in the 43d Eliz. c. 2." it is enacted, " That in case any Person or Persons shall find him, her, or themselves aggrieved by any Rate or Assessment, &c. or shall have any material Objection to such Account as aforesaid ; or shall find him, her, or themselves aggrieved by any Neglect, Act, or Thing done or omitted by the Churchwardens and Overseers of the Poor, or by any of his Majesty's Justices of the Peace ; it shall and may be lawful for such Person or Persons, in any of the Cases aforesaid, giving reasonable Notice to the Churchwardens or Overseers of the Poor of the Parish, Township, or Place, to Appeal

Vide this Clause as to Rate more fully under that Head.



" *Appeal to the next General or Quarter Sessions of the Peace for the County, Riding, Division, Corporation, or Franchise, where such Parish, Township, or Place lies; and the Justices of the Peace there assembled, are hereby authorized and required to receive such Appeal, and to hear and finally determine the same; but if it shall appear to the said Justices, that reasonable Notice was not given, then they shall adjourn the said Appeal to the next Quarter Sessions, and then and there finally hear and determine the same; and the said Justices may Award and Order, to the Party for whom such Appeal shall be determined, reasonable Costs, in the same Manner that they are impowered to do in Case of Appeals concerning the Settlement of Poor Persons; by an Act made in the Eighth and Ninth Years of King William the Third, intituled, an Act for supplying some Defects in the Laws for the Relief of the Poor of this Kingdom.*"

Appeal to the next Sessions.

Sect. 5. Provided always, That in all Corporations or Franchises, who have not FOUR Justices of the Peace, it shall and may be lawful for any Person or Persons, in any of the Cases aforesaid, where an APPEAL is given by this Act, to APPEAL, if he or they shall think fit, to the next General or Quarter Sessions of the Peace, for the COUNTY, RIDING, or DIVISION, wherein such CORPORATION or FRANCHISE is situate.

Proviso for Corporations not having four Justices, to appeal to the Quarter Sessions for the County.

N. B. The above Clause, in the 43 Eliz. leaves the Appeal at large, and may be had at any Time, not being restrained to the next or any other particular Sessions\*; and so it still continues, notwithstanding the above Statute, 17 Geo. 2. which directs the Appeal to be to the next Sessions; but not in negative words, that it shall be to the next Sessions, and not otherwise; so that both (as Doctor Burn observes) may seem to stand well together, and then the Statute 17 Geo. 2. will mean this, "That the Appeal against any Thing done or omitted by Overseers or Justices, in Cases wherein no Appeal is given by former Statutes, must be to the next Sessions only," because the Clause which gives the Appeal, limits it to such next Sessions: but in Cases wherein an Appeal is given by former Statutes, such Appeal may be to the next Sessions according to this Clause, or may be according to the directions of such former Statutes.

\* See Vide K. v. Butler, ante 42. Court refused to quash an Appointment of Overseers after their Year expired. In Cases where no Appeal is before given by former Statutes, it must be under this to the next Sessions; otherwise either under this Stat. to the next, or under such former Statute to any other Sessions.

And in Truth many Acts of the Churchwardens and Overseers may be so contrived, that they cannot be known before the next Sessions, and it would give them a great Opportunity of Fraud, if they might be safe from concealing such Practices, until the Time of appealing to the next Sessions should be expired. But then, if the Appeal be not under the 17 Geo. II. to the next Sessions, there is no Power to award Costs, under the 43 Eliz.



XV. *Who may appeal against such Appointment.*

The *Parishioners*, as well as the the Persons appointed for *Overseers*, may appeal to the Sessions, under 43 *Eliz.* against the Appointment.

In the *KING v. FORREST and others*, (*ante* 47,) an Appeal was made to the *Quarter-Sessions* by three Persons, *on Behalf of themselves and others, Parishioners of, &c.* and a special Case received for the Opinion of the Court of *King's Bench*.

And, on Argument, it was objected (among other Things) that *no Body* but the Person who was appointed Overseer, could appeal under 43 *Eliz.* c. 2. otherwise *every Parishioner* might appeal, and even upon separate Grounds; but it never could have been the Intention of the Legislature to open such a Door to Litigation.

LORD KENYON, *Chief Justice*. The Clause in the 43 *Eliz.* is conceived in the most general Terms. It enacts, "*that if any Person shall find himself aggrieved, &c. he may appeal, &c.*" A Case may reasonably be imagined to exist, in which the *Parishioners* would feel themselves aggrieved by the Appointment of Overseers, when we recollect the enormous Sums of Money which are received for the Relief of the Poor; as, for Instance, if the Magistrates were to appoint Persons who were *insolvent*.



XVI. Overseer refusing to take the Office.

THE KING v. JONES, *Mich. 14 Geo. II.* Indictment against Jones, for not taking upon him the Office of Overseer of the Poor.

Indictment lies against a Person refusing to take upon him the Office of Overseer of the Poor.

And on Demurrer—for the Defendant, it was objected—

First, It appears he was appointed the Officer, and the Statute requires no Oath; therefore he becomes the Officer, and it is absurd to say, he has not taken the Office; he is so by Appointment, without any Thing further; and the Statute lays a Penalty for Neglect of Duty, which they may proceed for; but not for refusing the Office, as against a Constable, who must take an Oath before he is a complete Officer.

Secondly, He is not indictable as for disobeying the Justices Order, for they have only a bare Authority to appoint, which they have done, and he is an Officer by that Appointment.

Thirdly, This is an Appointment to execute for a Year, which the Justices have no Authority to make; but it should be till another is appointed; for if Easter falls within the Year, new ones ought to be appointed; and it was so in fact here.

Fourthly, 'Tis said, the Jurors of the King, not for the King.

The Solicitor General, contra.—I agree that no Indictment lies for this at Common Law; because there is no such Officer; but by the Rules of Common Law it will; for when a Statute requires a Thing to be done or not done, a Breach of the Statute is indictable by the Rules of Common Law; here is a Neglect and Refusal to take the Office, which is confessed by the Demurrer.

Sir J. Strange.

Statute 43 Eliz. c. 2. supposes the Person to take the Office, and neglects it; but the Penalty is not for refusing to take it. The Penalty is but twenty Shillings, which cannot be supposed to be an Excuse for not executing it. The King v. Lane, *Mich. 5 Geo. II.* Indictment lies for refusing the Office of Constable, and said, that the Queen against Lacey, in *Salk.* was mistaken. The Penalty is not a Bar to other Proceedings. The Oath makes no Difference.

It is a proper Method to compel Obedience to Justices Orders, though the Authority is given by Statute, not by Common Law. The Justices can appoint only for a Year, and cannot till another is appointed. We could not proceed against him for Negligence in the Office, before he had taken the Office upon him.

LORD CHIEF JUSTICE. An Appointment for a Year is good; so held in the King against the Inhabitants of Marlow\*, *Trin. 13 Geo. I.*

Sir W. LEE.

As to the Jurors of the King, it would be well enough if it was so, but the Caption is for the King.

As to the principal Objection, it deserves Consideration.

The Statute says, "The Persons so appointed shall be called Overseers of the Poor."

Then the Statute gives Penalties for Neglect; now, if the Penalties only relate to the Neglect, then I think the Refusal of executing the Office will be punishable another Way.

\* Ante 31.  
Jurors of the King, good in an Indictment, especially if for the King in the Caption.

I see no Reason for a Distinction between a Constable and an Overseer, for when the Statute commands a Thing, the refusing to do it is by Law indictable, and I think the taking the Oath makes no Difference.

Mr. Justice PROBYN: They are annual Officers, and are to be chosen Officers for a Year; Non-acceptance of the Office is a Breach of the Statute, and therefore indictable.

The Statute says, shall be Overseers, &c.

The



The Oath of Constable is no Part of his Appointment; but, if he refuses taking the Oath, he is indictable.

It is a Contempt of the Justices Order, and as such would be indictable.

Mr. Justice CHAPPLE agreed, and therefore

Judgment, *unless Cause*, for the King.

2. Whether a Person appointed together with four others, for Overseers, is indictable for refusing the Office.

In an *anonymous* Case in *Viner*, Tit. POOR, 414. (*ante* 23,) it was moved to quash an Indictment against B. for that he, with four others, being appointed Overseers of the Poor of such a *Parish*, refused to take upon him that Office, &c. And,

By PARKER, Chief Justice; where more than four are added, they are not punishable by the Act, and they can only be added as *Assistants*.

POWELL, Justice. The Question will be, whether the Words of the Act will be any more than *directory*, or a Limitation of their Authority. In most of the *Parishes* about *London*, there are more than four.—But the Indictment was quashed for another Fault.



